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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

CAPTIVATING STATE:
YOUTHFUL DREAMS AND UNCERTAIN FUTURES IN KURDISTAN
This dissertation examines how Kurdistani young people experience contests of
values in a state shaped by sectarian political cultures during a time of trial and transition
for the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). The dissertation is based on approximately 20
months of ethnographic fieldwork (September 2015 - June 2017) spent among Kurdistani
youth, broadly defined as 12 to 30 years old, in secondary schools and fitness centers.
The ethnography presents interlocutors as co-theorists in conceptualizing the society and
state in which they live, through the use of descriptive vignettes, transcripts of
discussions, and lengthy interview quotes. Kurdistani interlocutors describe the push and
pull of living suspended in a “captivating state” in two senses of the phrase: One sense
refers to a state of feeling trapped for a variety of reasons, including displacement or
lacking resources to emigrate. The other sense of “captivating state” refers to the Iraqi
and Kurdistani states and the power they hold over the imaginations and affections of
their citizens. Throughout the ethnography, Kurdistani people negotiate the ethics of
staying or emigrating; debate descriptions of and prescriptions for state and civic order;
and express doubts and hopes for uncertain futures. By attending to interlocutors’
assessments of the “state of things” and strategies for generating hope, the ethnography
provides a view of ethical life in Kurdistan that centers young people and their moral
striving at the intersections of “sectarianism,” the “state,” and “values.”
KEYWORDS: Cultural Anthropology, Kurdistan, Iraq, Ethics, Youth, the State
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Preface
“Brother, don’t build your city of dreams. Help the people of this city to escape
even more sadness. We fantasise to forget our suffering. Imagination acts as a
shield in this city.” – Bakhtiyar Ali, I Stared at the Night of the City

In many ways, the Kurdistan Region Iraq (KRI) has a dreamlike quality about it.
It is not an independent state, but is, rather, an autonomous region subject to federal Iraq.
And yet it very much behaves like a state, increasingly so in the past couple decades.
Many people have desired an independent Kurdistani state, especially in the period which
this dissertation covers. And yet some of my interlocutors observed that an independent
Kurdistani state would be untenable because it would require more resources than the
Kurdistan Region could marshal. Some said independence would necessitate more
transparent and democratic governance than the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
is prepared, or willing, to undertake. For those skeptical of the KRG’s integrity or
political ambitions, Kurdish nationalism and talk of independence are illusions with
which the Kurdistani government continually captivates its subjects. Thus, the Kurdistan
Region is both always becoming and never becoming an independent state.
It is not enough to dream of statehood. To be received into the international fold
of states, that is, to receive the international political and financial support it would need
to survive as an independent state, the Kurdistan Region must demonstrate before an
international audience that it is “deserving” of statehood by Western or neoliberal
standards. When I first visited Kurdistan in 2012, it already had many markers of a
“successful” state. Cultural signs of the state, like a national anthem and flag, had existed
in Kurdistan since the early 20th century. More recent developments included political
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stability, increased sovereignty over its land and resources, and economic growth. In
2012, people pointed out to me all the new homes, schools, and businesses dotting the
landscape. In the Kurdistani capital city of Erbil, also called Hewlȇr, people talked about
luxury residential communities like “Dream City,” shopping malls, and restaurants, all
made possible by political stability and the flow of international capital into and out of
the KRI. For people with resources, this interwar period (2011 – 2014) in the Kurdistan
Region was a dream come true. The dream evaporated in 2014 when the Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria (ISIS or IS, also known as “Daesh” after the Arabic acronym) invaded
territories across Iraq and Syria, plunging the country into another cycle of war and
economic stagnation. It was during this difficult time that I carried out 20 months of
fieldwork in Kurdistan, from September 2015 to July 2017.
Although the conflict with the Islamic State devastated much of Iraq, it presented
the Kurdistan Region with further opportunities for enacting statehood. It temporarily
brought rival Kurdistani political parties together in a unified effort against the enemy
Islamic State. The Islamic State represented all the ways a majority Muslim polity could
go wrong, but which the Kurdistan Regional Government could make right. Whereas
ISIS was condemned for its massacres of minorities, the Kurdistan Regional Government
welcomed minorities and was praised as their protector. The KRI absorbed hundreds of
thousands of internally displaced Iraqis and refugees from Syria and supported them at
great expense. As Iraqi military forces fled, the Kurdish military, or peshmerga, occupied
territories long disputed by the Iraqi and Kurdistani governments. At the height of
Kurdish nationalistic fervor, approximately 92% of voters in a September 2017
government referendum supported Kurdistani independence.

xiv

For many of my interlocutors, however, dreams of Kurdistani statehood were met
with dread. Some of my closest acquaintances were neither Kurdish nor Muslim, but
rather members of minority populations, like Assyrian or Chaldean Christians. Many
were born and raised in Kurdistan, where their families had lived for generations. Others
had settled recently in the KRI, after they were displaced by violence elsewhere in Iraq or
in Syria. Some had led prosperous lives in urban centers with rich cultural and
intellectual heritages, like Baghdad or Damascus; they found Kurdistan stifling. While
many displaced people expressed gratitude for their refuge in the KRI, they also worried
about their minority status and lack of opportunities. How would the Kurdistani
government and the majority Kurdish society treat non-Kurdish and non-Muslim
residents?
A common topic of discussion among minority or displaced people I knew was
how to make sense of their lives in Kurdistan. Renewed violence had crushed many
individual dreams about possible futures, as well as hopes for a unified and peaceful Iraq.
For some, their sense of belonging and purpose owed much to a shared Iraqi national
identity. An independent Kurdistani state, however, would be the last nail in the coffin of
a unified Iraq. Exiled interlocutors often compared their present hardships with their past
ones. Their observations were tinged with nostalgia and sadness. They lamented the loss
of stability and national unity of the old Iraq that fell with former President Saddam
Hussein and his Baath regime. Although war and sanctions led to economic shortages,
displaced interlocutors recalled no shortage of good neighbors and friends in their former
homes. In the past, they enjoyed relationships enriched by ethnic and religious difference
and dignified by a shared Iraqi national identity. Their present interactions in Kurdistan,
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however, were thin in comparison. There was tolerance of diversity, but not flourishing.
Although some people recounted warm interactions and friendships formed across ethnic
or religious lines, others described microaggressions or humiliations in the allegedly
“pluralistic” environments in which they worked or lived. The prospect of an independent
Kurdistani state did not excite them, as it was not likely to be qualitatively better than
their present lives in the Kurdistan Region.
The people appearing in this dissertation are suspended in a “captivating state” in
two senses of the phrase. One sense refers to a state of feeling trapped for a variety of
reasons, including displacement or lacking resources to emigrate. The other sense of
“captivating state” refers to the Iraqi and Kurdistani states and the power they hold over
the imaginations and affections of their citizens. Whether interlocutors consider their
“country” to be “Kurdistan” or “Iraq,” many described a sense of feeling both pulled
away and drawn back into their country. Some people who expressed a desire to leave
simply did not have the resources or the ability to emigrate. Other interlocutors possessed
the resources but not the will; they chose to remain in their country and to work for a
better life for themselves and their families. Many people, however, inhabited a space
between, desiring to leave and desiring to stay. They speak of forces which constrain and
compel. They talk about dashed dreams, fragile hopes, and uncertain futures.
My interlocutors comprise two groups, or cohorts. The first cohort includes
teenagers, most of whom I knew through my research in their schools. The second cohort
includes young adults, people in their 20s and early 30s, ambitious “emerging adults”
who held university degrees and were focused on building their careers, and in some
cases delaying marriage. Members of both cohorts are positioned well-enough by wealth
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and status to entertain hopes of pursuing their dreams in Kurdistan, like opening a
business, or becoming a doctor or an engineer. But they also are experienced enough –
having lived variously through the First Gulf War, the sanctions era, the 2003 – 2011
war, and now the conflict with the Islamic State – to know that realizing their dreams
depends upon many factors beyond their control. War and politics foreclose many
possibilities, and social and family pressures pull people in different directions. In
contemporary Kurdistan, young people are presented with competing “ethical positions,”
with future-oriented narratives that instruct people to live in accordance with certain
values and goals. The cross-pressuring of different ethical positions is greater upon some
people than upon others. Many of my interlocutors were engaged in a struggle to meet the
demands of various ethical regimes while also pursuing individual dreams. Some lost
hope in dreaming altogether.
I use the language of “dreaming” when discussing both personal and national or
state aspirations because “dreaming” reflects the imaginative and ephemeral nature of
envisioning a future amid violence, precarity, and uncertainty. Dreams that occur while
sleeping and dreams formulated as conscious goals have much in common in present-day
Kurdistan. In waking life, just as in dream life, people find that they have little control
over the directions their dream takes. Although I am describing people who are engaged
to some extent in self-cultivation through envisioning futures, their ability to act can be
quite limited due to factors beyond their control. Because so much lies beyond the
individual’s control, there is a melding of the “fantasy” and the “real” in narratives about
nationalism, religion, or modernization.
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My discussion of “dreams” also takes inspiration from the magical realism of
Kurdish writer Bakhtiyar Ali, whose novel Ghezelnus u Baxekani Xeyal (Ghazalnus and
the Gardens of Imagination) I quote at the beginning of each chapter. Quotes are drawn
from Kareem Abdulrahman’s (2016) English language translation of the novel with a
different title, I Stared at the Night of the City. In his novel, Ali describes an expensive
neighborhood called “Nwemiran” (literally “New Princes” or “New Royalty”), which
resembles many of the luxury residential communities in Kurdistan, most famously one
called “Dream City.” The novel takes place in an unnamed city in the Kurdistan Region
that is dusty, crowded, violent, and morally corrupt. His protagonists – hardened
politicians, conniving middlemen, abused women, lovestruck poets, and naïve teachers –
wander the city in search of relief from material and existential hardships. Those who
find some peace do so through the imagination and enter a parallel dream world.
Although this dream world has profound effects on individual lives, the novelist suggests
that dreamers have little impact on the “real” world, whose politicians and city planners
can build only soulless approximations of the dream.
Like the characters of Ali’s novel, some people I knew in Kurdistan imagined
possible futures others criticized as “fantasy.” Many of my adult interlocutors had the
resources to emigrate and leave Iraq behind them, though few of them did so during the
time of my fieldwork. Some of my teenage interlocutors anticipated pursuing higher
education abroad and perhaps staying after finishing their degree, while others indicated
that they would probably return to Kurdistan. There was a sense of determination, even
desperation, not to give up on their country entirely. For some people, the “futures”
promoted by nationalist, religious, or secular ideologies turned out to be illusory, perhaps
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impossible. Nevertheless, people still desire “liveable” lives, to find what “good” remains
and to be “good” people. To skeptics, the efforts of many of my interlocutors may seem
like escapism, or living in privileged, parallel worlds: privileged to live one kind of life in
spaces like the university or the gym, and to live another with their family or religious
community. I suggest, however, that the sense of “living between” is a condition of living
in a transitional moment in Kurdistan, fraught with dreams and dread about possible
futures. It is also a condition of living in an increasingly value pluralistic society, as war
and displacement, migration, and diaspora returnees have exploded the diversity already
present in Kurdistan. By “value pluralism,” I refer to a context in which multiple values
circulate and compete; some values may be equally “moral,” but impossible to realize at
the same time. Political philosopher Isaiah Berlin refers to the moral dilemmas that result
from the fragmentation and incommensurability of values as “tragic” choices. We might
say they are “doubly tragic” in a time of war and deprivation when such choices are
painfully limited.
In this dissertation, I focus on interactions between Kurdistani people with
different orientations toward religion, nationalism, and modernization. These interactions
occur in the context of what is often described as “sectarian cultures” within a “failed” or
“failing” state. However, to attribute to “sectarianism” the myriad “failures” and
disappointments people suffer does not account for the other domains of life with
considerable power to shape individual values. I am referring to the “ethical” dimensions
of daily life, the mundane ways in which people respond to failure and disappointment. In
the encounters with state and sect described in this dissertation, we see a messy web of
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belief and doubt. We also witness interlocutors’ gradations of assent or dissent to identity
categories assigned by the state and by society.
I argue that we need a way of interpreting these kinds of encounters that focuses,
not on “sectarianism” as it has been conceptualized within anthropology of the Middle
East, but on the contests of values that occur when people desire different kinds of
political institutions and cultures that push back against the “sectarian” state. When
people pursue different “goods,” they bump up against not mere “ethnic” or “religious”
difference but “ethical difference,” signifying different values and value systems.
Contested “goods” are not merely theoretical, but, as anthropologists of “the good”
contend, central to many people’s lives. Throughout this dissertation, interlocutors
grapple with finding an acceptable, or one might say “ethical,” way of realizing certain
values and attaining certain goods despite enormous pressures toward other values and
other goods.
At the same time, anthropologists have critiqued the limits of concepts like “the
good” and “ethics,” especially in contexts of conflict and state collapse (Das et al. 2015).
It is true that one response to outward failures and disappointments is a turning inward, or
“cultivation of the self,” (Schielke 2010a; Al-Mohammad and Peluso 2012) which
Samuli Scheilke argues has dominated the study of Muslim worlds since the “ethical
turn” exemplified by Saba Mahmood’s (2005) work on “piety.” In striving to understand
moral life beyond the “grand schemes of Islam” (Schielke 2010a) and the “trope” of
“self-cultivation,” I center interlocutors’ own words, their articulations of the many
problems plaguing contemporary Iraq. People appearing in this dissertation are very
reflective about the failures of state and sect and about the power these institutions exert
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over their lives. I have organized the chapters according to repeated sayings I heard
throughout my field work. Unsurprisingly, the sayings reflect the generally negative
commentary so pervasive in Kurdistan at the time. They include phrases like “ma’sh
nȋya,” (“there is no salary”), a reference not only to the Kurdistan Regional
Government’s freeze on salaries owed to some 60% of the population, but also to the
general dysfunction of state and society.
One might ask, as some interlocutors do, what people are “going to do” or
“should do” about said dysfunction. Throughout the ethnography, interlocutors discuss
this problem, and I center their conversations as they are insightful co-theorists observing
themselves, their society, and their state. Failures, of course, do not obligate everyone to
act, as if people must “resist” in readily discernable, and romanticized, ways. Rather, this
dissertation is largely about “listening” to people speak about their disappointments, and
sometimes their hopes, while they wait for an uncertain “future,” or tragically, for “no
future”. My closest interlocutors at times expressed something like hopefulness that
resided in what might be called an “inner life,” whose content they shared only with their
closest friends and family, if they shared it at all. It would be “romanticizing resistance”
(Abu-Lughod 1990) for me to assert that these “inner lives,” in so far as they were shared
with me in fragments and moments, were “rich” in the sense of consciously formulating
alternatives to ineffective and oppressive systems of power. For this reason, I direct the
reader’s attention to my interlocutors’ words, often in the form of lengthy quotes or
transcripts of conversations, because it their own assessments about the state, hope, and
futures that comprise the ethical life with which this dissertation is concerned.
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As in Bakhtiyar Ali’s magical realist novel, some people effectively draw upon
the imagination, enabling them to be “hopeful.” Certainly, people with more material
resources and political connections seemed more optimistic about their future. They
responded to failures and disappointments by working with charitable organizations, or
they joined communities organized around self-improvement, like gym-goers and
bodybuilders. Some dreamed about improving their country, while others were looking
for temporary escape. But, for the many people lacking resources, it appears they are
“resigned” to doing “nothing.” Their “resignation” comprises much of the dialogue
appearing in this dissertation. Occasionally, through dialogue, study, and self-reflection,
people discover “bits of hope that nobody thought of,” as one thoughtful teenager named
Ashur observes at the end of his academic year.
Initially, I thought “alternative” practices and spaces, such as the private schools
and fitness centers in which I conducted research, were “pluralistic,” especially when
their founders or participants said so, often glossed in speech as “modern.” Rather, they
are spaces in which people were living “as if” – as if they could eliminate, or at least
minimize, the powers of state, sect, or family. Although contests of values occurred in
“pluralistic” spaces and influenced individual value-formation, the “winner” of such
contests was predetermined. In these allegedly pluralistic spaces, the hegemonic values of
a majority-Muslim society tended to prevail over attempts to introduce alternative values
or practices. For example, an attempt to teach a religious text in a more “neutral” way
that was deemed appropriate for a religiously diverse student body nevertheless
reinforced Islamic majoritarian values. Or a “modern” gym in which men and women
exercised together, and in which political party, ethnoreligious identity, or gender “didn’t
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matter,” nevertheless policed behaviors in the gym in familiar ways. To be clear, I am not
questioning sincerity of motives or evaluating the “success” or “failure” of anyone or
anything; I leave those assessments to my interlocutors.
In the following chapters, the degree to which individuals participate in ethical
self-formation and subscribe to any particular vision for a future Kurdistan varies greatly:
Some people find personal satisfaction through advancing a cause, while others suffer
failure and disillusionment. My interlocutors have faced incredible difficulties, and it is
remarkable that many of them have summoned the strength and courage to continue
striving for a good life for themselves, their families, and their country. Considering their
example, the dissertation’s conclusion contemplates how the cultivation of hope also may
benefit anthropologists. In her most recent “state of the discipline” article, Sherry Ortner
characterizes the anthropological work of the past couple decades as “dark anthropology”
due to its focus on “the harsh dimensions of social life (power, domination, inequality,
and oppression)” (2016:47). An unintended result of hyperattention to dark themes is that
anthropologists have neglected other aspects of human experience, such as the formation
and contestation of values, or conceptualizing and pursuing the “good” life. Even in
contexts of violence and suffering, such as “war-torn” Iraq, we find people engaged in the
daily, and often mundane, tasks which comprise “ethical life.” We even find people
cultivating hope. In an era of deepening inequalities and injustices and our preoccupation
with them, an anthropology of hope may guide us back to one of the central commitments
of our discipline: “the moral obligation to hope” (Geertz 2000) that our efforts can
contribute to better understanding, and thus, to a better world.
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Ch. 1: Ethical life in Iraqi Kurdistan
“If there is a dream city on this planet, it’s the one we are travelling
towards, but will never reach.” - Bakhtiyar Ali, I Stared at the Night of
the City

In the shadow of Dream City
In the city of Erbil, also known as “Hewlêr,” the capital of the Kurdistan Region
of Iraq, there is a gated luxury residential community called “Dream City.” Many Dream
City homes, with their palatial structures and eccentric architecture, are visible from the
adjacent, busy streets. Each new house strives to outdo the rest, with hodge-podge styles
ranging from terracotta Italian villas, to stark modernist mansions, to the extravagant
“White House,” which, as its name suggests, boasts a facade modeled after the official
residence of the President of the United States. Nearby, four- and five-star hotels tower
over the flat, arid city. These hotels host foreign dignitaries, international conferences,
and regional beauty pageants. People enjoy novelties available only in the newest, most
expensive establishments in Erbil, such as sushi, cocktails, and co-ed pool parties.
Across the street from these hotels, the sprawling Sami Abdulrahman Park offers
a cool, green escape from the dusty city. In Sami Park, men and women jog together on
the running paths, picnic in the gardens, and play sports. Anyone who visited Kurdistan
in its boom years (2011-2014) might have believed the hype: Erbil would be the “next
Dubai,” a phrase I first heard in 2012 when I visited the Kurdistan Region to conduct
preliminary dissertation fieldwork. And Erbil might have become the “next Dubai” had
the Islamic State (IS) not invaded Mosul in June 2014 and plunged Iraq into another
cycle of conflict, halting Erbil’s building frenzy.

1

The many unfinished construction sites around Erbil remind people of what Erbil
might have been. Their skeletal frames and sun-faded signs with architects’ mockups also
bitterly remind people of the ways the Iraqi and Kurdistani governments have failed
them, as Umut Kuruüzüm (2018) has documented. Just around the corner from the
luxury hotels is one such abandoned construction site. Large signs announcing the project
cover the entire perimeter fence, hiding the site itself from view. Perhaps it was this
privacy which appealed to the displaced Yezidi families who lived inside the perimeter.
Yezidi people are among Iraq’s dwindling ethnoreligious minority populations.
Throughout their history, Yezidi people have been maligned for their little-understood
religious practices. By their own count, Yezidis have suffered 74 genocides, including the
most recent one perpetrated by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). When the
Islamic State attacked Sinjar in 2014, tens of thousands of Yezidis fled north to the
Kurdistan Region of Iraq. While thousands of families settled in camps, other families
settled in the host community. Some of the Yezidis who fled to Erbil ended up in the
abandoned building site, squatting illegally in lean-to shelters made of construction litter.
Their camp lay in the shadow of an unfinished building.
“They need to know that there is someone caring about them, someone that loves
them,” Sara said to me as we drove to visit the Yezidi camp in June 2017. “Sara” was an
Iraqi Christian woman in her early twenties, displaced from the Christian village of
Qaraqosh. At university in Mosul, Sara had majored in English and aspired to earn a
master’s degree in English Literature. When the Islamic State invaded in 2014, Sara and
her extended family escaped to Erbil, taking only what they could fit in their vehicles.
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They lost their homes, land, and livelihood. The expensive agricultural equipment which
the family used in large-scale farming was destroyed by ISIS.
In Erbil, Sara was overworked. She taught all day at a private school, and in the
evenings, she earned extra money giving private lessons. She also responded to text
requests from her students when they wanted help with their homework, even late at
night. Sara helped her family with household chores whenever she could. She often
worried about her younger sister, who was pregnant with her second child. Sara, her
mother, father, sister, brother-in-law and their children rented a house together in the
increasingly crowded Ainkawa township. Ainkawa is home to generations of indigenous
Iraqi Christians, as well as recently arrived refugees and internally displaced people. Sara
and her father, also a teacher, supported their family with meagre salaries. When she
heard about the Yezidi camp, she asked herself, “How could I turn this opportunity
down?”
Despite being exhausted, Sara visited the Yezidi squatters camp on Fridays, the
first day of the weekend in Kurdistan (and in many other Muslim majority countries). In a
lengthy interview toward the end of my fieldwork, Sara told me,
I go [to the camp] and try my best, because I understand what it is to be in their
situation - not really, fully, because I did not lose family members, which is the
most important thing. I was thinking I would not be able to see them and not cry.
But when I went there, God gave me strength, and I felt joy. It is amazing how
they have these pure hearts. Being with them makes you feel more human. I try, I
try to treat them well and make sure they know I love them so much.
Along with a couple other volunteers, including her father, Sara taught the camp children
English and Arabic. (Yezidi people typically speak a variety of Kurmanji Kurdish, which
was not a language of instruction in any Erbil school.) Most of the children had missed
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multiple school years, and the volunteers hoped the students could learn enough to be
admitted to a government school for displaced youth.
Friday lessons were held in a large tent inside the camp. When we opened the tent
flap to enter, the escaping air felt hotter than the summer air outside. A lone mubarida
(water cooler) gurgled and spurted on generator power. Volunteers divided the students
into groups based on their abilities. A couple easels were used for teaching. One easel
displayed a hand-drawn map of Iraq, on which someone had located and written “Sinjar,”
the homeland these displaced families left behind. The territory is disputed, claimed at
times by both the central Iraqi government and the Kurdistan Regional Government. On
the hand-drawn map, the territory encompassing Sinjar was labeled “Kurdistan.”
Despite their best efforts, 16 out of 18 Yezidi students failed their government
school exams. Sara explained that her volunteer work was not just about helping students
continue with their education. “We want them to be socialized,” she said. Some of the
Yezidi camp youth told Sara they were upset by their treatment in government schools:
They told me when they had religion class, [the teachers] made them stay. I told
them if this happens again, let me know. I would talk to the person in charge of
the program. So it did not happen again. The rule is “Anyone who is not Muslim
go out” [from the Islam religion class] but [the teachers] did not let them out. The
problem about people here is they don’t have respect, especially about Yezidis
because they have misconceptions about what they believe in. But they are people
just like you, so treat them well.
Although a male volunteer sometimes took the male youth on excursions to Sami Park,
the girls rarely left the camp. “They are kind of buried in here,” Sara observed. She
complained that the teenagers, especially girls, married too young. “I want them to know
they can do something,” Sara told me. “It’s not only get married and that’s it. Also
education is important. Even if they get married, you have to teach your kids, you have to
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know things. I think they have been accepting the idea more.” Sara herself was reluctant
to marry because she did not want marriage responsibilities to interfere with her
volunteer work and teaching job.
While Sara felt comfortable encouraging the Yezidi youth about education, she
made it clear that she did not go to the camp to convert anyone to her religion. One day, a
Yezidi teenage boy wore a cross necklace to Friday lessons. Sara said to me,
Maybe they think that we are teaching them to change them, you know what I
mean? I would never do that. I will show them God’s love, and they can choose.
One of the Kurdish Muslim volunteers asked the boy, “Where did you get this?
Why are you wearing this? This is for Christians.” The boy said, “I know. I
bought it because I love Christians.” And we told him, “We love you too.” I think
we are both peaceful people who don’t want a fight. Even the other day they were
talking about marriage. If a Yezidi boy married a Muslim girl, his punishment is
death. But there is a possibility of marrying a Christian.
Sara said that the Kurdish male volunteer then offered to share an Islamic view of
Christianity with the Yezidi boy. She surmised that, while both Christians and Muslims
recognize Jesus as an important religious figure, perhaps Yezidis are not respected
because they do not have enough religious beliefs or practices in common with
neighboring religious communities. The most important thing for her was that the
displaced Yezidis knew they were loved. Her large, expressive eyes brimming with tears,
Sara concluded that her volunteer work had become central to her life:
They have struggled a lot and been through a lot. And this is the only thing I can
give: my love to them. And I think they appreciate it. They love me back, and I
feel like they are now an important part of my life. I don’t know how I will
survive without them now. Seeing them gives me hope.
When I last talked with Sara in 2017, she was struggling to hold onto hope: Her family
visited their hometown for the first time in almost three years. Seeing the rubble of homes
and churches pained Sara and her family, and they decided they could not bear resettling
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there. She also unsuccessfully applied for a scholarship to study in the United States.
Meanwhile, many of her foreign friends, myself included, returned to their home
countries. Her best friend and fellow teacher, Shams, moved to Turkey to earn a master’s
degree, leaving Sara feeling abandoned.
Eventually, Sara left her teaching job and joined a non-governmental organization
working with internally displaced Iraqis living in the Mosul area. She rarely shares
anything on social media, and her infrequent posts typically consist of inspirational
quotes like, “Don’t be afraid to fail at things that mean something. Be afraid to succeed at
things that mean nothing.” Or she posts about her NGO work: photos of Sara laughing
and running with a pack of children; videos of the countryside rushing past as she travels
between work sites; a photo of ruined buildings from the recent conflict with the Islamic
State; a photo of street scene in her home town - no people, just a lonely, wooden cross
with a small Iraqi flag attached.

Cultivating hope amid chaos

In the following chapters, I introduce the reader to many Kurdistani people, who,
like Sara, are striving to cultivate hope through practices of ethical self-formation during
a chaotic, transitional era for the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. In this section, I offer a brief
review of recent Iraqi history, particularly the events which have made cultivating hope
so difficult. Cyclical violence, tenuous political alliances, betrayals, and failed uprisings
characterize Kurdistani history of the past 50 years (and the past couple centuries, but
events of the past 50 years occurred within living memory of my older interlocutors).
Former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and his Baathist regime (1979-2003) destroyed
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thousands of villages, displacing tens of thousands of Kurdish people, and resettled those
villages with ethnic Arabs as part of an Iraqi Arabization campaign. Near the end of a
grueling eight-year war between Iraq and Iran (1980-1988), the Iraqi government also
waged war internally against its citizens: Tens of thousands of Kurdistani people were
killed in the Anfal (Spoils of War) genocide, most infamously in the chemical attack on
the Kurdish town of Halabja.
In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, prompting an international coalition, led by the
United States, to attack Iraqi forces in Kuwait and in Iraq (the 1991 Gulf War). For
Kurdistani people, an important outcome of this conflict was the coalition’s establishment
of a no-fly zone (NFZ) that banned Iraqi aircraft from entering the airspace over the
Kurdistan Region. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the NFZ protected the
Kurdistan Region from Iraqi forces (though not from internal conflict, as rival Kurdistani
political parties waged civil war in the mid-1990s and involved the Iraqi military at the
height of the conflict). Also in response to the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the United
Nations Security Council imposed economic sanctions on Iraq, which remained in place
(in various forms) until the 2003 invasion.
Many Kurdistani people welcomed the 2003 United States-led invasion, as it
deposed their enemy, Saddam Hussein, and dismantled the Baath Party. While the 20032011 Iraq War destroyed much of the country, the Kurdistan Region emerged from the
war in a stronger position, largely due to its Coalition allyship and protection. From 2011
to 2014, the KRI enjoyed a period of stability and rapid economic growth and anticipated
becoming “the next Dubai.” I first visited Iraqi Kurdistan in 2012 during this hopeful
boom era, when construction sites for new businesses, schools, shopping centers, and
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residential communities multiplied like mushrooms popping up across the landscape.
People spoke optimistically about their future plans, not imagining that the country would
soon be devastated by yet another war.
In June 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria invaded the city of Mosul and
surrounding territory of Nineveh province. Tens of thousands of people fled, including
Iraqi military forces. Many of the displaced people went to the north, to the Kurdistan
Region. In August, Daesh attacked the Sinjar area, home to a large Yezidi community, an
ethnoreligious minority whom Daesh branded “devil worshippers.” ISIS killed thousands
of civilians and abducted hundreds of Yezidi women, forcing them into marriages and
sex slavery. Thousands of people fled into the nearby mountains, where they were
besieged for days without food or water before U.S. airstrikes and various Kurdish militia
forces helped most of the stranded escape.
Kurdistani military forces (peshmerga) remobilized against Daesh and occupied
long-disputed territories claimed by both the Kurdistan Regional Government and the
central Iraqi government. With territorial expansion came hundreds of thousands of Iraqi
internally displaced persons (IDPs), as well as thousands of refugees from the war in
neighboring Syria. Before the conflict with Daesh, the population of the Kurdistan
Region was around 5 million people. During my fieldwork, that number increased to 7
million. Water and electricity shortages intensified. A protracted sovereignty dispute over
oil sales between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the federal Iraqi
government in Baghdad led to the cessation of government salaries which supported an
estimated 60% of its residents (Joseph and Sümer 2019). Economic stagnation followed,
and a widespread sense of despair settled over the KRI. Since the war against Daesh
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ended in late 2017, economic hardship and political disputes between the KRG and Iraq
have continued to plague the country.

Figure 1. Retired members of the Kurdish peshmerga at an informal reunion. Photo by
the author. 2012.
I carried out 20 months of fieldwork during this difficult and uncertain time. In
my last months in the field, I witnessed the buildup of anticipation for a Kurdistani
independence referendum. Political leaders said the referendum’s purpose was to gauge
support for establishing an independent Kurdistan. In September 2017, an overwhelming
majority of Kurdistani residents voted in favor of independence from Iraq, but the
international community did not support the referendum. In October 2017, Iraqi forces
invaded the oil-rich city of Kirkuk, retaking it and other disputed territories the Kurdish
peshmerga had gained during the war. Due to political infighting, the Kurdish forces
withdrew from the city. Days later, the Iraqi government announced it had reclaimed all
territories it held before 2014. The lack of international support for the Kurdistani
independence referendum, the subsequent invasion, and the loss of territory, particularly
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Kirkuk, humiliated the Kurdistan Region. One of my Kurdistani friends posted on
Facebook that she was glad that her father, who had died a few months prior, did not live
to see these events.
Some of the most disappointed Kurdistani people I met were youth, broadly
defined as ages 12 to 30. The generations born in the 1990s and 2000s were born into
conflict. Their childhoods were impacted by the First Gulf War (1990 - 1991); the
sanctions era (1990 - 2003); civil conflict between Kurdish political parties (1994 -1996);
and the Second Gulf War (2003 - 2011). It seemed that the recent period of stability
(2011 - 2014) had inspired hope in many people. When it all came crashing down in June
2014, some people’s lives were devastated suddenly, like Sara’s family or the Yezidi
squatters described earlier in the chapter. Others felt their hope slowly burning out.

Sites, methods, and positions
Before proceeding, I should explain further about my research sites, methods, and
positionality in the field. I spent almost two years living in the Kurdistan Region, from
September 2015 to July 2017, with the exception of five weeks in the summer of 2016,
during which time I traveled to Europe and took a “break” from fieldwork. Those five
weeks coincided with the month of Ramadan. Based on my previous experience, I did not
anticipate getting much research done during the long, hot days of fasting, and many of
my key interlocutors also traveled. During my “break,” I presented my preliminary
findings at two anthropology conferences in Europe, which proved helpful in rethinking
my research plan for the second half of my field work. In Kurdistan, I conducted field
work for approximately 20 months, including four months focused on learning Sorani
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Kurdish. My field work during these 20 months was challenging largely for two reasons:
The first is that I had less access to certain schools than I anticipated before going to the
field, which ultimately prompted me to reframe my research project. The second reason
is that my data collection occurred in fits and starts because I was sick frequently
throughout my fieldwork, with a (then) undiagnosed chronic health condition, in addition
to the usual illnesses one might expect during international field work.
Additional difficulties during fieldwork often concerned my researcher status and
my gender. When my husband and I moved to Kurdistan, we found housing with a
Kurdish family interested in renting out the top floor of their two-story home in “Kaysha
Nȋya,” a poor urban neighborhood allegedly settled by illegal squatters. Kaysha Nȋya
seemed like a traditional Kurdish village dropped into the middle of a city, with chickens
and children roaming the streets and tins of chunky, homemade yogurt for sale in an
elderly couple’s corner shop. To celebrate Jezhnȋ Qurban (the Feast of Sacrifice, ‘Eid alAdha in Arabic), our neighbors slaughtered a cow in front of their house. An endless
stream of visitors and reciprocal visits to see neighbors grounded me in the cultural
practices shared by many people in my field site: Intense socializing characterized by
hospitality, warmth, and humor. It seemed like an ideal place for language learning.
Nevertheless, one local university I sought a research affiliation with did not
approve of our decision to live in this area, perhaps owing to its “low” reputation. Taxi
drivers and new acquaintances reacted with surprise or laughter upon hearing where I
was living. The Kurdish security police (asayȋsh) seemed very reluctant to allow two
American citizens to live in this “backward” area. When we met with local security
officials to register our new residence, people questioned whether my husband and I
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might have ulterior motives. They expressed disbelief that my husband had “followed”
me to Kurdistan because I was pursuing a Ph.D. (and not the other way around). After
our meeting with the security police, our landlords confronted us about being “spies,”
saying they feared getting into trouble with the government. Why did I ask so many
questions? What did my husband “really” do? And how did I already know some
Kurdish? It was unusual for people to hear a foreigner like me conversant in Kurdish (at a
basic conversational level, acquired through an intense summer language program),
which says more about the paucity of Kurdish language learning resources in the United
States than my linguistic abilities. Instead, Kurdistani people were accustomed to
foreigners who worked in oil or natural resources industries or did humanitarian work,
and who lived in wealthier areas and did not interact much with local people. They rarely
learned more Kurdish or Arabic than a few greetings and basic phrases for transportation
and shopping.
In Kaysha Nȋya, our neighbors worried aloud about my being “alone” in the house
when my husband was away at his job teaching English. They asked me often about my
daily activities and who was present in the house. People also expressed disapproval
about my going to and from home unaccompanied and using taxis, especially in the
evenings when I worked at a fitness center across the city. I understood these were
concerns not just about my safety, but also about the potentially illicit relationships that
people feared our (male) landlords might form with me, which would scandalize the
extended family and the neighborhood. After two difficult months of disputes with
landlords and neighbors and some sexual harassment, it became clear to me that these
concerns were not unfounded; we decided to move to another area.
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For a few months, we shared a house and living expenses with an Assyrian
Christian Iraqi family in a newly constructed, gated residential community called
“International Village.” It was at the far outskirts of the city, where sections of the
roadway still had not been paved. International Village introduced me to another side of
life in Iraq: experiences of religious minorities, some of whom were native to the
Kurdistan Region and others who moved there after being displaced by war. We knew
little about our new neighbors, a diverse mix of busy professionals from inside and
outside Iraq, who lived quietly in their spacious homes removed from urban noise and
crowding. Some walked pet dogs, a novelty in an Islamic society in which dogs were
considered haram (forbidden). A small grocery store and cafe within the compound
offered imported foods and the convenience of not having to drive back into the city.
Residents of our new neighborhood did not socialize like in Kaysha Nȋya; living in
International Village was lonely compared to Kaysha Nȋya.
For the latter half of my fieldwork, we lived in an area called “Rapareen,” closer
to the city center. We rented the upstairs floor of an organization whose operations had
slowed as the conflict with the Islamic State deepened and foreign organizations recalled
their employees. Rapareen represented an older era, as some of my interlocutors
commented approvingly upon hearing that I had moved there. Rapareen’s population had
grown in the past decade through rural to urban migration and as people displaced from
elsewhere in Iraq resettled in the Kurdistan Region. A new, multi-story shopping mall
reflected the area’s development. Our neighbors were a mix of Kurdish Muslims,
Assyrian and Chaldean Christians, an Azeri Iranian family, and a Turkmani family; they
could attend a church or a mosque, both of which were located on our street.
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In Rapareen, Christian and Muslim neighbors visited during each other’s religious
holidays. Neighbors demonstrated necessary skills like washing debris and litter along the
gutter, how to (re)connect our home’s electrical wires to the giant pole we all shared, and
how to pay our water, electricity, and generator bills. People occasionally invited us into
their homes for a meal or party; they seemed to understand that our social visits were
limited because of our jobs and American lifestyle. At the risk of romanticizing, I
consider Rapareen and its residents as representative of the “pluralistic” and “tolerant”
Kurdistan I and many other people appearing in this dissertation wanted to see.
Living in three different types of areas in Kurdistan made encounters with
“pluralism” central to my research. Like many of my interlocutors, I daily crossed
“boundaries” between different frameworks for living in Kurdistan. Toward the end of
my fieldwork, when I thought I finally had a working map of the city and its possibilities,
a new acquaintance would invite me into their world, unchartered territory where the
field was suddenly new again. Anyone who has conducted fieldwork in Iraqi Kurdistan,
or any place with a high degree of sociality, knows how an ethnographer’s best-laid plans
can be redirected by others’ hospitality, sometimes fortuitously and sometimes
frustratingly. While moving frequently between wildly different spaces felt disorienting
at times, my specific research project would not have emerged without a willingness to
be carried along. The resulting project reflects my being carried along and encountering
different visions for the future of the Kurdistan Region and of Iraq. As the project took
shape, I focused on a narrower category of people defined by their common interest in
ethical self-formation and encounters with “ethical difference.”
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Before I discuss “ethical difference” and my theoretical framework, I need to
explain my research permissions, how my research unfolded, what data it yielded, and
what limitations it presented. My approved research protocol with the Institutional
Review Board (IRB) at the University of Kentucky permitted me to collect data
according to the following conditions: I was allowed to observe, informally converse
with, and conduct formal interviews with children aged 12 and older. Obtaining informed
consent with children involved reading an approved script and obtaining their verbal
assent. The script made clear that I would not share information they provided me with
anyone else, including their teachers and parents, unless that information concerned their
safety (e.g., self-harm); thankfully, the need to alert an adult to such a situation never
arose. Interviews with children typically occurred in their schools, where I also already
had research permission. I was careful not to allow my research to interfere with
educational lessons and objectives, requesting to interview students and teachers when
they had “free” time.
In my IRB protocol, I had a specific category of adults called “officials, inside
and outside Iraq,” that the IRB required me to obtain informed consent via a signed
approved form. This category included school principals or government officials, for
example. The majority of the adults who participated in my research did not belong in the
“officials” category, and with these adults, I had IRB permission to obtain informed
consent verbally with an approved IRB script. I requested of the IRB that I be allowed to
obtain informed consent verbally in most cases because many people in Kurdistan and
Iraq are hesitant to sign “official” documents that might identify them. I believe this is
largely owing to histories of state-sponsored violence against certain populations.
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After my initial four months in the field focused on language learning, I
approached a private school I call “Kurdistan Civilizational School,” or “KCS,” which
has multiple campuses across Kurdistan. I met with the school’s principal to request
permission to conduct observation and interviews for a semester, as I had planned in my
dissertation research proposal. The principal stated her concerns about the potentially
sensitive nature of my research interest in religious, ethnic, and national identities. The
school had received some negative publicity after an incident on one of the school
campuses a few years prior, which some people said resulted from an alleged religious
“conversion.” The religious nature of KCS is unique compared to other schools in
Kurdistan: Although the majority of KCS students identified as Muslim and Kurdish,
many of the schools’ founders and teachers were Christians. KCS was founded to provide
Kurdistani youth with an education based in “classical Christian education,” which takes
inspiration from the classical Trivium of grammar, logic, and rhetoric, taught under the
umbrella of a “Christian ethic.”
Because of the incident and negative publicity, the principal would not grant
access to anyone who might write an “exposé” about the school. I assured her that was
not my intention. Rather, I explained that, as a practicing or “believing” Christian, I
shared some interest in the religious nature of KCS. Second, I was familiar with the
curriculum, and I was known to the American NGO that provided some of the textbooks
and teaching staff. Furthermore, although I might not agree with everything in the school
(in fact, I was uncomfortable with many things I observed), as an anthropologist, I
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assured the principal that I was trained and committed to being careful to protect the
identities of research participants.
Undoubtedly, my shared religious identity and sympathetic attitude toward the
school helped me gain access, and not only through the principal’s official permission. I
told anyone who asked about my religious identity, which is a common question in
Kurdistan, that I was a “practicing” Christian, or a “believer.” Other Americans who
identified as Christian had worked in KCS over the years, and initially people thought I
was a newly arrived teacher. Students and teachers seemed pleased to meet me. Many
told me about their American friends or teachers who had worked at the school, and how
I reminded them of their beloved former coworkers or teachers. It was clear to me that
many of these American teachers had been well-liked and that they were missed. Due to
my open religious identity, my being an American, and my shared enthusiasm about
education, I developed a closeness with many teachers and students that I might not have
enjoyed if my identity and positionality had been otherwise. While English was the
lingua franca and the language of instruction for most courses at KCS, I understood
enough Sorani Kurdish to observe classes taught in Kurdish, such as komalayatȋ (social
studies). Relative to another of my research sites, a government school for Kurdish
speakers in the town of “Betala,” collecting data at KCS was easier linguistically and
relationally. There were far more instructional hours at KCS than at government schools,
allowing me more time to develop rapport with teachers and students.
In KCS, I formally interviewed 7 teachers and had countless conversations with
teachers in their break room. I conducted numerous individual and group interviews with
an estimated 100 students. This number is an estimation because group interviews with

17

students were open to any student and were fluid as students joined and left throughout
an interview. I selected Grade 10 as the cohort I would focus on while at KCS. Grade 10
included about 25 students, and I interacted with them daily by attending their classes,
socializing with them on the school bus and during breaks, and occasionally joining
social outings. My inclusion in social events and some confidences was significant
because teachers typically were not invited to student-organized gatherings. I, however,
inhabited a liminal position between adult authority figure and peer. At the time of my
fieldwork, I was in my late 20s, but with my smaller stature, blue jeans, and ponytail, I
regularly passed as much younger: On my first day in KCS, for example, a Kurdish
language teacher mistook me for a new international high school student and called on
me while I sat in a student desk at the back of the classroom. As someone still occupying
the “student” subject position, some administrators and teachers treated me as their
subordinate, even when we were close in age. Not wanting to be perceived as pushy or
uppity, I readily deferred to their authority. Other adults, especially the younger teachers,
seemed to consider me a peer.
My fieldwork in KCS followed the rhythms of the school day: riding the bus in
the morning, attending classes, eating lunch in the small cafeteria, attending more classes
or hanging out with teachers in their break room, and wrapping up the day around 3pm.
At that time, tired students, teachers, and staff quickly dispersed, and rarely did anyone
invite me to join them after the school day. Occasionally, a student’s parent or driver
might offer to drive me to my next location, which usually was the gym where I taught an
evening fitness class. Although I felt that I enjoyed generally good rapport while on the
school campus, I also perceived that students and teachers kept me at arm’s length and
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mostly out of their domestic lives by using the physical and temporal boundaries of the
school campus and the official end of the school day.
Although many students and some teachers were willing, even eager, to talk with
me about certain subjects, rapport only went so far. After “letting their guard down” by
saying something that might get them into trouble, students would suddenly remember I
was there and ask me not to say anything to their teachers. Despite my frequent
reassurances that I did not share information about students with their parents or teachers
and vice versa, I found that people assumed I did anyway. I did not attempt to collect any
data via surveys or questionnaires, although I wanted to do so, because I worried that
systematically recording potentially sensitive data (like ethnic and religious
demographics) might be perceived as threatening. I once asked to see the school’s
demographic data about students, but the evasive and uncomfortable response I received
convinced me that I had better not push my luck. To that end, I also did not interview the
school principal, most administrators, and certain teachers, for fear of asking “too many”
or the “wrong” questions that might compromise my research permission. Additionally,
earning students’ and some teachers’ confidences necessitated distancing myself from the
school’s administration.
As we neared the end of my semester in KCS, students asked if I could stay and
be their teacher. One faculty member suggested I remain at KCS and work (voluntarily)
as a “college counselor” while continuing my research there. The school needed someone
to help students navigate the college application and decision-making process. I
seriously considered changing my research plan. Rather than proceeding to a government
school, I could produce a more in-depth exploration of KCS, resulting in a dissertation
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that would more closely resemble a classic school ethnography. After weighing my
options, I decided that I would proceed with my original plan of carrying out research in
three types of schools in Kurdistan. When the semester ended, I was sad to leave all the
people I had come to know at KCS. Some I stayed in touch with during the rest of my
field work and after I returned to the United States. Dozens of students and teachers
connected with me on social media, and I have followed their lives at a distance. It has
been bittersweet for me to see KCS students grow up, and to see my friends who were
teachers leave the school for other opportunities.
Gaining access to a government school proved more difficult than I anticipated.
My Sorani language tutor and key interlocutor, Ashti, suggested I carry out research in
her school. She agreed that it was important that I observe a “typical” government high
school to have a more holistic understanding of education and youth in Kurdistan. Ashti
taught English language and literature to Kurdish high school girls in “Betala,” a rural
area about a 30-minute drive outside the city. Ashti and I could ride together to and from
the school, giving us more time together to discuss my observations or to speak as
friends. This plan was acceptable to the school’s principal, so I began visiting Betala with
Ashti and observing classes. Not many days had passed when a government official
happened to visit the school and spotted me in the courtyard – a pale, blonde wearing
blue jeans in a sea of Kurdish girls with dark hair and uniformly wearing white, long
sleeve shirts and ankle length, dark blue skirts.
Summoned to the principal’s office, I felt every bit the guilty student while this
apoplectic official lectured the school’s principal, who meekly explained why I was in the
school. With a scathing glance in my direction, she declared I could not be much older
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than the high school students, and that there was no way I was a Ph.D. student. Hearing
this, I offered her my business card and started to explain my research. Perhaps alarmed
that I had understood her Kurdish words not intended for my ears, she turned back to the
principal and continued her tirade: It was not enough that he had granted me permission;
I had to go to the Ministry of Education. I was not to return to the school until I had a
signed letter. I spent the next couple weeks going from one government office to another,
where each official insisted that some other official was the correct person to provide a
letter of permission.
Ashti taught lessons only certain days of the week, so if I wanted to travel to
Betala on those days, I had to find other transportation. Taking public transportation – a
taxi to the bus station, waiting until the bus filled up, arriving at another bus station, then
taking another taxi to the school – took hours. Paying a private taxi was expedient but
costly. Ashti also was suffering from stomach ulcers, causing her to miss her lessons. I
spent weeks sporadically attempting to carry out fieldwork in Betala, but it was often
fruitless: I arrived to learn that it was a government holiday. Or, the schedule had
changed unexpectedly, and classes had been in the morning and not the afternoon as
usual, and they forgot to tell me. At that time, the Kurdistani government was not paying
salaries, so some days there were no lessons, and I sat in the break room sipping tea
awkwardly with teachers I barely knew. Then, we entered the month-long exam
preparation period, in which the girls I had been trying to get to know were allowed to
stay home and study. The little data I gathered in Betala appears in Chapter 5 in which I
describe Ashti and other adults who had become deeply discouraged with the situation in
Kurdistan and Iraq and were reflecting on emigrating in the face of uncertain futures.
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I began seeking permission to carry out fieldwork in a third school. The schools
for displaced Arabic speaking youth, I was told, fell under another jurisdiction, not the
Erbil Governorate. What about a school for Kurdish speakers displaced from Syria, now
living in Iraqi Kurdistan? I asked. In Chapter 2, I describe my attempt to access one of
these schools inside a refugee camp. With shortened fieldwork in the Betala school, and
no forthcoming permission to observe a Syrian Kurdish refugee school, I realized my
original research plan would not work. Although my limited time spent in the Betala
school was disappointing, I experienced some significant exchanges there, which I
recount in Chapter 5. I have described my struggles accessing and collecting data at
Betala and in the refugee camp because they exemplify the bureaucracy and state-making
processes that I encountered throughout my field work. It was not just bureaucracy and
reluctance that sent me from one government office to another, or that barred my access
to certain spaces; it was also a manifestation of the unclear and shifting relationship
between the Iraqi and Kurdistani governments. I explore that relationship more in
Chapter 2.
With the Betala school behind me, I turned my attention to the one site I had
enjoyed consistent access and good rapport since the beginning of my time in the field:
the gym where I worked a part-time job teaching indoor cycling group fitness classes.
The global fitness industry had come to Kurdistan only in the past decade, and many
fitness centers were seeking instructors and personal trainers. Initially, I approached a
gym manager about teaching indoor cycling simply as a source of income to support my
field expenses and to give me access to a space for exercising and socializing. Gradually,
I realized that the schools and the gym shared an overlapping population sharing an
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interest in ethical self-formation. I began considering my place of employment as a site
for data collection, not just a part time gig. The gym manager, staff, and members all
knew that I was conducting research, and with the rapport I had established already,
obtaining informed consent went smoothly. I went to the gym most evenings, where I
spent at least 2 hours, and sometimes as many as 5 hours. I conducted 16 formal semistructured interviews with my gym acquaintances, including the gym manager, personal
trainers and instructors, and gym members. I conducted many of the interviews in the
gym lobby during quiet hours, or if it was during a busy period, I asked the gym
management if I could one of their offices for interviewing. In other cases, interviewees
asked that I visit them in their home, a café, or their workplace, so they would not be
overheard and could speak more freely.
The gym where I taught cycling classes was divided into three spaces: a “mixed”
gender space, for men and women to exercise together; a women’s only section; and a
group fitness studio that was used for both “mixed gender” and “women-only” (femalepresenting socially) classes. I had countless informal conversations with gym staff and
members, especially in the women’s only section of the gym. The gym was busiest
during the 6pm to 9pm window. During those hours, I typically joined in group
discussions in the lobby or the women’s section and attended group fitness classes.
During the slower times of the day, such as the early or midafternoon, few women would
use the women’s section. One useful strategy I developed was to hop onto the treadmill
or elliptical beside a woman and ask if I could talk with her while we exercised. Often, it
was during these off-peak hours that women who did not speak English visited the gym,
so many of my conversations with this subset of women were entirely in Sorani Kurdish.
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I also used the off-peak hours at the gym to type up field notes or interview notes.
People became accustomed to seeing me sitting in the gym lobby and typing notes, and
the regulars would stop by “my” table in the lobby to talk. I would shut my laptop while
we chatted, and resume typing when they left, sometimes immediately typing up what I
had just learned from our exchange. Staff and regular gym members knew me as both a
researcher and as a fitness instructor. Some of the gym regulars knew me from their
university, where I had a research affiliation and visited once or twice a week for
university-related events or to work in my office (generously provided by the university).
At my gym, I cultivated friendships with a diverse group of university-educated
and career-driven women in their 20s and early 30s, and my similar focus on education
and career made connecting with them easier. My cycling classes also attracted a small
group of regular attendees, including a young Kurdish university professor who shared
my research interests and became a key interlocutor. I also persuaded the gym manager to
permit me to create a new female-only cycling class, through which I grew to know
women who did not participate in mixed-gender group fitness, were often shy, and
typically spoke little English.
Issues of class permeated the gym in which I worked. Membership in private,
urban gyms was expensive, anywhere from 50 to 200 US dollars per month. Membership
fees were on the higher end at the gym where I worked, so the members typically were
wealthy, socially and politically well-connected elites. Once I was chatting with one of
the gym staff members, a middle-class university student, who complained that some
gym members treated the staff poorly because they were rich and from important
families. When I asked how he knew this, the staff member explained that the
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demographic information the gym collects on new members’ forms, such as family name
or occupation, reveals a lot in a society that is intensely interested in ascertaining and
“ranking” one’s kinship, class, or status. “And you can just look out the window there,”
he said, “and see all the [luxury] cars.” Indeed, most nights luxury vehicles and sportscars
occupied the prime parking spots outside the gym.
I also encountered class and political tensions in the gym, which I discuss in
Chapter 4. For example, when I asked a young man to dismount from the stationary
bicycle he was using because I needed the bike to teach my class, he refused. I tried
another approach, introducing myself in a pleasant tone. He curtly told me his name,
revealing he was probably related to some of the highest political leaders in the country. I
barely concealed my irritation, saying, “Nice to meet you Kak Sirwan,1 but I still need
that bicycle.” My gym acquaintances tended to express assumptions that I also must be
wealthy and thus had plenty of disposable income. As I mentioned before, Kurdistani
people had become accustomed to foreigners from Europe and the United States who
held high paying and high-status jobs in the Kurdistan Region. It was in the company of
these ambitious and affluent women that I visited some of the chic restaurants and cafes I
described in the opening of this chapter.
When I decided to expand my research concerning the fitness industry, the
relationships I had formed at my gym helped me make connections with other gym
owners, managers, and trainers. In the last couple months in the field, I visited 5 other
fitness centers, and I conducted formal interviews with 6 individuals who taught classes
or worked at the gym. My work experience as a group fitness instructor in the U.S. and in

1

A pseudonym. “Kak” or “kaka” is generally used as a term of respect for men, akin to “sir” in English.
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Kurdistan usually interested people, especially when I visited other fitness centers.
During our conversations, people often asked how much membership cost at my gym,
what “type” of people the gym attracted, and if men and women exercised together
(tȇkala). Women in my gym and some I met outside my gym seemed to regard me as an
expert in fitness and nutrition. I explained, usually to no avail, that I merely coached
indoor cycling classes as a hobby. Often people did not accept this answer, pointing out
that my slender and toned body evidenced otherwise. Although I sometimes attempted to
explain that I owed much of that to genetics and not necessarily to diet and exercise,
genetic inheritance did not seem to interest many people. It seemed to me that, for my
interlocutors, I embodied “global fitness culture” (Andreasson and Johansson 2014) and
was thus regarded as its emissary. In the words of some of my interlocutors, my body was
an “ideal” type of female fit body that circulates through global fitness culture. Although
I found it uncomfortable to have my body discussed so frequently, frankly, and openly, it
did help my research, as women often approached me eagerly rather than me having to
approach them and inquire hesitantly if they were interested to talk.
The result of my revised research plan was that I left the field with two data sets
(schools and fitness centers) concerning two cohorts (teenagers and young adults). I also
had taken other opportunities, especially when invited, such as visiting refugee and IDP
camps, touring the Kurdistan region, and attending events like conferences and lectures.
Data from those events, interviews, and conversations appears throughout the
dissertation, but the majority of the text concerns people in schools and fitness centers.
Over 20 months, I had traversed a variety of spaces and conversed with a remarkable
range of people. My daily schedules varied, sometimes drastically: I might spend the
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morning in a poor, rural school and share a meager meal with a local family; accompany
NGO acquaintances during an afternoon visit to a refugee camp; and in the evening find
myself chatting with one of my gym friends at a chic restaurant in a wealthy quarter of
Erbil. Moving between vastly different spaces and with different cohorts throughout my
field work brought encounters with pluralism to the fore in my analysis.

Ethnography of value pluralism
In this section, I outline how this dissertation proceeds analytically from my
ethnographic data. My theoretical framework is grounded in an observation about value
pluralism in Kurdistan: The contests of values recounted in this dissertation run deeper
than “identity politics” or “sectarianism,” although these forces and their various
conceptualizations are at play in my interlocutors’ experiences. Their encounters with
value pluralism are not determined by or limited to familiar analytical categories within
anthropologies of the Middle East and Muslim worlds, such as tribe, kinship, Islam, sect,
or nation. Rather, these same analytical categories are in flux as interlocutors
conceptualize and reconceptualize them through their everyday, moral negotiations with
people “belonging” to different identity categories. Ontologically speaking, what does it
“mean” to be identified as “Kurdish” or “Iraqi”? As “Muslim” or “Christian”? What
obligations do these categories entail, and for whom? What are the ethical ramifications
for realizing, or not realizing, one’s identity categories to the fullest? I speak of identity
categories being “realized” in the sense of people manifesting values based in religious,
cultural, social, and political frameworks in their everyday lives. Put another way, can
one still be a “good” [identity category, i.e., fill in the blank] if not satisfying the
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ontological and ethical demands of kin group, religious community, political party,
nation, or state?
This line of questioning about being a “good” person of a particular identity
category presents both ontological and ethical problems. On the one hand, these are not
new problems, but are based in the histories of imperial and state formations and they
ways in which they have regulated ethnic and religious difference, such as through the
Ottoman millet system. Additionally, enduring social practices related to patrilineal
kinship reproduce the boundedness of ethnic and religious identity categories. Modern
states in the Middle East conceptualize citizenship and govern family life with reference
to patrilineal kinship (King 2018). Thus, both social and state formulations of identity
have been mutually constitutive, reinforcing the boundedness of identity categories in
legal codes and in social practice.
On the other hand, some ontological and ethical problems arising from religious
difference, or more broadly, from value pluralism, are “new” in Kurdistan. Rapid
globalization of the Kurdistan Region and the expansion of “secular” spaces and
discourses have increased the frequency and varieties of encounters with value pluralism.
More than ever before in Kurdistan, people have access to information through the
expansion of technology. Censorship exists for certain topics, like the private lives of
political leaders, and freedom of expression is limited, but people in Kurdistan have
access to many sources of information with a range of viewpoints.
During the relatively prosperous interwar period of 2011 to 2014, many
Kurdistani people who had been living in diaspora, such as in Europe or the United
States, returned to Kurdistan. Some sought to recreate in Kurdistan aspects of their
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former lives abroad, such as by opening new businesses, schools, residential
communities, and entertainment services. When I first visited Kurdistan in 2012, I
observed that many people were optimistic about Kurdistan’s future. There was a sense
of anticipation about possibilities for Kurdistani independence and for collective and
individual freedoms. People were grappling with how to realize their goals within certain
state and social structures. While the conflict with the Islamic State (2014-2017) halted
many projects, it also had the effect of accelerating the circulation of discourses about
religion and nationalism. What did it mean to be a “Muslim” in the era of the Islamic
State? How was Kurdistan’s government and society different from the rest of Iraq or
from surrounding majority Muslim countries?
As my interlocutors grappled with questions of identity, they also were exploring
the limits of individual and collective freedoms in Kurdistan. In this ethnography,
“freedoms” take many forms: They can appear mundane or low stake, such as gym-goers
and bodybuilders who spend more time away from their family of origin, eat a nontraditional diet, and follow different rhythms of social life. Higher stake freedoms include
choices like (de)converting, “dating” in romantic relationships, or emigrating. I
conceptualize “freedoms” in a context of value pluralism by bringing together
anthropological theorizations of “modernity,” “sovereignty,” and “morality.” I ask to
what extent these theorizations can account for the forces pushing and pulling my
Kurdistani interlocutors toward different Kurdistani “futures.”
To understand how encounters with value pluralism influence ethical selfformation, I draw upon a philosophical line of inquiry about “ethical life” and the so
called “ethical turn” in anthropology (Mattingly and Throop 2018). My purpose in
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contextualizing the ethnography in the “ethical turn” is not to “weigh in” on debates
about ethics or freedoms, as that would go beyond the scope of this dissertation. Instead, I
focus on how people experience moral life and identity formation in contexts of value
pluralism within a majority Muslim state. I hope that approaching moral experience
through ethnography of value pluralism will help us understand the formation of
identities from the “bottom-up” of everyday encounters with ethical difference, in
addition to the more familiar “top-down” state and social contributions to identity
categories.

Encounters with “ethical difference,” not “Islam”
Violence, displacement, encounters with religious difference, nationalism,
emigration, and hope: these were common discussion topics among my Kurdistani
interlocutors, who come from diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds. In some cases, I
was present and witnessed exchanges in which people discussed their different
orientations to religion and politics. In other cases, people told me about significant past
encounters with what I call “ethical difference” which continue to inform how they
manage their relationships with others. In speaking of “others,” I refer to two kinds of
“otherness”: The first kind of otherness emerges through identity politics, in which group
identity, or perceived group identity, is the key variable. There is a large body of
literature on the politicization of identities, often referred to as “sectarianism,” in the
Middle East, particularly as it pertains to governance (e.g., Makdisi 2000; Davis 2008;
Mikdashi 2014). While the politicization of identities is relevant to my interlocutors’
lives, I focus on another aspect of “otherness.” This second kind of “otherness” hinges
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upon different sets of values, rather than different identity categories, coming into play. I
refer to this kind of “otherness” as “ethical difference.”
In speaking of “ethical difference,” I refer to encounters that occur in contexts of
value pluralism and between people holding contrasting opinions or beliefs, not just
about common moral subjects, but also about the ethical dimensions of nationalism and
state-making. About the first kind of “ethical difference,” or “common moral subjects,”
ethnographic work abounds. Anthropologists of the Middle East and Muslim worlds have
documented how people navigate religious rules, particularly pertaining to “Islam” as a
“discursive tradition.” For example, Lara Deeb and Mona Harb (2013) have found in
Lebanon that religious difference characterizes relationships between people who hold
different views on the consumption of alcohol, listening to music, or dancing. Lebanese
young people draw upon various “moral rubrics” to navigate religious difference as it
intersects with class and gender. While moral rubrics are helpful for understanding how
people navigate everyday experiences of religious difference in a majority Muslim
society, they have little to no bearing on how the state governs its subjects.
The state makes certain kinds of difference “legible” (Scott 1998) and thus subject
to governance, such as collective identity categories like nationality, ethnicity, or
religion. For example, we can examine how the Iraqi state has regulated relations
between ethnoreligious groups and contributed to the politicization of identities as an
expression of state “legibility.” Examinations of the Iraqi state abound, though they
typically approach the regulation of religious difference as “sectarianism” and through
the lenses of political economy or international relations. There are far fewer
anthropological studies, not just of Iraq but of Middle Eastern states in general, which
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illuminate the state’s contributions to how people navigate religious, or ethical, difference
in daily life.
Patrilineal kinship is central to making populations “legible” in Iraq and in many
other states across the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region. Patrilineal kinship is a
type of unilineal descent by which a person’s ancestry is traced through the father’s line;
at birth, a person inherits the religious and ethnic identity of his or her father. So, if a
person has a Christian mother and a Muslim father, they will be considered “Muslim” by
the state and society. “Patriliny,” the set of ideas and practices concerning patrilineal
kinship, is “integral to conceptions of citizenship and group membership in the Middle
East” (King 2018:305). The Iraqi state, and the Kurdistan Regional Government within it,
use this system of patrilineal reckoning to assign religious and ethnic identity categories
to citizens.
Unlike “identity politics,” encounters with ethical difference in contexts of value
pluralism are more difficult to describe categorically. They rarely “interest” the state, as
they typically do not produce recognizable changes in identity categories, such as a
religious conversion. Even in cases of what might be considered “identity
transformation,” such as religious conversion, marriage, or personal preference (choosing
to identify with one’s mother’s ethnic or religious identity for example), these subjective
transformations are not necessarily made “legible.” States like Iraq, whose citizenship
system and recognition of ethnoreligious identities follow patrilineal kinship practices, do
not simply fail to acknowledge changes in identity categories – the Iraqi government (and
the Kurdistani government) does not permit people to change their official ethnic or
religious identity categories on official identity documents. The state refuses to “see”
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individual subjects as they ask to be seen. Permitting individual voluntary changes to
ethnoreligious identity would be disruptive to the state’s citizenship regime. In some
cases, the state has weaponized ethnoreligious identity to increase the number of people
identified with a certain group to obtain a demographic advantage, like laying claim to a
territory, such as in the Arabization campaigns under the former Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein.
The subjective experiences of identity and value formation that I am describing
are often subtle, gradual, and have little bearing on a citizen’s relationship to the state.
They are, in a sense, illegible. Certain kinds of ethical difference I examine in my
dissertation do, however, pertain to governance and thus “interest” the state, not because
they challenge inherited or official identity categories but because they figure into
discourses about the state. I conceptualize ethical differences more broadly than Deeb
and Harb (2013). Not only does my conceptualization of ethical differences concern
common “moral” subjects in Muslim worlds about what is or is not permissible in Islam;
it also concerns the moral dimensions of nationalism and modernization. In Iraqi
Kurdistan, key ethical differences include:
•
•
•

Supporting Kurdistani independence versus a unified Iraq
Advocating for a more “modern” society with “secular” public spaces and
gender equality, versus a more “pious” Kurdistan in which more
conservative forms of Islam guide the state and social life
Choosing to remain in Kurdistan / Iraq and contribute to its development,
or choosing to emigrate and seek better opportunities elsewhere

By working with the concept of “ethical difference,” I hope to avoid the potential
pitfalls of subjecting my ethnographic data to what Samuli Schielke (2010) refers to as a
“grand scheme” such as scholars traditionally have conceptualized “Islam.” In his essay
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reviewing the “anthropology of Islam,” Schielke makes two observations that inform my
approach to understanding ethical or religious experience in my field site. First, Schielke
notes that Talal Asad’s important intervention in the anthropology of Islam – critiquing
the “textualization” of religious experience and approaching it instead as a “discursive
tradition” (1986) – led to a proliferation of anthropological work about religious debate,
tradition, piety, and ethics. These studies have offered a much-needed corrective to an
obsession with defining “what Islam is,” especially in the era of the “war on terror.”
Work on piety and ethics also has helped us “to recognize much better how Muslims’
engagement with their religion is neither the outcome of blind adherence, nor the result of
coercion,” Schielke writes, “but an active and dynamic process of engagement with ideals
of good life and personhood” (5).
The problem with a research program focused almost entirely on piety and
tradition is that it has, according to Schielke, created a meta-narrative in which Islam is
approached as a critical “other” to Western liberalism and secularism. In an effort to
critique the “alleged superiority and universality” of liberalism and secularism and to
analyze how liberal and/or secular regimes mask power, Islam is reduced to a critical
other or to a site of resistance. Schielke notes that it is too easy to blame “the usual
suspects” (i.e., Western liberalism and secularism) in understanding Muslim lives in the
shadow of (neo)colonialism. Although anthropological studies of piety and ethics in
Islam have yielded rich portraits of religious experience, these portraits do not adequately
account for the “ambivalence, the inconsistences, and the openness of people’s lives that
never fit into the framework of a single tradition” (1). Schielke concludes that
anthropologists may fail to recognize “what really is at stake for the people involved,”
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and consequently “fail to seriously recognise the humanity of people on their own terms”
(6).
In the case of my field site, the intense popular and scholarly interest in Islamic
movements, Kurdish nationalism, and politics, often does not capture “what really is at
stake” for people “on their own terms.” Too often, scholarly and popular focus is on
elites, the “engineers” producing and regulating discourse about religion or politics. To
accept these “high-level” discourses as paradigmatic of how people grapple with ethics in
the everyday is misleading. For example, “Islamic piety,” broadly speaking, is one kind
of ethical positioning in which some of my interlocutors situate their lives. They typically
appear to remain within the bounds of piety while resisting the pull of other ethical
regimes, such as nationalism or cosmopolitanism. The majority of my interlocutors,
however, regularly move in and out of various ethical positions, for reasons I explore
throughout the dissertation.
My research attends to contests of values that occur through everyday interactions
– not just “between Muslims” (Bush 2020), or between Muslims and people belonging to
other religious communities, but between people with many kinds of ethical differences.
What do people make of their engagements with religious or non-religious others – such
as neighbors, teachers, and coworkers – not in the manner of identity politics or religious
conversions, but in the intimate formation of personal values? Before I turn to developing
a theoretical framework for understanding ethical difference, I review some important
contributions of other interpretive frameworks for understanding religious difference in
Muslim worlds.
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Religious difference in a post-Ottoman and patrilineal society
In contemporary Kurdistan, relationships between diverse ethnic and religious
communities reflect historical legacies of imperial and state power. Additionally,
narratives about those legacies circulate in political rhetoric and in everyday discourse,
informing how Kurdistani people relate to each other across ethnic and religious identity
categories. While Kurdistan’s majority population is Sunni Muslim Kurdish, people
identifying with many other ethnic and religious communities also reside in Kurdistan,
including: Sunni Muslim Arabs, Shi’i Muslim Arabs, Chaldean and Assyrian Christians,
Arab Christians, Yezidis, Kakai, Turkmen, Shabaks, and Mandeans. At present,
intercommunal relationships in Kurdistan are relatively peaceful. Throughout the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however, the Ottoman state and its successors
repeatedly perpetrated violence against minority ethnic and religious groups (Klein
2011). American and European incursions in the region also contributed to tensions
between ethnic and religious groups (Becker 2015; John Joseph 2000; Taylor 2005).
Centuries of imperial power struggles and state-formation have created a “zone of
genocide” (Levene 1998) encompassing the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
That the history of state and sectarian violence continues to shape how ethnic and
religious identities are experienced in everyday life is self-evident for people appearing in
this dissertation. Even Kurdistani young people who had no direct experience of violence
– such as youth who lived comfortable lives in the Kurdistan Region and who had not
personally experienced war or displacement or deprivation – recognize how histories of
violence inform social life in Kurdistan. Kurdistani youth learn about violence in modern
Iraq through oral histories, news media, and school curriculum. Some young people I
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knew expressed distrust, fear, or hatred of certain ethnic or religious groups. This usually
took the form of avoiding members of a certain group.
On the other hand, many young people in Kurdistan expressed openness to
forming relationships across ethnic and religious boundaries. Some were the children of
ethnically or religiously “mixed” marriages. Exogamous marriage is not necessarily
viewed as problematic, but social and family norms, past and present, tend to favor
endogamous marriage. “Forbidden” love between people belonging to different religions
features in Kurdistani poetic traditions (Bush 2020) and in folk music, such as ballads
about the “kchȋ gawr,” the “heathen woman” (i.e., non-Muslim) who leads pious
(Muslim) men astray. Nevertheless, friendships and marriages between people from
different ethnic and religious groups are not unusual in Iraq, though recent conflict and
renewed politicization of identities have made these relationships more difficult.
During my fieldwork, I heard two general discourses about religious difference in
Kurdistan. One kind of discourse asserted that ethnic and religious “others” were not
trustworthy. People holding this view referred to histories of genocide and the conflict
with the Islamic State. They also described ongoing problems between the Kurdistan
Regional Government and the central Iraqi government not only as a struggle for
sovereignty, but also as a racial or ethnic problem between the Kurdish minority and the
Arab majority in Iraq.
Another type of discourse also pointed to “sectarian” struggle as evidence of state
“failures.” People contrasted genocidal violence and failures of the Iraqi state with the
relatively stable Kurdistan Region, which welcomed and protected ethnic and religious
minorities. In this way, people spoke of the Kurdistan Region as a majority Muslim
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society and government more progressive than other majority Muslim states, particularly
antagonist or enemy states like Turkey, the Iraqi state, or the Islamic State. Such
discourse characterizes Kurdistan as a “counterpublic” (King 2014), an ethical polity
standing in opposition to the wrongs committed by surrounding states. Counterdiscourse
about a “tolerant” Kurdistan was prevalent in political rhetoric and in government-issued
curriculum, which I explore later in the dissertation.
I interacted with critics of both kinds of discourse about religious difference in
Kurdistan. Young people complained of ethnic or religious discrimination and expressed
a desire to make Kurdistan a more “modern” and pluralistic place. While it is true that
hundreds of thousands of people have found refuge within the KRI’s borders, the degree
to which minorities also felt welcomed and treated fairly varied greatly. In my
experience, critics of the “tolerant Kurdistan” discourse tended to be minorities, and as I
observed, they tended to be discreet in their criticism. For example, in Chapter 5, students
Ashur and Rasim express disillusionment with diversity talk they encountered in their
private high school. Both boys were Christians attending a private school that, while its
student body was more diverse than those found in government schools, was still a
majority Muslim school. Although some school administrators and teachers described the
private school as tolerant of religious difference, Ashur and Rasim observed that certain
“Islamic” discourses or practices were nevertheless hegemonic.
“Tolerance” discourse, or “radical affirmation” of religious difference, is a feature
of post-Ottoman societies (Bush 2020). It also features in scholarship on the Ottoman
Empire, some of which romanticizes the “tolerance” of the millet system. As
anthropologist Andrew Shryock (2009) observes in his conversation with historians Marc
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Baer and Ussama Makdisi, scholars often have treated “Ottoman tolerance as a virtue”
and have disregarded how the Ottoman state was “a violent, hegemonic imperial
formation in its own right” (936). Makdisi (2017) notes that the significance of the
Ottoman millet system was not about “tolerance” or “intolerance,” but that different
communities lived side by side through imperial and state formations (53). Likewise,
rather than evaluating the “sincerity” of the “tolerance” discourse I observed in
Kurdistan, I examine everyday experiences of coexistence shaped by Iraqi and Kurdistani
state formation.
Andrew Bush, another anthropologist of Iraqi Kurdistan, observes affirmation of
religious pluralism in the form of morality tales. In one famous story, a renowned
nineteenth century Sufi figure, Kak Ahmedi Sheikh, and another Muslim man are
conducting business with a Jewish man. Kak Ahmedi’s Muslim companion asks the Jew
why he does not convert to Islam. The Jewish man replied, “‘If Islam is what they do,’ he
said, ‘then I have no need for it. If it is what [Kak Ahmedi] does, then I have no strength
for it’” (Bush 2017). In this tale, Kak Ahmedi demonstrates what Bush calls the “virtue
of not asking” about another person’s religious identity or pressuring someone to convert
to Islam. Thus, Kak Ahmedi exemplifies for all Muslims an ethical sensibility of
magnanimity and tolerance that makes Islam attractive to religious others. Bush argues
that the virtue of not asking “radically affirms” religious difference while undergirding a
“natural superiority of Islam” (523).
The “virtue of not asking” may derive from the Islamic concept of “People of the
Book” (‘Ahl al-Kitab). The Quran refers to Jews, Christians, and Sabeans as “possessors
of books previously revealed by God,” referring to the Torah, Psalms, and Gospels
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(Esposito 2004:10). Although, in Islam, these books have been abrogated and superseded
by the Quran, the Quran recognizes Christians and Jews as “protected minorities”
(collectively,‘ahl ad-dhimmah, or dhimmi). In the Ottoman empire, dhimmi status
permitted Jews and Christians to practice their religion and to govern their own
communities through separate religious courts.
In the Iraqi state and the Kurdistan Region, the idea of “People of the Book”
persists in common sayings like, “Each one has their religion” (In Kurmanji Kurdish,
“Her ek dine xwe et hȇn”) as Diane King has heard throughout her fieldwork (2017).
Another saying in Sorani Kurdish is, “Jesus with his own religion and Moses with his
own religion” (“Issa ba dȋnȋ khoȋ wa Musa ba dȋnȋ khoȋ”). Among the three Abrahamic
faiths, Judaism has the least presence in Kurdistan. In 1948, the Iraqi government
required its Jewish subjects to relocate to the newly formed state of Israel. Today, a small
community of Jewish people, including Kurds, lives in the Kurdistan Region. Members
of one Jewish community invited me to attend a multifaith iftar2 hosted by a Christian
institution in Erbil. Around 200 people attended, including some foreign dignitaries.
Before the meal, a series of representatives from various religious communities gave
speeches about the historic contributions of individual Christian or Jewish Iraqis. Then,
some of the audience moved to a nearby grassy area for Muslim prayers; none of the
other religious communities represented held prayers for the attendees.
Public “national” space sometimes includes references to religious communities
in Kurdistan, like the Barzanȋ Memorial Center described in Chapter 2. At the Memorial
Center, my Kurdish tour guide explained that three prominent domes atop one building

2

The evening meal that breaks the daytime fasting during Ramadan.
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represent “the three religions of Kurdistan,” which were “Islam, Christianity, and
Yezidi.” As Kurdistani officials continue to develop the KRI’s public image, religious
pluralism discourse helps establish contemporary Kurdistan as an inclusive, progressive
majority Muslim polity “worthy” of statehood. Religious pluralism discourse promotes
the superiority of the aspirational Kurdistani state, but also the “natural superiority”
(Bush 2020) of Islam and of Kurdistani society.
In Erbil, I sometimes heard people express similar sentiments about religious
pluralism, such as in my exchange with Guldar, a middle-aged Kurdish woman. Upon
meeting Guldar for the first time, she asked me, “What is your religion?” In Kurdistan, as
in much of the Muslim world(s), people tend to assume that everyone identifies with a
particular religious tradition. “Each having a religion” is an assumption based in part on
the logic of patrilineal kinship. “Patriliny,” the set of ideas and practices concerning
patrilineal kinship, is “integral to conceptions of citizenship and group membership in the
Middle East” (King 2018:305). The Iraqi state, and the Kurdistan Regional Government
within it, use this system of patrilineal reckoning to assign religious and ethnic identity
categories to citizens.
Personal status codes also reinforce patrilineal reckoning. In Iraq, the Personal
Status Law, in effect since 1959, governs family life, stipulating who can marry, divorce,
inherit, and pass on citizenship to children (Efrati 2005). A series of secular governments
throughout twentieth century Iraq shaped the Personal Status Law, which was considered
liberal relative to other majority Muslim countries. Many Iraqis consider the PSL to
protect women’s rights by raising the minimum legal age of marriage, permitting women
to initiate a divorce, and regulating more equitable inheritance among male and female
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relatives. There have been many attempts to amend or abolish the PSL by critics who
want religious courts based on Islamic law to regulate family life.
In Kurdistan people know, of course, that some individuals do not believe or
practice their “inherited” religion, or any religion for that matter. While terms like
“atheist” (bȇdȋn or mulhȋd) and “secular” (‘almanȋ borrowed from Arabic, or sekuler
from English) exist in common speech, they are not official identity categories
recognized by the state. National identity documents identify the bearer as belonging to
one religion selected from a list of religious identities recognized by the state. As of this
writing, the state does not permit an individual to change his or her official religious
affiliation on identity documents.
However, converts in the KRI are relatively free to practice their chosen religion
or no religion. For example, in Erbil I visited a church comprised of converts from Islam
to Christianity. The church operates openly and with state approval in the KRI, which is
rare in the Muslim world. Many people, nevertheless, keep their beliefs private or entrust
them only to close friends. If they (de)convert, they often do so in secret and continue to
give the appearance of adhering to their official religious identity. Although state and
society maintain rigid boundaries around ethnicity and religion and limit mobility
between those categories, people find flexibility in other aspects of their lives. They work
out questions of morality in “private” conversations or in spaces removed from the prying
eyes and ears of family, neighbors, or the state.
The Ottoman state, the Iraqi state, and patrilineal social organization have
codified religious difference in Iraq in enduring ways. The resulting collective identity
categories, however, appear more bounded and rigid than people may experience them to
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be in everyday life. Scholars of Iraq and the Middle East have tended to focus on the
politicization of collective identity categories, sometimes inadvertently reproducing the
illusion of clearly bounded religious and ethnic identities. As Ussama Makdisi observes,
“the idea of sectarianism, and the sectarian, has come to haunt the modern imaginary of
the Arab world in much the same way that the idea of racism has haunted the modern
imaginary of the USA” (2017:25). Makdisi and other contributors to the edited volume
Sectarianization (Hashemi and Postel 2017) locate the emergence of sectarianism in the
form which we recognize it today in the nineteenth century Ottoman empire. During the
mid-nineteenth century Tanzimat period, the Ottoman state promoted a form of
citizenship and a sense of nationality untethered from religious affiliation, which Makdisi
suggests threatened Ottoman Muslim subjects’ sense of superiority. At the same time,
American and European imperial powers were pressuring the Ottoman state to undertake
reforms, and Western missionary activity in the Ottoman empire was increasing. Western
“protections” of Eastern Christian populations became entangled with imperial political
and economic projects.
The conflation of religious identity and imperial powers contributed to cycles of
religious massacres in the Ottoman empire, which continued throughout twentieth
century Iraq. Fanar Haddad (2017) write,
The sectarian competition we are witnessing in Iraq today, and elsewhere in the
region, is not simply a product of the fact of sectarian plurality in and of itself; it
is more a product of the emergence of the modern nation-state, and is related to
contested political dynamics to do with nation-building, national identity the
(mis)management of sectarian plurality, and, ultimately state legitimacy (102).
Scholars critical of “sectarianism” have demonstrated that the presence of religious
plurality itself is not to blame. Rather, we should look to the imperial and state
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formations that have pitted communities against one another. My approach to examining
these problems of power in Iraqi Kurdistan is to consider ethnoreligious identities and
state-making more broadly as “contests of values,” in which no “vision” (e.g., the Iraqi
state, Kurdish nationalism, Islam, cosmopolitanism, etc.) adequately unifies all the
spheres of interlocutors’ fragmented and liminal lived experiences “caught between”
competing visions.
In the following chapters, I examine the “contests of values” shaping institutions,
cultural formations, and individual lives. I have written an ethnography of how
“sectarianism” intersects with “value pluralism”. Examining value pluralism, or the
contest of values, is an underdeveloped approach within our discipline and within my
geographic area of specialization (Robbins 2013b). Ethnographies of morality in the
Middle East at times describe how different values pull people in multiple directions.
Samuli Scheilke (2009; 2015), for example, demonstrates how Egyptian youth experience
the pull of competing values, like having fun but also being good Muslims. Scheilke
suggests that youth desire to emigrate to escape the painful pull. Lara Deeb and Mona
Harb (2013) likewise demonstrate how Lebanese youth draw upon different moral rubrics
to rationalize their decisions, such as rejecting or accepting a family member’s or friend’s
invitation to a wedding or a cafe where alcohol is served. Anthropologists of the MENA
region, like their interlocutors, tend to focus on a particular kind of ethical positioning,
which is typically some expression of Islam. For example, Saba Mahmood’s The Politics
of Piety (2005) shows how the ethical and the political can become linked within a single
domain, such as the women’s piety movement in Cairo. While anthropologists’ tendency
to approach morals or ethics as Islamic reflects the widespread influence of Islam in
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everyday life, it is also a testament to the enduring pull of religious systems for how
compellingly and thoroughly they can organize people’s lives.

Ethical positioning
In the following chapters, my interlocutors, to varying extents, ascribe to various
competing narratives about Kurdistani and Iraqi observations with Kurdistani people.
“Ethical positions” are heuristic devices I use to organize my data and analysis; they
provide narrative frameworks for the many people and stories following. Ethical
positions, of course, are not clearly delineated in lived experience, and their histories,
methods, and goals often overlap. Sometimes they clash, and painfully so. My
interlocutors felt pulled in different directions as they engaged in ethical self-formation
within the larger spheres of family, religious community, nation, and world. Their stories
- the ways in which these youth described themselves, explained their situations, and
struggled to generate hope - comprise the lived experience that this dissertation bears
witness to and takes inspiration from.
Cultural transformations that individuals or groups seek to realize often hinge
upon future-oriented narratives about the desired self, society, or state. The “moral
ambition” (Elisha 2011) of individuals may involve attracting more people to their cause
to increase mobilization and their effect on society. During my fieldwork, I encountered
recurring narratives circulated in conversations with my interlocutors, as well as in news
media, the Kurdistani government, and non-governmental or humanitarian organizations.
Each narrative is oriented toward particular goods with reference to some kind of ethical
position. My use of the language of “ethics” or “ethical” is informed by the recent
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“ethical turn” in anthropology (Mattingly and Throop 2018), which emerges from
anthropology’s longstanding concern with morality and values. In this dissertation
“positions” are “ethical” in the sense that they are concerned with evaluative and
negotiated moral action about the world as it is said to be, as it is experienced, and as it
might or should be. People work out their lived experiences, observations, and
rationalizations in reference to one or more ethical regimes and those regimes’
corresponding sets of values. Ethical positions contain clusters of values, with some
values overlapping with other ethical positions. Most of these positions, however,
encompass certain values that are incompatible with other positions and their values.
Thus, people feel pulled in different directions. Not everyone is positioned to be pulled in
different directions, for reasons I explore in the dissertation, and not everyone resists the
pull.
My interlocutors mainly consist of Kurdistani young people who are positioned,
by virtue of their wealth, status, or education, to move in and out of competing ethical
positions. Over the 20 months I spent in the field, I observed the various ways my
interlocutors dealt with the push and pull of ethical life. Some eventually, or at least
tentatively, settled on one kind of ethical position, perhaps to escape the pain of being
pulled in different directions. Other interlocutors resisted becoming settled, or
constrained, by a single position. They struggled to reconcile values characteristic of
competing frames, such as simultaneously striving to be an “ethnonationalist” and a
“modernizer.” Values upheld by ethnonationalism, such as loyalty to tribe and nation,
might be undermined by values upheld by “modernization,” such as egalitarianism and
pluralism.
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Ethical positions strongly exert the power to contain people and institutions
within their narrative grasp. The internal coherence that a clearly defined position, or
narrative, provides is alluring. Ethical positions compellingly explain the world and offer
coherence, especially when people feel their world is falling apart. Ethical positioning is
about generating and negotiating narratives that seek to explain the world and one’s place
in it, with a strong undercurrent of moral duty to contribute to the realization of a
particular vision. In my field site, there is a shared sense that things have gone horribly
wrong in Iraq’s and Kurdistan’s past, but there is no single ethical position or kind of
positioning that accommodates all possible values or all possible futures for Kurdistan or
for Iraq. Ethical positioning draws upon with the same raw data of history and lived
experience and help people (re)frame that data to generate particular justifications for
their inherited or chosen values. While some of my interlocutors focused on radically
different interpretations of Iraqi and Kurdistani histories, other interlocutors looked ahead
to possible modern or cosmopolitan futures.

Bricolage, bricoleur, and ethical self-formation
My ethnography is a bricolage of Kurdistani youth experiences. I refer to
“bricolage,” not in the structuralist sense by which Levi-Strauss (1966) theorized myth,
but rather as an activity, a tactic employed both by interlocutors and by ethnographers. I
speak of bricolage as a metaphor for a method rather than an epistemological concept.
The bricoleur combines and creates with whatever is at hand, which is why the French
bricoleur sometimes is translated “handyman.” Levi-Strauss contrasts the bricoleur with
the engineer, who has the training and resources to construct a new cultural whole rather
than to repurpose materials and tools. The engineer, however, is a “myth,” as all

47

discourse is bricolage (Derrida 1978). People “make do” in their everyday lives as they
“make innumerable and infinitesimal transformations of and within the dominant cultural
economy in order to adapt it to their own interests and their own rules” (De Certeau
1984).
The bricoleur is akin to the “wsta” ()وهستا, the Kurdish handy-person who often
advertises their services by painting “  ”وهستاand a phone number on the sides of
buildings. Typically, the wsta is not formally trained. The wsta is a tinkerer or a hack,
who might, for example, rig up your connection to the neighborhood’s electrical system
using the abandoned objects lying in the empty lot (i.e., junkyard) near your house.
Hiring the wsta is more expedient than asking a “professional,” perhaps someone from
the city’s office of electricity, to come repair the electrical connection, which really is
part of a systemic problem. Most people appearing in this dissertation are like the wsta:
They are not wealthy businessmen, or politicians, or religious leaders. They do not have
the entire “ethical position” and its resources at their disposal, so they appropriate aspects
of different frames to fashion a working narrative. Their working narratives take into
account how they really (and not just ideally) live. The “making do” that people live by
typically does not fit neatly into any ethical position. People who “make do” as bricoleurs
inhabit the liminal spaces between ethical positions. There are significant social,
religious, and political pressures to inhabit fully only one frame, and to direct one’s
efforts at realizing the values of that frame. Thus, inhabiting the liminal spaces between
frames may be criticized as indecisiveness or hypocrisy.
Although the bricoleur is criticized for innovation (often considered dubious or
unsanctioned), it is the self-styled engineers and their followers who do not acknowledge
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their own projects of bricolage: Ethical positions, though they are presented as original,
clearly-bounded, and coherent frameworks for living, might themselves be products of
bricolage, just older and sanctioned. Bricolage enriches the ethnography by connecting
the threads of seemingly disparate sites - what do schools have to do with bodybuilders or
city planners? - to weave a picture of everyday experiences of cultural transformation
across the KRI. Thus, my research sites include:
•

A private secondary school with a diverse student body and faculty

•

A government secondary school for Kurdish girls in a poor, rural area

•

Fitness centers, including one gym where I worked as a group fitness
instructor

•

Education planning weekly meetings for NGOs and government officials

•

Youth social gatherings, some focused on fun, such as socializing at
cafes, and some focused on activism, such as volunteering in IDP or
refugee camps

What connected these people and spaces was a shared interest in transformation, a desire
not only to improve oneself, but also to contribute to the betterment of the larger realms
of family, religious community, nation, and state.

Outline of the ethnography
Chapter 2, “Ma’ash nȋya” (“There are no salaries”), introduces Kurdistani
interlocutors grappling with state failures and national disappointments, which constrain
how they realize their own ethical lives. The challenging circumstances of the war against
Daesh, the economic crisis, and alleged government corruption lead people to question
the cultural and political pillars supporting the “nation” and the “state”. Interlocutors
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encounter the purported “goodness” of the mythical Kurdish nation and aspirational
Kurdistani state in social studies classes and in national sites commemorating the nation.
At the same time, they are confronted with harsh, lived realities of cultural and political
practices, such as “patriliny” and sovereignty-making, which make them question the
“goodness” of the “nation.” The chapter also considers how anthropologists likewise
struggle with analyzing ethical life premised on notions of “the good” in field sites that
appear bleak.
Chapter 3, “They Don’t Love Iraq,” reflects on how people critique Kurdistani
society and aspirations to statehood by measuring “Kurdistan” according to their vision
of a “national” and “unified” Iraq. The chapter focuses on teachers and students at
Kurdistan Civilizational School (KCS), a private high school, and one of several spaces
featured in this dissertation, in which people encounter competing ethical positions.
Many people, especially those displaced from elsewhere in Iraq, evaluated their present
situation in Kurdistan by recalling their life in pre-invasion Iraq. These “nostalgic”
interlocutors came of age during the sanctions era, which they recall warmly as a time in
which people supported one another as neighbors and fellow citizens. They contrast their
childhoods, marked by material shortages, with those of their Kurdistani private school
students. Their students enjoy material comforts and security but suffer from their insular
and pampered lifestyles. While some interlocutors expressed resignation about youth
“apathy”, others, like “Mariam” the high school civics teacher, were determined to
rehabilitate the state for the next generation – if not a unified Iraq, then at least a
Kurdistani state committed to the good of all its citizens. Only time will tell if Mariam’s
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vision for restoring the country reached her cynical Kurdistani students, many who dream
of leaving Kurdistan for a better life abroad.
Chapter 4, “This is the Life Here: Ethical Life among Bodybuilders and Gymgoers,” considers how bodybuilding and gym-going narratives contribute to a larger
discourse about broken bodies, state violence, and ethical life in Iraq. Interlocutors assert
that they have created truly “pluralistic” spaces, like “modern” fitness centers, in which
they can work out their own ethical self-formation by escaping, or at least minimizing,
the powers of family, sect, and state. By understanding how Iraqi bodybuilding narratives
both employ and critique tropes about national strength, “modernity”, and pluralism, this
chapter demonstrates how the spread of the global fitness industry offers individual
athletes and their fitness communities a set of ethical practices and an interpretative
framework in the wake of the collapsing Iraqi state. The selves and subjects produced in
discursively “pluralistic” spaces were at odds: People drew upon romanticized notions of
the autonomous individual, which conflicted with the ethnonationalist or religious
citizen-subjecthood desired by administrators, managers, family members, Kurdistani
society, and the emerging Kurdistani state.
Chapter 5, “There is No Future,” offers several vignettes in which interlocutors
express deep doubts about cultural practices, state institutions, and even “causes,” such as
a future Kurdistani state, or a rehabilitated, shared national Iraqi identity. Some people
also struggle with reconciling the everyday experiences of the “immanent frame” with the
transcendent, such as Ashti, the Kurdish teacher who felt “called” to work in Iraqi
Kurdistan but was sliding deeper into despair at the apparent lack of progress in her
students and in her homeland. The concluding chapter, “Bits of Hope,” asks if
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interlocutors’ various modes of ethical positioning, which seem to generate hope and
make life liveable, might also aid anthropologists. Perhaps an anthropology of “hope”
could reinvigorate the discipline by returning to its foundational humanism – to “the
moral obligation to hope” (Geertz 2000) that our efforts can contribute to better
understanding in a “dark” world.
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Ch. 2 “Ma’ash nȋya”: State failures and national disappointments
“Politicians create fresh hells, not dream cities.” - Bakhtiyar Ali, I Stared at the
Night of the City

The first day of school
In the Grade 10 classroom, someone has opened a window. Students sitting close
to the window can feel the prickling, January cold on the back of their necks. There is not
much heating in the school, but the classrooms become stuffy and stale nonetheless. A
truck selling propane gas canisters drives slowly by the school, announcing its
neighborhood rounds with a tinny tune like an American ice cream truck. Later a
vegetable seller passes in his creaky pick-up truck, windows rolled down, shouting,
“Yalla bandora! Yalla kheyar!” (Come get tomatoes! Come get cucumbers!)
It is the first day of the semester at Kurdistan Civilizational School (KCS), a
private K-12 school.3 A group of girls has invited me to sit in an empty desk formerly
belonging to a student who has emigrated with her family to Australia over the Winter
break. In front of me, two girls turn in their desks to face their classmates. “Everyone is
leaving!” laments Ishtar, the group’s apparent leader. She studies me, the newcomer, for
a moment. Then she points to a girl near the front of the room, “She’s leaving next
week!” Ishtar says mock accusingly. The girl spins around and says, “Yes, I’m leaving
for Sweden!”

3

Kurdistan Civilizational School was a network of three campuses located in each of the three Kurdistani
governorates: Duhok, Erbil, and Slemani. Although KCS was locally owned and run, it maintained a
connection with an American NGO. The American influence in the school was intentional, as KCS taught
using curriculum imported from the United States and methods characteristic of “classical Christian
education,” the educational model upon which it was based.
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“It’s colder there than here,” I observe, shivering from the open window. The girls
speak rapidly, code-switching between Kurdish, Arabic, and English.
“We speak like this because we know different languages,” Nergȋz explains. “She
only speaks Arabic and English [gesturing to Ishtar], and we [gesturing to Gulistan]
speak Sorani Kurdish, Arabic and English. It’s based on who you’re talking with, which
language you use.”
“Everyone is leaving,” Gulistan says. “We had two or three in our class leave.
It’s not nice here anymore.”
“Because of the problem with Daesh?” I ask.
“Yes,” said Ishtar. “Because of that. But also because sometimes the classes here
are too hard.”
Their literature teacher, Jamila, enters the room and directs the class to look at
Book 18 of The Odyssey, in which a beggar enters the plot. This class is taught in
English, as most of the KCS courses are, although students sometimes make comments in
Arabic or Kurdish. “Do you think begging is shameful?” Jamila asks the class. The class
seems to think so. “If begging is a choice,” Jamila continues, “then why would people
choose to do something shameful?” Hawar, one of the more vocal male students, gestures
in the direction of a nearby, busy intersection and exclaims in Kurdish, “There are
beggars in this street şerem nȋya (with no shame)!” Jamila nods without comment. (Later
that year, the numerous Syrian refugees, predominantly children, begging at that
intersection disappeared; allegedly, they were rounded up and taken to refugee camps
outside the city.) Jamila moves on to the next event in the plot. She finishes her lesson,
leaves the room, and Bijar the math teacher enters the grade 10 room.
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In math class, Bijar, becomes distracted by a couple of boys in the front who are
struggling with the lesson. He leans over their desk and explains. The girls in the back of
the room take advantage of this interlude and spin around to face each other again. “How
could she kill herself? She was not the type of person to do that. Everyone says so,”
whispers Nergȋz. A 24- year-old lawyer had been found dead in her car near the luxury
residential area “Dream City.” The press was reporting it as a murder, but these girls
were skeptical. Nergȋz described the condition of the body, gesturing to her face and
wrists. I leaned closer and asked, “So do you think it was a murder?”
“Definitely a murder,” Ishtar said, her expression deadly serious.
“Yes, her brother is a police officer,” Gulistan urgently whispered. “Either she or
her brother must have been involved in a bad case, a case that wasn’t closed, you know?”
Mr. Bijar turned again to face the class, and the girls ducked their heads as if working on
their assigned calculations.
During lunch in the cafeteria, several grade 10 students and I gather around one of
the plastic tables. They take turns sharing information I ought to know as a newcomer to
Erbil. “Hewlêr is nice,” one timid girl offers. The students all look at me to hear my
initial impressions of Erbil.
Before I can respond, another student, Noor, concludes the conversation as the
bell rings: “That’s bullshit,” she says, standing up and stalking off toward the high school
building. On the first day of the new semester, students have discussed emigration, the
conflict with Daesh, begging, and a possible murder. Maybe Noor is right, I thought.
---
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(Later, in conversation with grade 10 students)
Layla: I don’t think that I have a future here. Who would have known that one day there
was gonna be no salary?”
Serbest: This is the first time in history that people don’t get a salary.
Layla: How are the people going to live?

“Ma’ash nȋya”
It was a saying, an explanation, an excuse, and an expression of resignation I
heard over and over during my field work: “Ma’ash nȋya,” (“There are no salaries”).
When I asked taxi drivers or service workers about their life in Kurdistan, most often the
reply included, “Ma’ash nȋya.” When I visited a government school to observe classes,
only to find most of the teachers socializing in the break room all morning rather than
teaching their lessons without pay, the explanation offered was, “Ma’ash nȋya.” When I
heard people complain about the prices of goods, they reminded shopkeepers or
managers, “Ma’ash nȋya.” The saying was a reference to the Kurdistan Regional
Government’s months-long freeze and reductions on salaries owed to some 60% of the
population. The phrase also signified systemic dysfunction of state and society. By the
end of my field work, when people asked me what I thought about life in Kurdistan, my
standard reply was, “Khelkȋ Kurdistan bashn, balam ma’ash nȋya” (The people of
Kurdistan are good, but there are no salaries). This answer seemed to satisfy everyone.
Many Kurdistani people struggled to feel hopeful in a landscape marred by cycles
of war and violence and in a time of economic stagnation. My fieldwork (September
2015 - June 2017) occurred during a period of deepening crisis, or qairan, for the
Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). Many of my interlocutors spoke about the qairan, and it
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was the subject of numerous news media reports. Qairan primarily referred to the KRI’s
economic difficulties, although I came to understand that it, like the saying “ma’ash
nȋya,” referred to political and social woes as well. Economic problems stemmed from
several sources: First, the Kurdistan Region had become a “safe haven” for people fleeing
surrounding conflicts, burdening the KRI’s infrastructure. During the 2003-2011 Iraq
war, thousands of people displaced by the violence in Baghdad and southern Iraq settled
in the Kurdistan Region. Starting in 2011, refugees from nearby Syria also began spilling
into the KRI. Then, in June 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), or “Daesh”
as it is known in the Middle East, invaded Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq. Iraqi
military forces abandoned their posts and fled along with hundreds of thousands of
people, most of whom went north to the Kurdistan Region.
In the weeks following, Daesh displaced over 500,000 people and attempted to
exterminate Yezidis, an ethnoreligious minority. The Kurdish peshmerga military forces
led a difficult campaign against Daesh. In August 2014, Daesh captured Kurdishcontrolled areas and sent the peshmerga retreating. People feared ISIS would attempt to
take the Kurdistani capital city of Hewlêr (Erbil). In response, U.S. President Barack
Obama ordered airstrikes to protect American citizens and assets in Erbil. U.S. airstrikes
continued over the next three years as the conflict spread into Syria and as ISIS
sympathizers continued to launch attacks inside and outside Iraq.
Kurdistani people became increasingly demoralized by the protracted conflict
and its effects. An estimated 1.5 million refugees and IDPs living within the Kurdistan
region were straining its power grid; in the intense heat of summer or the damp cold of
winter, electricity was out for hours at a time. There were frequent water shortages.
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Meanwhile, those who could afford better lived in gated, luxury residential compounds
where they noticed only a blip as city electricity (raȋsȋ) went out and expensive, personal
backup generators (mǒlida) switched on. At the same time, the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) was engaged in another conflict: a political disagreement with the
Iraqi federal government. After Kurdish forces took control of Kirkuk in 2014, the KRG
began selling oil independently rather than through the federal Iraqi government.
Consequently, Baghdad began withholding the KRI’s share of the national budget.
(Baghdad did not resume sending revenue to the KRG until March 2018.) With its budget
increasingly strained, the Kurdistani Government began reducing and withholding
salaries. As over half of the KRI’s population was on the government payroll (Joseph and
Sümer 2019), economic stagnation ensued.
It seemed to me that, over the course of my fieldwork, the atmosphere in
Kurdistan gradually darkened. I often heard people speak critically of the Kurdistani
Government, which was rumored to be lining its own members’ pockets while claiming it
could not pay thousands of public sector employees’ salaries. The Kurdistan Democratic
Party (KDP or PDK), the dominant political party, barred several members of Parliament
belonging to rival party Gorran (Change Party) from entering Erbil; resulting protests
turned violent. Kurdistani President Mesud Barzanȋ did not step down when his elected
term ended, citing a state of emergency. As the months dragged on, patriotic displays
rang hollow for some. Families who lost loved ones in the war struggled to make ends
meet. University graduates could not find satisfying work. Many young people I came to
know through my time at the gym and at a local university, felt their lives had stalled
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indefinitely. With the qairan overshadowing Kurdistan, how could anyone generate
hope?
In this chapter, interlocutors living in a time of crisis struggle to conceptualize the
Kurdish “nation,” which is central to thinking about the “state” in Iraq and in the
Kurdistan Region. A sense of “rightness” about one’s nation also is crucial for generating
hope. The stories in this chapter demonstrate how the nation’s disappointments, such as
being denied an independent state or experiencing some negative aspect of Kurdish
national “culture,” are intimately connected with personal disappointments. In their
narrations, interlocutors incorporate national myths, civilizational and regional histories,
and reflections on life in pre-invasion Iraq (before 2003) and experiences while living
abroad. People wrestle especially with how their lived experiences and beliefs fit with, or
do not fit with, their subject positions, as a “Kurdish female,” for example, or as a
returnee from the Kurdish diaspora. Fundamental to conceptualizing the “nation” is a
sense of “rightness” or “goodness” (Anderson 1999) that may not correspond to one’s
lived experiences as a member of, or resident in, that “nation.”

Patriliny and the myth of the Medes
At Kurdistan Civilizational School (KCS), the new komalayatȋ (social studies)
teacher, Karza, was a recent graduate with degrees in sociology and philosophy from a
local Kurdish university. KCS students had experienced a lot of turnover with their
komalayatȋ teachers. Students told me that their previous komalayatȋ teachers did not
answer their questions, did not use the textbook, and instead gave students summaries to
memorize and recall on multiple choice tests. Their new teacher, Karza, employed a
different approach. Karza brought a subversive energy into the classroom, where he
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taught komalayatȋ for students in grades 7, 8, and 9. As required by the Kurdistan
Region’s Ministry of Education, Karza taught directly from the government-issued
komalayatȋ textbook. He sometimes departed from it, however, by raising questions or
including information he learned during his university studies. Although Karza spoke
only Sorani Kurdish and taught his courses in Kurdish, he frequently paused and
permitted his multilingual students to translate for one another, as some students at KCS
spoke Arabic and did not understand Kurdish. Translation often led to debates about
interpretation that departed from the lesson, and Karza encouraged discussion. He
prompted his students to think critically and not to accept everything they were told or
read, including the government-issued social studies textbook. At times, he made subtle,
critical remarks about contemporary politics, connecting the historical content of the
lesson to the present-day.
For example, during one lesson, Karza read aloud from the textbook about the
Islamic history of the region. He paused reading and asked a boy to draw a tank on the
dry erase board. “In 2003, democracy came to America on the back of a tank,” Karza
began. “And long ago, Islam came to Iraq in the same way. Before Muslims came, the
name of this country was Kurdistan. And with Islam came ‘Arab ideas,’ (fiqrȋ ‘arab) and
women became victims.” These comments caught me off guard as I sat in the back of the
classroom taking notes. Karza did not look in my direction, and I wondered if I heard him
correctly. I felt certain that the government issued textbooks contained nothing overtly
critical of Islam or the United States. After class, I confirmed with several students that
what I heard was indeed what Karza said, but the students were puzzled about what point
their teacher wanted to make. It was one of many episodes in which I wondered how my
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presence in the classroom influenced the lessons. But Karza’s political commentary also
was typical of his teaching style, leading students down a critical path but stopping short
of forming a conclusion for them. Some of Karza’s older students appreciated his edgier
approach. Most students, however, were baffled by his sly, indirect references to
contemporary politics, such as the grade 7 students in the following anecdote.
That day, Karza began class by writing on the board, “Media” (referring to the
Median Empire) and “Mediakan” (the Medes). Beside “Media” he wrote “homeland”
(nishtiman) and beside Mediakan he wrote “Kurd.” He turned to face the class, “You
know, like in our national anthem, ‘We are the descendants of the Medes and
Cyaxares.’”
This was a revelation for the grade 7 students, who exclaimed in unison,
“Oh!” Karza described the capital city of the Medes, and he explained that before the
religions of Christianity and Islam came to Kurdistan, there was another religion called
“Zoroastrianism.”
“Is Zoroastrianism the Kurdish religion?” asked Welat.
“There were many religions,” Karza replied, “but the Medes at that time were
Zoroastrian.”
Then Karza wrote “Diaoku” on the board. Karza explained that Diaoku was the
man who established the Medes and was the first Kurd.
“So Diaoku is like the first Kurdish father?” asked Heba. Karza nodded and
explained to the class how Diaoku’s line came to an end when Diaoku’s great grandson,
Astyages, had no male heir and arranged for his daughter, Mandane, to marry a Persian
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man. Mandane’s marriage to a foreigner was not only the end of Diaoku’s patriline, but
the end of the Median civilization.
The Komalayatȋ textbook, and Karza’s lesson, probably drew upon Herodotus’
account of the “history” of the Medes. According to Herodotus, the Median King
Diaoku’s great-grandson Astyages was the last king of the Medes. King Asytyages feared
his daughter Mandane. This was because Astyages had two dreams, one in which
Mandane urinated all over Asia, drowning its inhabitants, and another in which a vine
spread from Mandane’s genitals and covered all of Asia. Fearful of his daughter’s
potential progeny, he married Mandane to a Persian man named Cambyses. When
Mandane gave birth to a son, Asytages ordered to have the baby killed because his
advisers, or magi, believed Mandane’s child would replace Astyages as king. The magi
advised Astyages, saying, “Sire, it means a great deal to us that you continue to rule
securely and successfully, because if your rule were to pass to this Persian boy, it will
come into the hands of others, and the Persians will make us their slaves and despise us,
since we are foreigners to them” (67). Through a series of twists and turns, Mandane’s
baby boy, Cyrus, is not killed and, as an adult, leads the Persians in battle to overthrow
Astyages and conquer the Medes. Herodatus concludes, “Now the Medes would become
slaves instead of masters, through no offense of their own, and the Persians, the former
slaves of the Medes, would become their masters” (71).
Karza mentioned to the class that Diaoku’s male successors were Phraortes,
Cyaxares, and Astyages.
“What was Diaoku’s wife’s name? And what was Astyages’ wife’s name?” asked
Pinar, one of the more extroverted girls in the class.
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“I don’t know,” Karza shrugged.
“But weren’t they famous?” Pinar pressed him.
“We don’t know their names,” Karza admitted, “but there have been many
famous and important women in our history.”
“Like who?” Pinar asked.
“There is a famous Kurdish woman, a legend,” Karza began. Then he told the
class about how this woman worked in an important government office, which was a
great achievement, especially at a time when few women occupied high positions in the
government. Her marriage to an Arab man, however, was a source of controversy. Prior
to this class, I also had heard about this controversy. People said that it was traitorous and
denigrating for a Kurdish woman from a respected family to marry an Arab man already
in a polygynous marriage (permissible in Islam, but socially controversial in Kurdistan).
Some Kurdish people I knew had described Arabs as their “enemy,” or at least had
expressed distrust of Arabs, due to cycles of conflict and genocide, most famously the
Anfal genocide against Kurds. Other people argued that marrying “for love” was all that
mattered. Knowing this, I wondered if the komalayatȋ teacher was drawing a connection
between a contemporary Kurdish female politician’s “mixed-marriage” with an “enemy,”
and the mythical “failure” of the Median line when female Median royalty mixed with
enemy Persians.
Karza concluded the lesson by telling a version of the Newroz myth about Kawa
the blacksmith, a Mede who rebelled against an evil Persian king oppressing the Medes.
After Karza dismissed the class, I lingered in the classroom to ask a couple students about
their understanding of the lesson. They repeated the highlights to me. One of the boys
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turned to Karza, who was erasing the board, and asked, “Was the problem that the
daughter [Mandane] married a Persian man?”
Karza simply answered, “Yes.”

In Iraqi Kurdistan, it would be difficult to imagine the Kurdish nation without its
foundational patrilineages. They include ancient lineages, like Diaoku’s lineage in the
myth of the Medes, as well as patrilineages from more recent history, such as the three
generations of the Barzanȋ family whose members have figured prominently in Iraqi
Kurdistan’s political life. One of the strongest contributors to and stabilizers of Kurdish
identity is patrilineal kinship, in which a person inherits ethnic and religious identity from
his or her father (King 2014). In the komalayatȋ lesson, Karza drew upon the logics of
patrilineal kinship, or “patriliny,” when he spoke of the “failure” of a Median royal
woman marrying a Persian man, thus producing children who were not considered Medes
but Persians. Consequently, the Median royal line was absorbed into the Persian nation,
and the Persians later rebelled and conquered their former masters, the Medes.
The logic of patriliny also is at work in contemporary Iraq, as it is across much of
the Middle East, North Africa, and Asia. For example, the child of an Arab Christian
mother and a Kurdish Muslim father would be recognized, both by social convention and
by the state, as Kurdish and Muslim, the same identity categories ascribed to their father.
The Iraqi state and the Kurdistan Regional Government use patrilineal identity categories
to assign their citizens religious and ethnic identity categories and to confer citizenship,
as do the majority of states in the Middle East (King 2018). Patrilineal kinship has
significant legal implications, connecting people to land and determining how property
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can be passed from individuals. Many people can trace their genealogy through several
generations, especially if they belong to an esteemed lineage, such as the descendants of
the Prophet Muhammad.
At the heart of Karza’s lesson about the mythical rise and fall of the Kurdish
nation was a failed patriline. It failed because a Kurdish woman had a child with a man
from not just the wrong patrilineage, but the wrong nation. In other lessons, Karza
commented that the Kurdish nation (gel or millet) has been the pawn of its more powerful
neighbors, Iran and Turkey, for centuries. Many times, Karza expressed frustration that
Kurdish people are the perpetual pawn of their foreign masters, whether Persian or
Iranian, Ottoman or Turkish. Likewise, historian David McDowall (2004) observes that,
“The pattern of nominal submission to central government, be it Persian, Arab or
subsequently Turkic, alongside the assertion of as much local independence as possible,
became an enduring theme in Kurdish political life” (21). In drawing upon the logic of
patriliny, Karza drew a line from the original “failure” of the Median / Kurdish line to
contemporary fears about Iran and Turkey.
Within Kurdistan, certain lineages, such as the Barzanȋ family and their
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), have become the dominant political players and
guardians of national mythology. Some people criticized how the Barzanȋs control the
Kurdish ethnonationalist narrative and regulate displays of nationalism. Karza, for
example, critiqued contemporary politics by contextualizing them within a foundational
national myth that provided a narrative structure in which the Barzanȋ family, Iran, and
Turkey play archetypal roles in contemporary politics. Many of my interlocutors,
however, spoke of Kurdish nationalism as existing beyond a tribe or political party; they
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appealed to a deeper, larger struggle spanning time and territory. The struggles of the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey, for instance, or of Rojava, the Kurdish
autonomous region in Syria, represent “greater Kurdistan,” an enduring and noble nation,
beyond the provincial cause of a de facto state run by an oligarchy in Iraqi Kurdistan.

The “goodness” of nations
Benedict Anderson (1991), who famously, and perhaps romantically (Chatterjee
1999), conceptualized the nation as an “imagined community,” was nonetheless aware of
the dangers of nationalisms, such as colonialism, racism, and genocide. People living in
Iraq and in the Kurdistan Region know these dangers all too well. Despite all the “wrong”
nations can do, however, we have not abandoned the concept of the “nation.” Anderson
speculated this is because the “nation” represents an essential “goodness” for its people in
a way that religion does not. Anderson observes that one cannot say, “My religion, right
or wrong,” as it would negate that religion’s claims on truth and adherents. Conversely,
one could believe in an essential “goodness” of one’s nation, whether its current rulers do
“right” or “wrong”:
For if nations can, at least hypothetically, be ‘wrong,’ this wrongness is
temporary, and is always set against a more permanent ‘good.’ The question then
is – and one poses it in opposition to the eternal goodness of religion – what is the
source of this goodness, given that the nation, no matter how grandly conceived,
is intrahistorical (it has no place in heaven or in hell)? I argue that we need to
think about innocence, or, more precisely, about who, in the national ambience,
guarantees the nation’s ultimate blamelessness” (1999:197).
The nation embodies the goodness of the dead, the living, and the unborn. During
times of crisis, the nation’s leaders invoke the sacrifices made by the nation’s dead,
compelling the living citizens to make similar sacrifices to ensure the future of the nation,
symbolized by the unborn. Many scholars have since critiqued Anderson’s “imagined
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communities”, and I do not examine those critiques here. Rather, I take up Anderson’s
inquiry about the “goodness” of nations, approaching it not through history or philosophy
but through ethnography.
I argue that what is at stake in encounters with the Kurdish “nation” and its
purported “goodness” are not merely the political ramifications of successfully or
unsuccessfully cultivating patriotic sentiment or gaining international support for an
independent Kurdistani state. Also at stake are individuals’ ethical sensibilities, their
sense of purpose and identity formed through their participation (or non-participation) in
the ethical dimensions of nationalisms and state-making. The ethnographic accounts in
this chapter, which feature Kurdistani people encountering, conceptualizing, and
responding to the “nation,” demonstrate how individual projects of ethical-self formation
become entangled with the “goodness” of the nation.
In what follows, I examine how the genealogy of Kurdish nationalisms and statemaking contributes to contemporary Kurdistani subjectivities, that is, to the way that
people living in the Kurdistan Region conceptualize selfhood and understand their
relationships to other individuals, as well as to collectivities like their family, religious
community, nation, and state. The ways in which people have conceptualized Kurdish
identity and nationalisms have shaped not only everyday discourse, but also scholarship
on Kurdistan. “Deep-seated Western views” of language and culture (Allison 2018) and
orientalist epistemologies have constrained how foreign and local academics and
politicians approach Kurdish identity and politics (Hassanpour 1993), which a new
generation of scholars, including many ethnic Kurds, is challenging (Al-Ali et al. 2020).
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Decolonizing Kurdish nationalisms and state-making
Throughout this dissertation, I refer to the Kurdish “nation,” “Kurdish
nationalism” or “ethnonationalism,” and the “Kurdistani state.” Using these terms
critically requires examining the genealogy of narratives, academic and popular, about
Kurdish identity and nationalism. A reevaluation of Kurdish studies is long overdue, as
argued by a recent “Decolonizing Kurdish Studies” roundtable comprised of a new
generation of scholars, many of Kurdish origin (Al-Ali et al. 2020). The discipline of
anthropology likewise is confronting its history of complicity with colonization (Jobson
2020; Allen and Jobson 2016; Harrison 2011), including knowledge production about the
Middle East North Africa (MENA) region (Asad 1973; Deeb and Winegar 2015; Makdisi
2008; Sharkey 2008). Reassessing epistemologies and methods within Kurdish studies
and within anthropology is especially relevant for research about Kurdistan, a territory
which was, and in many ways still is, a “colony” of the modern state (Kurt 2020).
Knowledge production about Kurdish people and Kurdistan has been
concentrated in the West, produced by imperial or colonial agents and by researchers.
Western and orientalist epistemologies have dominated how foreign and local academics
and politicians approach Kurdish identity and politics (Hassanpour 1993; Al-Ali et al.
2020). Kurdish studies scholars, including many academics of Kurdish origin, often focus
their work on Kurdish nationalism and the possibility of Kurdistani statehood, and thus
overlook many other aspects of Kurdish or Kurdistani lifeways. During my fieldwork, I
encountered scholarly preoccupation with Kurdish nationalism on many occasions. The
most memorable of these encounters occurred when I gave an invited lecture for faculty
members at a local university in 2017. The organizer asked me to talk about my ongoing
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research, so I accepted the opportunity, hoping to promote anthropology. I knew that my
discipline was little-understood and respected in my field site, especially relative to
prestigious fields like medicine and engineering.
Faculty in attendance at my talk mainly worked in science and technology fields,
as the university skewed toward STEM education. Overall, faculty reactions were not
favorable. While some faculty criticized anthropological methods during the questionand-answer segment, commenting, for example, that “anthropology is not a real science,”
others complained that I was missing the point: Why was I socializing with youth in
schools and fitness centers? Why was I not interviewing politicians and experts? Would
not Kurdish nationalism be a more important and relevant subject, considering the
upcoming independence referendum? The consensus was that I had misapprehended my
field site.
The critical response reflected, in part, the timing of my talk during a politically
tense moment in the months before the 2017 independence referendum. At another
faculty talk, I observed heavy criticism of a foreign guest lecturer who argued that the
Kurdistan Region should not pursue forming an independent Kurdish state, a very
unpopular opinion at the time. What struck a nerve, I believe, was that I was ignoring
local “experts” and their opinions about an urgent issue. Instead, I was listening to
children and young adults talk about their relatively privileged lives while the rest of the
country suffers: Wealthy young people, with the latest iPhone model, hanging around
expensive malls and cafes or sitting idly at home playing video games or watching
American movies, while refugees beg on street corners and live inside abandoned
construction sites. Seemingly self-absorbed bodybuilders and gym-goers paying one or
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two hundred dollars a month for gym membership, when many people struggled to pay
their rent and feed their families. Including privileged youth in my research, however,
does not belittle or erase the suffering of others. The painful histories and present
situations of Kurdish people, as well as of many other groups of people who have
suffered violence in Iraq, are woven throughout my ethnography.
Kurdish nationalism and the Kurdistani state are intimately connected with
longstanding narratives about Kurdish people. Internationally, the following narrative
outline about Kurdistan is well-known: Kurds are the largest ethnic group in the world
without a state, and they are the fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle East. They have
suffered seemingly endless cycles of violence and many betrayals by their alleged allies,
reflected in the oft repeated saying, “The Kurds have no friends but the mountains.”
Mountainous terrain ties together much of greater Kurdistan. Those who have sought to
control this territory, from the seventh century Arab conquests to modern states, have
been thwarted by the difficulty of governing mountainous terrain occupied by numerous
independent Kurdish tribes and emirates skilled in the “art of not being governed” (Scott
2010). The “Kurds have no friends but the mountains” narrative has been effective in
garnering support for Kurdish causes; it is employed, for example, by advocates of
American-Kurdish political allyship (Mansfield 2014).
Such narratives portray Kurdish people as highly nationalistic and resistant to
imperial and state formations, and thus often the victims of imperial and state violence.
These narratives endure in political and academic discourse, shored up by scholarship
that reifies Kurdish identity and politics. Kurdish Studies scholarship often focuses on
elaborating Kurdish origins and demonstrating a historical, unified “Kurdish” identity.
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For example, Wadie Jwaideh (2006) argues that, “A strong sense of nationality has
existed among Kurds for a very long time. Although a people of mixed origin, the Kurds
constitute a nationality that has proved its vigor throughout the ages” (290). Jwaideh
attributes a strong sense of Kurdish national consciousness to the Kurds’ “peculiar
mountain culture” which is the “product of environmental, geographic, and historical
forces that have combined to shape the general configuration of Kurdish life and
institutions” (291). Likewise, Peter Hahn (2012) describes the Kurds as a “militant
mountain people of a distinct ethnic and linguistic identity” (16), language echoing
colonial racial typologies characterizing some groups, such as the Iraqi Assyrian levies,
as “martial races.”
On the other hand, some scholars critique the idea of a unified Kurdish identity
predating World War I. Historian David McDowall argues that “it is extremely doubtful
that the Kurds form an ethnically coherent whole in the sense that they have a common
ancestry.” Kurds are most likely the descendants of various Indo-European tribes who
moved westward from Iran some 3500 years ago (2004:8). McDowall maintains that “the
Kurds only really began to think and act as an ethnic community from 1918 onwards” in
the era of Wilsonian self-determination (2003:4). Anthropologist Martin van Bruinessen
notes that the term “Kurd” or “Akrad” (its Arabic plural) historically was used to refer to
all non-Arab nomadic and tribal people; only gradually did people come to use the term
to refer to a specific ethnic group (1992a:111). Van Bruinessen speculates that the
“underdevelopment” of Kurdistan, exacerbated by difficult travel and the inaccessibility
of villages, hindered Kurdish nationalist movements, making “primordial ties” all the
more important (1992:20-21). Consequently, van Bruinessen suggests that identity
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dichotomies were intensified, hinging upon a “dualistic world-view” of “my enemies’
enemy is my friend” (1992:77), which brings to mind Fredrik Barth’s (1969) classic
theorization of ethnic boundaries.
Kurdish identity, or Kurdayetȋ, as conventionally understood today, is based on
language and ethnic self-identification, as well as other modes of Kurdishness, like dress,
custom, or cuisine, which are said to signify Kurdish ethnicity (Celiker 2013; Bruinessen
1992b). In some contexts, “Kurdish” cultural markers may differ little from surrounding
cultural groups. Perhaps the strongest case for unified Kurdish cultural identity can be
made for language, as Yalçin -Heckman argues (1991:27). Some scholars have argued
that varieties of Kurdish are “dialects” of the same language, which reinforces a sense of
pan-Kurdish identity or national unity; conversely, “dialects” may be more accurately
described as distinct languages belonging to a Kurdish language family (Ghazi 2009).
Empires and states historically have subjugated their Kurdish populations through
suppression of Kurdish language and culture. The Arab conquest brought Islam and the
Arabic language to the region that is now Kurdistan. Some of my Kurdistani interlocutors
regarded Arabic and Islam, especially more conversative variants of Islam, as hindrances
to the Kurdish cause at best, and at worst, as “colonizing consciousness,” to borrow a
phrase from John and Jean Comaroff (1991). Successive empires, like the Mongols and
later the Ottomans, perpetuated linguistic domination over their subject peoples. The
states created after World War I, such as Turkey and Iraq, continued Kurdish linguistic
and cultural suppression to varying extents (Hassanpour 1996; Fernandes 2008; Salih
2019). Since its creation in 1921, Iraq has maintained official recognition and language
rights of its Kurdish population, but, as Christine Allison notes, these rights “have always
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fallen short of Kurdish demands, which have been a leitmotif of Kurdish resistance”
(Allison 2018:21).
Kurdish resistance and aspirations to statehood have become the focal point of
scholarship on Kurdish identities in Iraq. A rich body of literature examines Iraqi
identities through the lenses of Pan-Arabism, Iraqi nationalism, and sectarian, class, and
urban-rural divides (Batatu 1978; Davis 2005; Longrigg 1953; Bashkin 2008; Eppel
1998). However, Kurdish experiences of identity formation within this literature typically
are regarded as provincial, with the modern state at the center of identity formation in
Iraq. Thus, Kurdish identity, like other minority identities in Iraq (Bashkin 2012), is
reduced to a kind of “otherness,” conceptualized primarily through its opposition to
imperial (Ottoman or British) and state formations (Iraq, Iran, Syria, or Turkey).
Scholarship which views ethnic plurality as inherently problematic within the modern
Iraqi state also reproduces Kurdish “otherness.” In this literature, the formation and
contestation of collective identities typically are conceptualized with the Iraqi state at the
center, undergirded by some idea of “Iraqi nationality,” whether unified or “fragmented”
(Zubaida 2002). Iraqi nationality competes with pan-Arabism, or with ethnic and
territorial nationalisms such as with the Kurdish population of Iraq.
As Arbella Bet-Shlimon (2019) argues in her study of Kirkuk, the “boundaries of
the nation-state” too often limit conceptualizing identities in Iraqi society. Bet-Shlimon
observes that historical and contemporary narratives about Kirkuk approach the fact of
ethnic pluralism as problematic and as a threat to the nation state. In the historical record
and in the present day, however, many people in Iraq claim multiple or hybrid identities
that do not correspond neatly to state-recognized identity categories. Furthermore, some
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people are ethnically or nationally “indifferent” to the identity categories assigned to
them by external powers, (Bet-Shlimon 2019, citing Zahra 2010) until those identity
categories are used by the state or groups to lay claim to territory and resources.
We have seen how popular discourse, political rhetoric, and some scholarship
perpetuate certain narratives about Kurdish identity and politics. These narratives are
problematic because they reproduce the colonial gaze; rely on a state-centered approach
that marginalizes Kurdistan; reify identity categories according to Western notions about
“ethnicity”; and reduce power struggles between groups and the state to “sectarianism.”
Such narratives are especially egregious considering the ways in which Kurdistan
continues to be marginalized, both as a political reality and as an object of study. As
Lissa Malkki (1995) has argued, theorizing group identities with reference to states and
the “national order of things” pathologizes “stateless” populations. For the reasons
outlined above, I use the broader and more inclusive term “Kurdistani” to refer to people
residing in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. I use the ethnic designation “Kurdish” only
when people self-identify or ascribe this identity to others, and I do not refer uncritically
to “Kurdish” or any other identity categorization.

Kurdistani sovereignty as a contested good
Central to my interlocutors’ encounters with nationalisms and state-making is the
contested power to define and ascribe “Kurdish” and “Kurdistani” identities, or
conversely, “Iraqi.” Encounters with the “nation” occur in sites familiar to
anthropologists of sovereignty and the state, such as contexts of Foucauldian disciplinary
power like schools, or “spaces of exception” like camps (Agamben 1998). Nationalist
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messaging in textbooks, in the classroom, and in patriotic ceremonies at schools are all
well-trodden territory for anthropologists of youth and nationalism in the Middle East
(Adely 2012; Kaplan 2006; Altinay 2004; Herrera 2006). People predictably encounter
Kurdish nationalist ideology and imagery at “national” sites, like the Barzanȋ Memorial
Center described in the following section. Another key site for contesting sovereignty is
the ubiquitous refugee or IDP camp, found throughout the Kurdistan Region, including
informal camps like the Yezidi settlement described in chapter one, and formal,
government-regulated camps, like the camp for Syrian Kurds which appears later in this
chapter.
Theorizing sovereignty has been a key concern of the discipline of anthropology,
from classic studies on kingship and authority (e.g., Evans-Pritchard 1940), to the
emergence in the 1990s of the anthropologies of the state and globalization which
examine modern forms of governance and the regulation of bodies and populations
(Aretxaga 2003; Sharma and Gupta 2006; Das 2004; Humphrey 2004). In the past couple
decades, anthropologists have critiqued “the sign of sovereignty itself as a category of
Western political thought,” (Bonilla 2017:330), which approaches statehood and selfdetermination as if they were “one and the same” across the postcolonial world (Kauanui
2017:327). Western concepts of sovereignty also may be problematic because they are
premised upon the classically liberal “fiction” of “autonomous individuals” (Rose 1996).
Anthropologists continue challenging “the rationalization of sovereignty as
simply the unification of power and the basic concept of political organization” (Kauanui
2017:328), instead approaching sovereignty as “a tentative and always emergent form of
authority grounded in violence” (Hansen and Stepputat 2006). Studies of settler
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colonialism reveal how sovereignty is both a conceptual framework and a discourse that
produces particular experiences of political life (Sturm 2017; Simpson 2014; Ford 2010).
For example, Amal Bishara’s work in Palestine demonstrates how people enact
“provisional popular sovereignties” based in “insistent confrontation or quiet acts of
caring for community in the face of abandonment” (Bishara 2017:350). Although popular
sovereignties may not impact the political order, they can, however, “challenge the
legitimacy of state authorities, create new forms of collectivity, and forge new ideas of
how power should function, even though they have not ultimately restructured state
power” (350).
In her work on Kurdish women’s resistance movements in Turkey, Marlene
Schäfers (2020) shows how “familial and personal relationships are crucial sites where
expectations of political loyalty and allegiance take on shape and substance but are also
negotiated and contested” (120). When political movements become institutionalized in
everyday life, “sovereignty becomes just as much a social as a political project, one that
is lodged at the heart of ordinary life and the intimate relations of kinship, sexuality, and
friendship” (120). The embeddedness of sovereignties in the “everyday, the personal, and
the intimate lends ‘projects of sovereignty’ immense strength while simultaneously
rendering their claims to power continually vulnerable to competing loyalties” (Schäfers
2020:121). Schäfers observes that it is “precisely those moments of vulnerability when
loyalties compete, conflict, or overlap,” which are “particularly valuable from an
analytical point of view, because they allow us to observe the contours of the social labor
that goes into the making and maintenance of sovereignty” (2020:121).
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The sites of contested sovereignty throughout Kurdistan, such as schools and
camps, are not new ethnographic or analytical territory for thinking about sovereignty,
but they are underutilized sites for exploring the intersections of “sectarianism” and
“contests of values.” Rather than analyzing these sites through the anthropology of
sovereignty, I approach “sovereignty” as a contested “good” within a framework of value
pluralism. Many of my interlocutors were engaged in a struggle to meet the demands of
various ethical regimes, and subsequently pursue certain “goods,” while also pursuing
individual projects of sovereignty, or personal “dreams.” My interlocutors, sometimes by
choice and other times by force, participate in spaces of contested individual, collective,
national, and state sovereignties. The incursion of political loyalties, such as the ethical
dimensions of nationalism and state-making, into the “loyalties” of personal life, such as
kinship and friendship, deeply impacts Kurdistani subjectivities and forms of belonging.
Political incursions into personal life can be painful and disruptive. In the vignettes
following, interlocutors’ encounters with the “nation” leaving some people wondering if
“sovereignty” and nationalisms are “goods” worth pursuing in contemporary Kurdistan.

National sites
On a chilly day in mid-March 2017, when the winter had not quite yielded to
spring, the mouth of Shanidar cave was shrouded in mist. Surrounding the cave, as far as
the eye could see, rose the jagged Zagros mountains, whose peaks disappeared into grey,
heavy clouds. A new Kurdish acquaintance, “Sěbr,” was leading us (myself and my
husband) on a three-day tour around the Kurdistan Region to visit historic and cultural
sites. I had requested that we visit Shanidar cave. The site became world-famous in the
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late 1950s and early 1960s, when Neanderthal remains were excavated there by
Columbia University archaeologist Ralph Solecki and a team of Kurdish workers. Traces
of flower pollen, presumably brought into the cave by humans to commemorate the dead,
were considered the oldest and best example of ritualistic human burial. (Later
researchers argued that the pollen may have been the result of animal activity.) Shanidar
appears in the Kurdistani government-issued social studies (komalayatȋ) curriculum, and
the KRG’s official tourism website includes a page about the cave. At the time of my
visit, the site seemed neglected, with litter scattered everywhere and some weathered
didactic panels about the cave’s history that needed replacing. Managing this out-of-the
way-site was probably a low priority at the time for the Kurdistani Government, of
course, as it was dealing with a war and an economic crisis.
We returned to Sěbr’s SUV and headed toward the Barzan region. From the
backseat, I asked questions about Kurdish nationalism, and our guide responded by
telling us stories about corruption. In one story, Sěbr witnessed a shady governmentbusiness deal being made. He said that for a time after, he worried someone would
threaten him or something bad might happen to him because he knew about the deal. But
to his amazement, nothing happened because “they do this openly. There is no secret,” he
scoffed.
When we reached a security checkpoint near our destination, Sěbr told the guards
that we were tourists just passing through the area. He did not mention that we were
going to visit the Barzanȋ National Memorial center commemorating Kurdish
revolutionary leader Mullah Mustafa Barzanȋ. From the 1940s until his death in 1979,
Mullah Mustafa Barzanȋ was one of the primary leaders of Kurdish resistance movements
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against the Iraqi and Iranian governments. “If we tell them here that we are going to the
memorial, they will have television cameras and will interview you, and you will be on
the evening news, ‘Foreigners come to honor the late Mullah Mustafa Barzanȋ,’” Sěbr
chuckled. Because it was the month of Mullah Mustafa’s birthday and the Newroz spring
holiday, many people were visiting the memorial.

Figure 2 Kurdish women from Zakho gathered for a group photo during their visit to the
Memorial Center, March 2017. Photo by the author.
We drove a few minutes more, reached the memorial gates, and parked in a small
lot. Sěbr asked if I would cover my hair out of respect. “We won’t be here long,” he said
as if to reassure me I would not be covering my hair for an extended period. I tucked my
short hair inside a knit beanie.
As we walked slowly through the memorial complex, Sěbr pointed out a large
building, with a banquet hall said to hold up to 1500 guests. He pointed to the building’s
three domes “representing the three religions in Kurdistan.”
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“Which three?” I asked.
“Islam, Christianity, and Yezidi,” he replied. Earlier in the day, Sěbr told us that
his grandmother converted from Judaism to Islam. Her conversion caused quite a stir in
their small town, Sěbr explained, because it was “not necessary” for Christian or Jewish
women to convert when marrying a Muslim man. I waited to see if he had any comments
about religious representation at the memorial, especially about the absence of Judaism,
but he remained silent. Looming over us, an enormous Kurdistani flag flapped in the cold
wind.
The graves themselves were simple stone slabs with inscriptions. A short stone
wall enclosed the little cemetery, and vivid green grass was growing over the graves.
Quiet, respectful people left small bouquets of nergiz, the pale-yellow daffodil popular
during the Spring Newroz season. As soon as we approached the cemetery, a young man
dressed traditionally in jli kurdi noticed us and walked quickly in our direction, snapping
photos with his large camera. Sěbr was telling us about the inscriptions, but I was
distracted by the photographer, who circled around us while our friend talked. Finally, the
photographer introduced himself, saying he worked for the memorial archive, and that he
photographs all foreign visitors. Sěbr gave us a knowing look.
Our guide seemed eager to leave the memorial and continue our tour, but like a
good host, he waited patiently whenever we saw something that interested us. Other
memorial visitors began approaching us, smiling nervously, and asking to take group
selfies with us. I chatted with some young Kurdish women from the town of Zakho who
were travelling together for the holiday; my husband posed with a couple families. As we
walked back toward the parking lot, I noticed a banner in Sorani Kurdish and read aloud,
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“Mullah Mustafa nasnamay netewanȋ gelȋ Kurd.” Turning to Sěbr, I asked, “‘Mullah
Mustafa is the identity of the Kurdish nation,’ is that translation right?”
“Yes,” he said, glancing toward the banner.
“Is Mullah Mustafa a national hero?” Kyle (my husband) asked.
“The Barzanȋs want to make him one, but most people, especially outside Erbil
and Duhok provinces, in Slemanȋ and in greater Kurdistan, do not consider him a hero.
Rather, he is the opposite,” Sěbr replied drily. He stopped walking and hesitated,
observing a large tent beside the banner. “Do you want to eat in the tent? They serve a
small meal to visitors. Every year they spend millions of dollars, some of it to feed all the
guests to the memorial.”
I nodded. “If it’s not too much trouble.”
We stepped inside the tent. Around one dozen men and women, probably
relatives, clustered at one end of a long row of tables pushed together. Sěbr led us to the
other end, where an old man sat eating alone. The old man asked about us, and the family
at the other end quieted to hear Sěbr’s brief explanation. A staff member brought us a
platter of bread to share, and for each person, a plate of bulgur, a small bowl of lentil
soup, and a flimsy plastic water cup.
Sěbr looked disappointed. “This is a military meal,” he sighed.
“There’s no raw onion either,” the old man added.
After our meal, we stood outside the tent, sipping small cups of hot, sugary black
tea and chatting with other visitors for a few minutes. Sěbr motioned for us to return to
the vehicle. He seemed tense. As we pulled out of the memorial center, I apologized,
saying, “Maybe we stayed too long.”
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Sěbr said it was “fine,” though his tone of voice and taut expression said
otherwise.

Sěbr, like many Kurdish people I met, expressed disillusionment with political
life in Iraqi Kurdistan. As we visited sites across the Kurdistan Region, Sěbr’s remarks
seemed to follow a “script,” benign running commentary that gave an overall positive
impression of the Kurdistan Region. I imagine he had used this script countless times in
his career as a tour guide for international visitors to the Kurdistan Region, mostly
“retired people interested in Mesopotamia,” he chuckled. Knowing that I was interested
to hear not just a polite script but also his opinions, Sěbr gradually disclosed them. He
had become cynical through repeated encounters with the Kurdistani Government, its
agents, its policies, and its “scripts,” such as when he gave tours for “important”
international visitors. Throughout our trip with Sěbr, he offered us the official script, but
he prefaced his “scripted” remarks. He drew our attention to how the Kurdistani
Government would want the Kurdistan Region portrayed and contrasted that “good”
image with how he and people he knew experienced life in the Kurdistan Region.
When we visited the Barzanȋ Memorial Center, he spoke in a resigned tone, and
his comments were tinged with bitterness: About how we international visitors might be
received eagerly and how our visit might be filmed and reported in news media, as he had
witnessed many times when working as a tour guide. About how the Memorial Center
conflated the Kurdish nation with the Barzanȋ clan, evidenced by the banner declaring
Mullah Mustafa Barzanȋ to be the “identity” of the Kurdish nation. And when he pointed
out the three domes representing the “three religions of Kurdistan,” the lack of
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representation of other religions, including his own partial-Jewish ancestry, was made
more obvious by Sěbr’s grim silence.
On our way to visit the Yezidi holy site of Lalish in the Duhok Governorate, we
passed by several camps for IDPs. Near the town of Sheikhan, Sěbr pulled the vehicle
over on a hillside, where we had a view overlooking an expansive IDP camp. The sky
was grey and misty. White tents flapping in the cold wind stood out starkly against the
red-brown mud of the plains. Sěbr complained that Yezidi IDPs had suffered more than
other internally displaced people because Christian churches, foreign and local, only
supported Christian IDPs. Throughout our tour, Sěbr made oblique remarks about the
Kurdistan Regional Government’s “inability” to direct money to certain relief efforts or
to pay government sector salaries.

Figure 3. Refugee camp near Sheikhan, March 2017. Photo by the author.
During our evening meal in a café, Sěbr ate half-heartedly and told us his story.
When he was a teenager in the 1990s, Sěbr paid a man to smuggle him out of Iraq. For
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weeks, Sěbr and a handful of other people trekked through the mountains crossing the
Iraq-Turkey border. The smuggler abandoned them without food or water for two days in
a filthy rice paddy; people sobbed from hunger and thirst and incessant mosquitos. At one
point in their journey, the refugees were instructed to hide inside cotton bales on a truck.
It was miserably hot, and the cotton stuck to their sweaty bodies. Finally, they reached
Greece, where Greek people “were kind because of our mutual enemy, the Turks.” But
the refugees had to sleep in a park that gay men used for clandestine meetups. In the
morning, the police dispersed the sleepers with water hoses, which was welcome, Sěbr
said, smiling sadly, because they had not showered in weeks. Eventually, Sěbr made it to
London, where he worked his way up in the restaurant industry. Like many people in the
Kurdish diaspora, he returned to the Kurdistan Region during the relatively stable and
prosperous 2000s. With his savings, he paid 250,000 dollars in advance to secure a house
in a new residential construction project in Erbil. When the real estate industry tanked,
Sěbr sold his unfinished house at a huge loss.
For the last leg of the tour, we stopped in the town of Akre, famous for its Newroz
(new year) celebrations. Our friends in Erbil had encouraged us to borrow their jilȋ Kurdȋ
to wear when visiting Akre. Sěbr regarded the traditional Kurdish clothing my husband
and I wore for the occasion with a mix of amusement and resignation, perhaps having
seen many tourists also eager to participate in Kurdish “culture.” Waving us off, Sěbr
stayed with his vehicle and chain smoked. From a crowded rooftop, we watched
fireworks and men bearing torches marching up the mountains surrounding Akre.
Another rooftop spectator pointed out to me a separate procession of women bearing
torches marching up a different mountain.
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After the fireworks and toward the end of the festivities, there was a frantic rush
of spectators as everyone tried to return to their homes and vehicles. Myself, my husband,
and a few other people were quickly enveloped by a column of hundreds of rowdy young
men, some bearing torches or firearms. In that moment, I realized how quickly the
festivities had changed from a family-friendly affair to a dangerous one. During the drive
home, I casually mentioned to Sěbr that I had been “harassed” by men in the street. Sěbr,
not taking his eyes off the road, replied flatly, “That is how people are here,” and why he
preferred not to attend such events.
On the drive home, I thought about how the “nation” can take many forms, like
the large meals of dolma and biryani we enjoyed in friends’ homes; picnics in the
countryside during the Newroz holiday; or the families strolling in around the bazaar
fountains eating ice cream in the cool evening. That night, the nation I observed was
personified by aggressive men dominating the public space of a national cultural event
celebrating the endurance and “goodness” of the Kurdish nation. But it was not good for
all.
From female acquaintances, I heard a range of stories about gender-based
violence, from sexual harassment to “honor killings.” Some people spoke with sadness
about severely curtailed opportunities for women, like when Ashti told me how her
paternal uncle forbade her from going to school after age eleven. Some expressed
frustration, such as female students who complained to me that their families would not
permit them to study abroad but allowed their brothers. And many expressed mixed
frustration and resignation about cultural gender norms, including men like Sȇbr the tour
guide. Within Kurdish studies, there is growing acknowledgement and discussion of how
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the gendered aspects of Kurdish “culture” shape the lived experiences of Kurdish women
(Hardi 2011; 2013; Fischer-Tahir 2005; 2009; 2010), as well as the experiences of female
scholars within Kurdish studies (Schäfers et al., 2020; Hardi 2020). In later chapters, I
discuss how Kurdistani interlocutors deal with the gendered aspects of culture.
In the ethnographic vignettes in this chapter, we see interlocutors grappling with
the purported “goodness” of the Kurdish “nation.” If patrilineal kinship, patriliny, and
“patriarchy” are integral to Kurdish cultural identity, as in the myth of the Medes and in
contemporary state and social practices of ascribing identity, then can Kurdish “culture”
be “good” for women? Can a nation run by a “kleptocratic” oligarchy be “good”? Can a
nation that treats its non-Kurdish residents as second-class citizens be “good”? These
questions are, of course, rhetorical in the sense that not all my interlocutors ask these
questions; some people merely allude to problems. I bring these questions to the fore in
thinking about the ethical dimensions of nationalism and state-making, especially how
individuals link their own ethical self-formation to the nation or the state. Before I move
to analyze how interlocutors wrestle with the nation’s “goodness,” in the following
section I discuss how anthropologists conceptualize “goodness,” particularly as it pertains
to violence and suffering.

Suffering and anthropology of the good
Anthropologists, especially those who work in Iraq (Al-Mohammad 2012) or in
Iraqi Kurdistan (King 2011), frequently bear witness to suffering. My interlocutors
suffered many types of violence, from gender-based violence, to discrimination, to the
atrocities of war, such as physical injury, rape, or psychological trauma, that had
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devastated the lives of so many. Suffering has always been “there,” visible to
anthropologists working in “the field,” but in recent decades, anthropologists increasingly
have turned their attention to documenting suffering and the conditions which produce it.
Anthropologists, who for much of the discipline’s history as a “science of the ‘other’”
(De Certeau 1986) focused their research on “exotic others,” or the “savage slot”
(Trouillot 2003), now focus primarily on the “suffering slot” (Robbins 2013a). The
“suffering slot” reflects a disciplinary shift to what Sherry Ortner has dubbed “dark
anthropology,” or a focus on “the harsh dimensions of social life (power, domination,
inequality, and oppression)” (2016:47). “Dark anthropology” infuses ethnography with
the work of many theorists and social scientists who have examined power, violence, and
human suffering (Agamben 1998; Butler 1997; Arendt 1970; Foucault 1977). In some
ways, my ethnography reflects “dark anthropology,” as I would expect any holistic
ethnographic approach to contemporary Iraq to include at least some of the “dark”
themes haunting the country.
One strength of ethnography is “bearing witness” to suffering (Atalay 2018;
Bonet and McWilliams 2019; Hauser et al. 2018), which is just about everywhere you
look in Iraq. Bearing witness involves interrogating the effects of overt violence, such the
thousands of civilian deaths during the 2003-2011 Iraq war. Bearing witness also entails
examining less obvious forms of violence, like the everyday discrimination internally
displaced people and refugees suffer in the Kurdistan Region. Discrimination is one
manifestation, among many, of “structural violence,” meaning “the ways in which epic
poverty and inequality, with their deep histories, become embodied and experienced as
violence,” as Paul Farmer has popularized the term (2010:47). Farmer (1996) observed

87

that anthropology’s longstanding commitment to cultural relativism and to the “culture”
concept led many anthropologists to conflate forms of violence with “cultural
difference.” The conflation was symptomatic of “‘studying down’ steep gradients of
power” (277), and of a discipline built on “othering” people and societies, as critical
scholars like Talal Asad (1973) had been arguing for decades.
While “dark anthropology” has addressed some of the discipline’s problems with
conceptualizing violence, the intense disciplinary focus on suffering tends to overlook
other aspects of human experience. Joel Robbins (2013a) observes that, as
anthropologists in 1980s and 1990s increasingly focused on power and violence and
began the work of decolonizing the discipline, the “culture” concept receded into the
background. In the disciplinary transition from studying the “savage” to the “suffering,”
some of the strengths of ethnography have diminished, namely the “critical potential of
the notion of difference” (2013a:447). In the era of dark anthropology, ethnographies
resemble case studies of the same inequalities and suffering subject, just situated in
different cultural contexts. “We have learned so much in the last few decades about how
human beings can disregard and do violence to one another,” Robbins argues, that other
ways of understanding human experience have been neglected (458).
As a supplement to anthropology of the “suffering slot,” Robbins proposes an
“anthropology of the good,” a line of inquiry about how “people living in different
societies strive to create the good in their lives” (457). An anthropology of “the good”
does not presume the existence any universal goods, but rather examines how people
pursue various socially or individually defined “goods.” Robbins argues that a shared
model of human action, one which recognizes that people think some things are good and
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worth pursuing, has undergirded anthropology since its inception. The “savage slot” drew
upon romantic notions of a utopia lost to the Western world, which might be found in the
lives of the “other” (Trouillot 2003). “Dark anthropology,” though it has moved beyond
the romanticism and orientalism of the “other,” nevertheless suggests in its critique of
suffering that better ways of living are possible.
Disagreement about conceptualizing an “anthropology of the good” centers on
two problems: The first problem concerns how to define ethics and the ethical subject;
the second concerns whether or not anthropologists can or should describe anything as
“good.” While it may be argued that anthropologists have been studying “the social
construction of morality” since the beginnings of the discipline (Howell 1997),
historically, anthropologists have not given morality and ethics as much attention and
systematic study as other areas of inquiry, like political or economic life, kinship and
marriage, or religion (Laidlaw 2017). During the “ethical turn” of the past couple
decades, anthropologists increasingly approached morality and ethics as objects of
inquiry by engaging with philosophical traditions. Out of the ethical turn, two general
schools of thought emerged, which I refer to as “virtue ethics” and “ordinary ethics.”
There is, of course, more nuance within individual anthropologists’ work, which Cheryl
Mattingly and Jason Throop (2018) cover in depth in their Annual Review article. Here, I
group anthropologists loosely for the purpose of sketching an outline of a particular
debate about ethical agency in which I position my own work.
Anthropologists in the first group, “virtue ethics,” typically approach ethics as a
conscious, moral deliberative process, set apart from everyday life, for the purpose of
determining what is “good” and living accordingly. Their work often draws upon neo-
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Aristotelian thinking to theorize how people become ethical subjects through conscious
reflection and action. Ethics concerns the examined life, in which, “Every art and every
inquiry, and similarly every action and every choice is thought to aim at some good; and
for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim”
(Aristotle 2009:3). It could be said that roughly the same model of human action and
approach to morality informs both ancient philosophers, now enjoying a renewed interest
among anthropologists of ethics, and classic social theory. For example, Robbins (Das et
al. 2015) notes that Emile Durkheim’s formulation of “moral facts” assumes that human
action is oriented toward pursuing “the good.” This is because, as Durkheim argues, “it is
psychologically impossible to pursue an end to which are indifferent – i.e. that does not
appear to us as good and does not affect our sensibility” (1953:45).
Anthropologists working with a virtue ethics framework posit an ethical subject
who is a “self-interpretative animal” (Taylor 1989) with a capacity for “reflective
freedom,” which is the “capacity reflectively to evaluate in light of values or ideals”
(Laidlaw 2017:188). In this formulation of “ethics,” the ethical subject requires freedom
and capacity to reflect, a process philosopher Charles Taylor calls “strong evaluation,” in
which people make distinctions between the importance or value of things. Taylor
suggests that the power to evaluate desires is “distinctively human” (1985a:15-16) and
that it shapes individual identities or selves. In this sense, strong evaluation guides
personal projects in which people “quite deliberately set out on a concerted project of
refashioning themselves, in light of a set of values or doctrines to which they consciously
subscribe, or of modelling their conduct on that of chosen exemplars” (Laidlaw
2017:186) Joel Robbins (2004) points out that chosen exemplars are exemplary because
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these individuals realize a value to its fullest potential in ways that everyday life does not
permit ordinary people. We admire Mother Teresa’s compassion and selfless service, but
most of us do not want to live in deprivation as she lived so that we might realize certain
virtues to the fullest in our own lives. Although we might not have the conditions, the
capacity, or the desire necessary to pursue any virtue to the fullest, values are salient
nonetheless in everyday life. “Our identity is defined,” Taylor argues, “by our
fundamental evaluations…the concept of identity is bound up with that of certain strong
evaluations which are inseparable from myself” (1985a:34).
These basic philosophical observations about ethics, morality, meaning, and
identity, can inform anthropological analysis, but they only go so far. If we assume a
model of human action based in “first person virtue ethics” (Mattingly 2014), then it
follows that ethnographers need only to listen to how people articulate justifications for
their choices or way of life. But “dark anthropology” makes evident what we already
know: Most people do not live in conditions of their own choosing, which greatly
constrains self-reflective and virtue-oriented ethical agency. An “ethics” which requires
certain freedoms and capacities suggests that only the privileged have “ethics” or are
capable of fully realized ethical agency. As Michel Foucault observed (1997), a person
living in unfree conditions, such as slavery, only can carry out the will of the master or of
others; a person in these conditions would have no “ethics.” Thus, it is no surprise that
anthropologists whose research involves people living in extremely difficult
circumstances vigorously object to neo-Aristotelian models of ethical agency.
Hayder Al-Mohammad, for example, argues that in war-torn Iraq, the
fundamental question people are asking is not “‘What must I do?, but rather, ‘What can I
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do? What am I capable of doing?’” (Das et al. 2015, emphasis is Al-Mohammad's). To
suggest that people in desperate circumstances are pausing to philosophize about the
virtue of their actions seems ludicrous when survival is at stake. “You don’t need that
category [of “the good”],” Al-Mohammad continues, “to say why somebody goes out and
works for twelve, fourteen hours a day in fifty-degree Celsius heat to explain why they
struggle for their daughter, their son, their neighbor, their friends” (ibid.). Some human
action “is simply its own explanation – there is nothing more to say” (ibid.).
Objecting to the “strong,” or some might say “narrow,” view of virtue ethics does
not imply that there is no “strong evaluation” occurring in human action. Rather, the
ways in which human beings are ethical subjects can be found in ordinary human life,
which “is a life of continuous and routine self-description, self-evaluation and
incremental self-constitution” (Laidlaw 2017:177). Because ethics can be found in
mundane, daily acts, this approach is often referred to as “ordinary ethics” (Das 2012;
Lambek 2010; Lempert 2013). Ordinary ethics questions the degree to which selfreflection, virtue, and “the good” are necessary criteria for speaking of ethics and ethical
subjects. The “ordinary” approach views ethical behavior not as a transcendent, reflective
process requiring certain conditions and freedoms, but immanent in everyday life, and
especially so for people living in unfree conditions.
In some cases, perhaps there is “nothing more to say” about many human
behaviors other than their surface-level description. Al-Mohammad suggests that
anthropologists, by saying anything “more” – such as interpreting human action through
virtue-oriented ethics and premising those ethics on some notion of “culture” or
“tradition” – risk reverting to unequal knowledge production which plagues the
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discipline. To illustrate his point, Al-Mohammad describes a scene in which he visits a
household: he takes his shoes off before entering the home; children collect their toys
from the living room; he is instructed to sit in the most comfortable seat, where he is
served a glass of juice, and so on. Al-Mohammad reflects how he, as an anthropologist,
might interpret this domestic scene:
Maybe if this scene were played out in the Middle East, where I work, I might
have been forced to reference Islam, the twinned shame/honour, or how the glass
of juice symbolises vitality, or the wooden table male power and authority, or
whatever version such logics now take in the discipline. But, thankfully, we will
be spared this today for the above took place in North London in the home of an
Anglo-Saxon couple for whom we do not seem to have prepared logics and
cosmologies as yet…How odd the ethnographic subject has figured out her world
and can so easily locate goods and bad, never fluffing the distinction. In truth, we
inhabit worlds we are not masters of, and with no clear blueprint or principles by
which to proceed – no matter how many texts and traditions we keep citing and
referring to. What we find in the world are not goods which make claims on us,
but oughts (Das et al. 2015).

In the above excerpt, Al-Mohammad speaks of two concerns: The first is that an
anthropology of “the good” conflates “the good” with custom or rules, which is a
foundational debate about morality. In saying “we inhabit worlds we are not masters of,”
Al-Mohammad echoes what many social scientists have recognized to be common to
human experience. As Karl Marx famously phrased it, “Men make their own history, but
they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances,
but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past” (2005:1).
The second objection is to the “prepared logics and cosmologies” of the discipline, which
in this case refers to stereotypical characterizations of the Middle East or Islam.
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Two caveats about the good
It seems to me that the two concerns Das and Al-Mohammad express – the one
about orientalist-haunted knowledge production and the other, an observation that people
are not the masters of their worlds – are conflated in this debate on “the good.” Firstly,
what Al-Mohammad and Das object to in conceptualizing “the good” is not only the
concept itself, but also its cultural baggage: Western-dominated knowledge production
within the social sciences, which continues to haunt scholarship about the “non-Western
world.” Inviting Eurocentric philosophy into an anthropological conversation about
conceptualizing ethics in “non-Western” places does seem to perpetuate Eurocentric
knowledge production about morality. Moreover, that Eurocentric knowledge production
is historically bound up with colonial and neocolonial projects, which, in justifying their
rule, have advanced some concepts of “the good” as universal. Modern secular, liberal
governance, in its “right” to adjudicate “the good,” can harm more than help, such as
Saba Mahmood (2015) has found in Egypt, where colonial and postcolonial “secular”
governance exacerbates tensions between religious minorities and majorities.
Additionally, Elizabeth Povinelli (2002; 2011; 2016) has given us many examples
demonstrating how late liberalism’s ability to ascribe good and to determine which ways
of living are best reveals the dark side of “positive liberty” as it empowers settler
colonialisms.
In the ethnographic and historical records, we have seen how people mobilize
concepts of “the good” toward “bad” ends, to put it crudely. Not only have
anthropologists documented destructive uses of “the good,” such as Veena Das in her
work on India, in which speaking of “the good” sounds like the “salvation talk” of
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religion or of political liberalism (2014; 2018). Anthropologists also must be wary of how
“the good” becomes implicated in projects of liberation, including those of our own
discipline (Das et al. 2015). Das objects to a virtue ethics approach because discursive
regimes about “the good” grant anthropologists “the right to judge the behavior of others,
good intentions notwithstanding.” One risk inherent in an anthropology of “the good,”
Das argues, is that it creates a “division of ethical labor,” in which “the philosophers will
give us the theory and we the anthropologists will tell them how things are on the
ground.” Here, I would point to James Laidlaw’s (2017) observation that defining
anything as “ethical,” meaning related to “ethics,” does not imply that anthropologists
also approve of said “ethical” behavior or are making any kind of moral judgment. “One
can imagine a movement, a party or even a society of highly ethical monsters,” Laidlaw
reminds us.
Nevertheless, Das is right to be concerned about who gets to theorize about “the
good” in anthropological analysis, considering the historical dominance of
anthropological theory in the West (Harrison 2011). Not only have anthropologists
employed methods or theories we now reject as inaccurate or unequitable; some suggest
that the discipline itself is irrevocably and irredeemably dependent on knowledge
production about “otherness.” In her 2017 article reviewing the state of the discipline,
Lucia Cantero remarks that the “discursive presence of the past” characterizes
anthropology as “ontologically haunted,” or as “hauntology” (309), using the
portmanteau coined by Jacques Derrida (1994). In the same year as Cantero’s review,
Vassos Argyrou also described anthropology’s perennial “problem” as “hauntological or
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spectral,” again referring to Derrida’s “theme of the spectre or ghost that exists and does
not exist, is present and not present” (53).
The “spectre” that haunts the discipline is the problem of representation: “There is
no anthropological paradigm,” Argyrou argues, “in which cultural difference does not
emerge as cultural inferiority, not a single one that has not been found guilty of
ethnocentrism” (2017:51). Argyrou insists that, “no matter how well intended,
anthropological representations cannot avoid being ethnocentric” (52). Anthropologists
are “possessed by the idea of Pure Humanity” lurking in the discipline’s foundational
axioms like “making the strange familiar, and the familiar strange,” and subsequently,
they seek “ways and means of neutralizing representations.” Consequently, anthropology
is stuck in a pattern of theoretical “turns” in a struggle to “redeem otherness” (53). Thus,
in anthropology “the return of the repressed disturbs and spooks the living” (52). It could
be said that “the good,” like “otherness,” becomes both the object and the subject of our
discipline.
In addition to the methodological, or “positional, problems of power when
anthropologists conceptualize “the good,” Das also expresses concern about how
anthropologists might conceptualize “the good” as a moral consensus, or as the winner in
a contest of “values.” An anthropology of “the good” seems to assume that, not only can
our interlocutors articulate their values and desires, but that it also uncritically accepts
their articulations as “true”:
Our experience is never transparent to us, and because we can so often mistake
our performance of allegiance to higher ideals – be these those guaranteed by the
state, the party, or religious authorities – as somehow corresponding to our true
need, conflict of values is too tame a description of the impasse in the light of
which we must craft our moral lives and our lives as moral (2018:490).
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In conceptualizing “the good,” there are two interrelated concerns at play: First,
anthropologists should be careful never to presume that we know what people value or
desire, or to accept uncritically what they say they value and desire; this is fundamental to
our disciplinary training. The second and related problem concerns theorizing the role of
custom, rules, and power in shaping “morality” or “ethics.” For Al-Mohammad and Das,
anthropologists working with virtue ethics risk conflating “the good” with the
“normative.”
Das suggests that what a virtue ethics approach considers “a conflict of values” is
simply “the difficulty of reality,” because “real” life does not “offer us a set of
commensurable values among which we can choose” (2015). Although “cosmologies
might appear coherent and well-integrated when they are narrated,” Das concedes, they
often are incommensurate with lived experience (2014:490). Das fears that
conceptualizing “the good” as a kind of transcendent ethics undermines the value of
everyday human action. “So great is the lure of the good,” Das argues, “that power
disappears in rethinking the social” (Das et al. 2015). Rather, attention to the
contingencies of experience, such as “luck” or “chance,” can tell us about “the shape of
our moral lives,” in which our obligations stem not from contracts between sovereign
subjects but from our willingness to accept responsibility for an other whom fate has
placed in our vicinity” (490-491). Das’s description of ethical agency gets to the heart of
the problem of freedom in ethics: “whether action and reflection are to be set apart”
(2014:493)
Although Das, in her 2014 article, does not propose a new theoretical framework
for “ethics,” other anthropologists have offered some alternatives to what I have
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categorized as a “virtue ethics” approach. Hayder Al-Mohammad, for example, seeks to
broaden the scope of ethics beyond a focus on the “self,” found not only in “virtue
ethics,” or the “ethics of self-cultivation” (Mahmood 2005; Hirschkind 2006), but also in
some “ordinary ethics” approaches (Lambek 2010; Das 2012). Instead, he develops an
“ethics of being with” (2010) which recognizes the always, already situatedness of people
and the “interdependency and intercorporeality” of human action (Das et al. 2015).
Borrowing from Wittgenstein the concept of “the rough ground of the everyday,” AlMohammad examines how ethics emerges from everyday interactions in which “lives
come together in complex ways and in which care and also neglect and violence ravel
and unravel the entangling of lives with other lives”. His concept of “entanglements” is
immanent in everyday life, and it echoes Veena Das’s “contingencies” and “willingness
to accept responsibility for an other.”
Drawing upon Erving Goffman’s work on interactions in which people move
through shared space without bumping into one another, Al-Mohammad proposes an
“ethics” embodied in similar everyday movements between people. “If one turns to the
everyday in Iraq,” he writes, “one can find small gestures, moments of kindness and care,
that are not simply positive tales contained within the destruction of post invasion Iraq
but are the very grounds by which many Iraqis have been able to survive and live through
the terror and uncertainty of the last decade” (2015:111). Al-Mohammad’s middle way
ethics, between transcendence /event and immanent / everyday, produces a picture of life
in Iraq that does not reproduce tropes of destruction and breakdown and does not cast
people exclusively as victims or survivors.
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Other anthropologists also offer theories of ethics which hold the transcendent /
event in tension with the immanent / ordinary. In Webb Keane’s work, for example, the
ethical subject is not just an individual but any collective or system with a capacity for
conscious self-formation. An ethical subject expanded beyond the scope of the individual
opens the way for anthropologists to reevaluate work on collectives, such as kinship
studies, as James Laidlaw suggests (2017). In his analysis, Keane makes a distinction
between “ethics” and “morality,” which he adopts from philosopher Bernard Williams:
Ethics is the Socratic examined life, whereas “morality or “the morality system,” refers to
how people generate answers for the problem of the examined, or ethical, life. It is a
distinction that may be clarifying, but not necessary.
Another philosophy-inflected anthropological approach to ethics can be found in
Jarrett Zigon’s work. Zigon argues that ethics are found not in the “metaphysical
humanism” of virtue ethics and self-cultivation, but in “assembled and situated worlds.”
Morality is built on living in “attunement” with one’s world, something like habitus
(2008:17). “Ethics” emerges only when that attunement is compromised by “breakdown”
and attunement is no longer possible. One response to breakdown is cultivating “an ethics
of dwelling,” which Zigon describes as “the response to an existential imperative
emerging from a world that has become unbearable as a result of a particular situation
that has led to the breakdown of this world” (2018). An “ethics of dwelling” is not a
premeditated, “examined life,” and cannot be known before breakdown. It is, rather,
living “sanely” to the degree possible in the world as people experience it.
In approaching ethical life in Kurdistan through an “anthropology of the good,” I
describe my interlocutors as I found them: positioned somewhere between constraint, like

99

Zigon’s “attunement,” and the “freedom” inherent in self-reflection. Amidst the
“breakdown” of state and society, interlocutors still point to certain, desirable “goods,”
whose attainment seemed possible in the transitional moment for Kurdistan in which I
conducted fieldwork. Recognizing the complex, constrained, even miserable, conditions
in which people live does not entail their complete inability to speak about moral selfevaluation or reflective capacities. The pull between the “ought” of morality and the
“can” of ethical self-reflection is where I locate ethics. The tension between the two is a
productive space for anthropologists of value pluralism. As James Laidlaw writes,
It is part of the work of an anthropology of ethics to describe the historical
changes, the changing kinds of institutions and practices, that explain the greater
and lesser degrees to which, as well as the differing ways in which, people at
varying historical junctures have become taken up with ethical reflection and the
formulation and following of explicit, more or less rationalized, ethical doctrines”
(2017: 184).
This positioning – between the “should” and the “can” of moral systems – allows me to
work with concepts of the “good” just as interlocutors do: In an always emerging,
tentative way, in which individual projects of ethical self-formation intersect with the
larger projects of the “nation” or the “state.” It is a position that recognizes the two
aforementioned caveats characterizing an anthropology of ethics – that virtue ethics
brings with it some Western cultural baggage, and that “ethics” often is conflated with
the normative, not “can” but “ought.” At the same time, it is a position that is not
hindered by the tedious work of sorting out the “immanent” or “everyday” from “virtue
ethics” and “self-reflection.” It recognizes, rather, that “ethics” is what emerges from
those intersections or tensions. It is in those intersections that I find my interlocutors
working out their ethical lives, and in which I situate my analysis.
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Sovereignty-making in a Syrian Kurdish camp
In an earlier section, I suggested that “sovereignty” and “sovereignty-making”
might be conceived of as desirable “goods,” or as undesirable, according to which
interlocutors and discourses were speaking. In this section, I explore this idea further by
examining how Kurdistani “sovereignty-making” in a camp for Syrian Kurdish refugees
impinged upon the ethical lives of two young men, Serkar and Serhand, in their efforts to
realize their own “moral progress”. The refugee camp was a 30-minute drive outside
Erbil’s city limits, in an impoverished town called “Betala.” During former Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein’s regime, hundreds of thousands of non-Arab minorities,
including an estimated 600,000 Kurdish people, were forcibly resettled in camps called
“collective camps” (mujama’at) as part of Saddam’s Arabization campaigns (McDowall
2004, 339). Betala began as a collective camp. A Kurdish university professor I knew
described Betala as one of the “empty places” created by displacement, rather than a
meaningful place associated with a particular family or group and their claims to the land.
With time, as camp residents constructed more permanent residences and small shops,
Betala the Kurdish collective camp became Betala the town. Years later, after Betala had
established itself as a Kurdish town, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
constructed new, separate camps for recently displaced Arabic-speaking Iraqis and for
Syrian Kurdish refugees.
One afternoon, I was in the area and decided to visit the Syrian Kurdish refugee
camp in Betala. Unlike the Yezidi settlement described earlier, the camp for Syrian
Kurdish refugees was enormous and clearly visible. Small, uniform cinder block
structures in neat rows stretched as far as the eye could see. As my Kurdish taxi driver
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and I approached the camp, he clicked his tongue and said, “Zor badakhtawa” (How very
unfortunate). The camp was tightly gated and guarded. I heard that its residents were
discouraged from mixing with the Betala townspeople, probably to maintain control over
the population, such as preventing intermarriage, minimizing any potential conflict
between camp and town, and contain the spread of (mis)information about camp
conditions.
While I had walked freely into the neglected construction site where the Yezidi
people were living, at Betala camp a security guard ushered me into an office crammed
with several men. An official demanded to know why I wanted to see inside the camp;
they “had problems” with people visiting the camp for “exposé” journalism. Several
minutes of intense negotiations followed, during which I assured these officials that I was
a harmless student merely there as a cultural observer and not as a critic. It would be
better if I had a letter of support, they said, though there was some disagreement about
where I should get the letter. I suggested the Erbil Governorate education office. The
official said it would be better to take a letter from the Kurdish security police (asayȋsh).
For a couple minutes the men discussed the situation in Behdȋnȋ, a dialect of Kurdish I do
not speak or understand. Finally, the official turned back to me and said, “Actually, you
could visit the Barzanȋ Charity Foundation and take a letter from our director. That would
be good.”
Surprised, I asked, “So the asayȋsh letter wouldn’t be necessary if I have a Barzanȋ
Charity letter?”
The official explained, “We [the Barzanȋ Charity Foundation] are in charge of the
camp. The Asayȋsh [security police] answer to us.”
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This answer was unexpected, so I said, “Oh, I didn’t know the Barzanȋ Charity
Foundation was in charge.” A long pause followed, during which I worried about this
revelation. The Barzanȋ family had been the Kurdistan Regional Government’s ruling
family since Mullah Mustafa Barzanȋ led the Kurdish struggle against the Iraqi central
government in the 1960s and 1970s. The current KRG President was Mullah Mustafa’s
son, Mesud Barzanȋ, who controversially had overstayed his elected term since 2015,
citing a national emergency. It was said that the Barzanȋs were involved in many business
deals, pocketed large sums of money, and had their critics imprisoned or killed. I did not
know about the nature of the relationship between the Barzanȋ Charity Foundation and
the Kurdistan Regional Government, but I suspected it might be highly politicized.
With some hesitation, I was told that I would be allowed inside the Syrian
Kurdish refugee camp today only and with a chaperone beside me at all times. I was
forbidden from asking any political questions. I could not ask about the situation in Syria.
I could not ask about Kurdish political parties, or the Kurdistan Regional Government, or
the Kurdistan Regional Government’s relationship with the Turkish government. I
vigorously agreed to these conditions. My chaperone would be “Serkar,” a quiet young
Kurdish man who had been standing silently in the corner during the meeting.
Negotiations ended and I followed Serkar out the office door. Once out of earshot of the
other officials, Serkar became very talkative. He hoped to continue his studies in the
United States. He had earned a law degree from a Kurdistani university, but he did not
practice “because practicing law is very dangerous here,” he said. I nodded, recalling that
the previous year a female lawyer was found murdered in her car near Dream City. After
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graduating, Serkar struggled to find a job in a stagnant economy, so he accepted a
position with the Charity Foundation which shared his name (Barzanȋ).
“This camp is really good, the best one, you know,” Serkar said eagerly to me as
we walked around the camp. “You know we were refugees in Iran. It was terrible. We
didn’t have anything, not like this. No shelter, no food. That’s why it’s important for me
to work in the camp. I know what it’s like to be in this bad situation.” I asked him if he
was talking about the failed 1991 uprisings against Saddam Hussein’s regime, resulting
in thousands of Kurdish people fleeing into the mountains. “Yes, some to Turkey, some
to Iran. The Barzanȋs, we went to Iran. And you know they killed 8,000 of our men,” he
said, referring to an earlier tragedy: In 1983, Saddam Hussein’s forces abducted and later
murdered an estimated 8,000 males belonging to the Barzanȋ tribe (McDowall 2004).
Serkar was born as a refugee in Iran and spent the first three years of his life there before
returning to Iraqi Kurdistan in 1994. I found it strange that he spoke as if he remembered
living in camps when he was between 1 and 3 years old. Perhaps it was a collective
memory; perhaps his relatives impressed upon him the horrible conditions they suffered
in the camps.
Serkar pointed to some new plots, where very small cinder block structures were
being built. “We have only 80 plots, but already 1,160 people have given their names.
There is not enough space,” he said in a quiet, serious voice. During our camp tour, we
ran into some employees of the International Finance Corporation (a sister organization
of the World Bank). Months before I visited Betala, I had met these IFC employees in a
different camp. They warmly greeted me, explaining that they were in the Betala camp
for “awareness raising” purposes. Serkar seemed alarmed by my acquaintance with the
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IFC staff, but he remained silent. After our tour ended and we ate lunch with some of the
BCF staff, Serkar said farewell. A fellow BCF employee, “Serhand,” offered to give me
and another BCF staffer a lift back to Erbil.
From the backseat, I watched the flat, dull landscape rush past. Oil tankers
lumbered along this route headed to and from the border with Turkey. Serhand broke the
silence, “Do you have any questions about the camp?”
“Oh, I always have questions.” I thought for a moment. “What is the general
opinion about the camps? I mean, people who maybe have never been in the camp, what
do they say about them?”
Serhand replied in a resigned tone, “Oh, sure, you know, I am very sorry to say
this - this isn’t my opinion, I am just telling you what people say - they say that the
people in the camps are bad. Because they see some Syrians begging in the street, like
gypsies, they think all people from Syria are like this. Actually, only 30% of the refugee
population is living in the camps. The rest are living outside.”
“Do you mean in the host community?” I asked.
“Yes, with the host community.” Again, he emphasized that this was not his
opinion, just the general public opinion about refugees. After Serhand dropped off his
fellow staffer, he invited me to move to the front passenger seat.
Aware that women typically sat in the backseat when traveling with unrelated
males, I asked, “‘Ayb Nȋya?” (It’s not shameful?). I had to repeat it twice before he
replied.
“Do you know what this word ‘ayb means?” He seemed agitated. “It means
something like sherem (shame), like something a person shouldn’t do.” He paused and
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then said, “Well, maybe you have some idea about it, but for me, I’m not one of these
traditional people. You are like my sister or friend; there is no difference. It doesn’t
matter to me.” I apologized for my rude question and moved to the front seat. “Besides,”
Serhand continued, “Kurdistan is changing. People are becoming more open.” I asked
what accounted for this change. “It is social media, people are traveling, it is more open,
people go outside for study.” As he drove, Serhand told me about his time in Cyprus
studying for a law degree. “When I was there, I had a girlfriend,” he said, “and she came
to Kurdistan and visited my family.”
“But would your sisters be allowed to travel outside?” I asked.
“Well, you are right, there is a difference,” he conceded. “Yes, they can travel
with family or friends, but alone, no. And they can have male friends, but not to stay the
night, if you know what I mean.” I didn’t comment, waiting to see if he would say more.
“I mean, here the woman has to be a virgin until marriage, but not for the man.” I
nodded.
“Did your girlfriend enjoy her visit to Kurdistan?” I asked.
“Yes, Barzan is a beautiful area,” he began, his aspect brightening. He wistfully
described the natural beauty, rivers, mountains, and the Spring Newroz (new year)
season. After a lull in conversation, I asked Serhand if he had any plans for the future.
Would he keep working for the Barzanȋ Charity Foundation? He seemed unsure. He said
the economy was bad, and he didn’t have a plan. He fell silent and remained so until we
reached my drop-off point. I thanked him again for his hospitality. His tone became
resigned again, “You’re welcome. It was our duty.”
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Serhand’s parting comment about “duty” reflects not only cultural hospitality
norms, but also how his own ethical self-formation was bound up with the larger process
of sovereignty-making in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The Barzanȋ Charity Foundation,
with the permission of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), manages the Betala
camp residents because the refugees are ethnically Kurdish; the KRG’s right to govern
this “Kurdish” population is presented as “natural,” as Kurdish people from Syria and
from Iraq belong to “greater Kurdistan.” For many years, the KRG has been positioning
itself as the patron of all ethnic Kurds in “greater Kurdistan,” a homeland and aspirational
future state spanning Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Refugee and IDP camps not only
shelter populations; they also heighten and make visible political and social tensions.
Liissa Malkki’s work (1995) has illuminated the central role the “camp” plays in creating
boundaries and purifying identities for the nation or the state. In my encounter with the
officials running the camp for Syrian Kurdish refugees, I was told I could not ask any
questions about Syria or Turkey or their political relations with the Kurdistan Regional
Government. Instead, the camp officials presented the refugees from Syria as primarily
“Kurdish,” and thus rightfully under the authority of the Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG) and its agents, the duty-bound patrons of all Kurdish people living in greater
Kurdistan.
In Chapter 1, I wrote about Sara, the displaced Christian woman who worked as a
teacher and volunteered in a camp for displaced Yezidi people. By working in the camps,
Sara, Serkar and Serhand linked their own sense of moral duty and ethical self-formation
to the larger frames of family, nationalism, and religion. Sara, Serkar, and Serhad
represent the motivations and concerns of many people I met during my fieldwork; they
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are, in a sense, “types.” Sara primarily drew inspiration from her Christian faith and made
appeals to shared Iraqi citizenship and shared humanity. Throughout my fieldwork, I
heard many people make similar appeals. Sara became a key interlocutor who could
speak about living in the Kurdistan Region as an ethnic or religious minority, and she
appears again later in the dissertation.
Serkar and Serhand also made moral appeals to common humanity. Additionally,
they contextualized their own moral strivings within the Kurdistan Region’s claims to
sovereignty, tolerance, and progress. As bearers of the Barzanȋ name, Serkar and Serhand
expressed a duty to help other ethnic Kurds. They also were eager to tell me about the
moral progress and modernization they saw in Kurdistan. Both men, nevertheless,
expressed deep disappointment about the stagnant economy, lack of jobs, and Kurdistan’s
perennially “victimized” position in regional and global affairs. For good or for ill, their
fortunes were tethered to the Kurdistani Government’s. Although probably betterconnected and better provided for than the average Kurdistani, Serkar and Serhand
nevertheless echoed the countless conversations I had with young people throughout my
fieldwork, in which individual moral strivings were intimately connected with the moral
dimensions of nationalism and state-making.
“Kurds ascending”
Politicians, journalists, historians, and everyday discourse characterize the
Kurdish nation as the victim centuries of cyclical violence, including genocide, war, and
civil conflict. The 2003 invasion of Iraq and ensuring war, while it absolutely devastated
much of the country, was the beginning of a new era for the Kurdistan Region in northern
Iraq. The invasion seemed to bring one chapter to a close – that of Kurdish people
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suffering violence at the hand of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein – and to open
another. For almost two decades, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq enjoyed a relatively calm
period of political stability and economic growth. Many Kurdish people who had been
living abroad in diaspora returned to their homeland. International commerce flourished,
in large part secured through the Kurdistan Regional Government’s independently
negotiated agreements with foreign companies. During this era of “Kurds ascending”
(Gunter 2007), many people became hopeful about the Kurdistan Region’s future. After
decades of struggle, Kurdish people in the KRI were living with more autonomy and
prosperity than ever before.
The Kurdish ascent came to an abrupt halt in 2014, when the Islamic State began
its campaign across Iraq and Syria. As a result of the 2003-2011 Iraq war, the conflict
with Daesh, and the ongoing war in Syria, hundreds of thousands of internally displaced
people and refugees have settled in the KRI. Some of the IDPs and refugees are
ethnically Kurdish, but most are not, such as Iraqi or Syrian Arabs, Assyrian and
Chaldean Christians, and Yezidis. Kurdish people, although still a minority population
within the state of Iraq, are the largest demographic in the Kurdistan Region. Thus, the
Kurdistan Region has found itself in reversed roles, suddenly in the position of
overseeing hundreds of thousands of people belonging to other ethnoreligious
populations, such as Arabs, with whom Kurdish people have a long and storied
history. During the war with the Islamic State and the ensuing economic crisis, the
Kurdistani president Mesud Barzanȋ, son of Mullah Mustafa Barzanȋ, declared a national
emergency and overstayed his elected term. Members of Parliament associated with
Goran, a political opposition party, were barred from entering the Erbil Governorate, and

109

Parliament was suspended for months. The Barzanȋ family and their political party, the
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP or PDK), tightened its grip on the Region’s
government.
For many people, the ascendency of the Kurdistan Region signaled the end of a
unified Iraqi national identity. Throughout my fieldwork, I observed many
demonstrations of Kurdish ethnonationalism, often mandated or regulated by the
Kurdistan Regional Government. These demonstrations are not always well-received
among ethnically Kurdish residents of the Kurdistan Region, many of whom question the
sincerity of the demonstrations, considering the alleged corruption of KRG politicians
and restricted freedoms, such as freedom of expression. I met many Kurdish people who
professed belief in a greater Kurdish cause and desire for an independent Kurdish state
yet had little hope that the current political regime would promote these causes equitably,
if at all.
A victory for the “Kurdish nation,” such as an independent Kurdish state, would
not be a victory for all. Many of my non-Kurdish interlocutors expressed ambivalence
about living in a Kurdish majority polity. Some had escaped violence elsewhere in Iraq or
in Syria and had found refuge in the Kurdistan Region, for which they were grateful. But
many newcomers to the Kurdistan Region also encountered racism or felt they were
treated as second-class citizens. I also heard non-Kurdish people, some from families
living in the KRI for generations, criticize how the Kurdistan Regional Government
privileged its ethnically Kurdish citizens. Non-Kurdish people were expected at times to
participate in displays of Kurdish ethnonationalism, such as the non-Kurdish private
school students appearing in Chapter 3. For others, especially some of my older non-
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Kurdish interlocutors, a victorious independent Kurdish state would be the final nail in
the coffin of a unified Iraq. For those worried about Kurdish hegemony, the KRG is in
danger of repeating many of the same injustices Kurdish people experienced at the hands
of former Iraqi government agents.
In this chapter, we have witnessed people living in Kurdistan grappling with the
purported “goodness” of the Kurdish “nation.” The centrality of patriliny and patriarchy
in Kurdish “culture” has left many interlocutors wondering about its “goodness.”
Patriliny figures into national mythmaking, as we saw in the komalayatȋ lesson about the
Medes, and in ethnonationalist displays, such as those during the Newroz holiday or at
national sites like the Barzanȋ Memorial Center. National mythmaking portrays the
Kurdish nation as continually victimized but resilient, as in the popular saying, “The
Kurds have no friends but the mountains.” But some, such as Karza the komalayatȋ
teacher, or Sebr the tour guide, point out the underlying power struggles and betrayals in
the Kurdish nation’s “ascent,” which have precipitated many an individual “fall.” In that
uncertain, transitional moment, it seemed the Kurdish “nation” and the Kurdistani
Government teetered on the edge of a political and social downfall.
Whether Kurdish or not, young or old, privileged or poor, many of my
interlocutors hold in common a set of questions about their life in Kurdistan: Why did
this bad thing happen to me, to my family, to my community, and to my country? How
should I live in light of this knowledge and experience? One answer, proposed by many
Kurdish politicians and nationalists at the time, was an independent Kurdistani state that
would protect people from violence inflicted on them by others – often by the Iraqi,
Iranian, Turkish, or Syrian state, or the “Islamic State.” An independent Kurdistani state
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seemed like a good answer to some people, but many of my interlocutors who were not
Kurdish worried that a Kurdistani state would not protect them equally, if at all. If so,
then a Kurdistani state would not be a good thing worth pursuing. Alternately, emigration
seemed like a good option – for those who could afford it. Moreover, suffering so much
state sanctioned violence left many people questioning the “goodness” or “desirability”
of a Kurdistani state, and by extension, question the purported “goodness” of the “nation”
and of the political formation known as the “state.” The following chapter takes up the
question of the feasibility and “goodness” of one specific state - a “unified” Iraq.
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Ch. 3 “They don’t love Iraq”
“My architect friends, fellow users of protractors, compasses and rulers, look at
this city. Consider the tall, stone houses with Greek-style columns and all the
serenity of the dwellings of the Olympian gods that are slowly mushrooming.
What, when you look carefully, do you see other than disorder? Nothing. Nothing.
Despite the meticulousness of the engineers, each working to their own designs,
it’s still a wasteland. Any beauty you plant in a wasteland will only draw more
attention to that wasteland.” - Bakhtiyar Ali, I Stared at the Night of the City

The school minibus bumped along one of the major thoroughfares of Ainkawa,
the Christian-majority township of the city of Erbil. During the months I conducted field
work in Kurdistan Civilizational School (KCS), I often rode a minibus to school with
students who lived near my home. I sat in the front seat, with Marwa sitting between me
and the driver, a kindly, middle-aged man everyone called “Amo” (“uncle” in Arabic).
Marwa was in grade 8 at KCS, but she projected the authority and disapproval of a
maiden aunt. The bus transported around 15 students to and from Ainkawa, mostly rowdy
boys older than Marwa. The boys frequently argued over which English pop songs to
play on the bus radio, which was connected by Bluetooth to their smartphones. From the
front seat, Marwa policed song lyrics, alerting Amo, who understood some English, when
the song was “dirty.” Amo would scold the boys and make them choose another song. On
the daily bus ride, Marwa alternately worked on homework and offered commentary on
students’ behavior, her classes and teachers, and things we observed outside the bus.
One morning, a compact car with four passengers turned in front of the bus. It
moved slowly, impeding our progress. Amo, Marwa, and I leaned forward to study the
car’s license plate: Someone had applied an image of a Kurdish flag with the word
“Kurdistan” to cover up the part of the plate that typically says “Iraq.” Amo pulled
around the car, and we stared at the passengers as we drove past. After a moment of
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silence, as if to process what they had just seen, Amo and Marwa began discussing the
license plate. “People here are so crazy about their country,” Marwa said to me, rolling
her eyes. I understood that by “country,” Marwa meant “Kurdistan.”
Not long after meeting Marwa, she told me privately that she was Mandean, a fact
she did not draw attention to at school. Mandeans are one of Iraq’s dwindling
ethnoreligious minorities. Their community formerly was centered around Baghdad.
During the Iraq war, Marwa’s family fled Baghdad and moved to Erbil. Between 2003
and 2019, about 90% of Mandeans left Iraq. By 2019, the Ministry of Endowments and
Religious Affairs estimated that only 400 Mandeans were living in the Erbil Governorate
and were facing “extinction” (Salloum 2019). “I hate everything Kurdish,” Marwa
continued, “komalayatȋ (social studies), grammar, all of it!” Amo nodded solemnly and
said, “They don’t love Iraq.”

In this chapter, I examine how people critique Kurdistani society and aspirations
to statehood by measuring “Kurdistan” according to their vision of a “national” and
“unified” Iraq. In some cases, people also referred to ideas about “democracy” that might
be called “Western” or “neoliberal.” Many people, especially those displaced from
elsewhere in Iraq, evaluated their present situation in Kurdistan by recalling their life in
pre-invasion Iraq. They characterize their former homes as “open-minded,” diverse, and
peaceful, rather than as divided according to sect. These “nostalgic” interlocutors, like the
teachers appearing in this chapter, came of age during the sanctions era, which they recall
warmly as a time in which people supported one another as neighbors and fellow citizens.
They contrast their childhoods, marked by material shortages, with those of their
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Kurdistani private school students. Their students enjoy material comforts and security
but suffer from their insular and pampered lifestyles. Consequently, the younger
generation lacks the good character or ethical sensibilities formed through hardship. To
their teachers’ dismay, students often exhibited apathy toward their peers, especially
toward those belonging to different ethnoreligious groups. These Kurdistani youth, like
many of their adult counterparts, are not motivated by a shared sense of “Iraqi” identity.
As Amo the bus driver observed, “they don’t love Iraq.”
Students’ lack of “brotherly love” and apathy about Iraqi society’s fragmentation
discouraged their teachers, and some, such as Naila, became increasingly cynical. Other
teachers, like Sara and Mariam, redoubled their efforts to help their students cultivate the
ethical sensibilities they lacked. In their lessons, they made frequent appeals to concepts
like common humanity, a shared monotheistic identity, or duty to one’s self, family, and
country. Students received these lessons unevenly. Sometimes they resisted and argued
with their teachers, and at other times they remained silent. Occasionally, older students
expressed sentiments about improving themselves and their country, but more often they
expressed a desire to escape the turmoil.
Teachers’ efforts to cultivate a sense of moral obligation in their students often
failed, or appeared to fail, to motivate them. With a few exceptions, teachers’ appeals to
shared “Iraqi” national identity were met with defiance or indifference; most students
asserted they had no such national identity. Likewise, appeals to a shared “Kurdistani”
experience only seemed to prompt students to recount their internal differences and to
retreat into their fragmented sense of identity and insular lifestyle. When I interviewed
students, individually or in groups, however, their thoughts on these topics could be
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drawn out, though not without provoking some to arguing, and in one case, a near fist
fight. My impression was that many teachers had “given up” and resigned themselves to
focus their lessons on mastery of content rather than on character, and I could not blame
them.
On the one hand, we could, as some interlocutors told me, expect “immature” or
“selfish” behavior from children. Upon hearing that my research involved listening to
youth, people reacted variously with amusement, dismissiveness, or even indignation that
I was not consulting with “experts” and “elders.” In conducting research with children, I
confronted not only negative “cultural” attitudes but also scholarly skepticism. In a recent
American Historical Review roundtable, historians discussed to what extent
“chronological age” is a “useful category of historical analysis.” In a vigorous rejoinder
to the roundtable, “The Kids Aren’t All Right,” Sarah Maza argues that children are not a
reliable or productive category of analysis because they “produce few sources of their
own voices, have limited agency, and as individuals and as a group soon outgrow their
subaltern status” (Maza 2020).
I think we can make a couple observations, without delving into this debate
among historians. First, anthropologists conducting ethnographic research might be better
positioned to collect the ephemeral data of childhood. Secondly, not all children
“outgrow their subaltern status,” because there are more ways of being subaltern than
simply age. Among my interlocutors, refugee or displaced young people seemed
painfully aware of their low status. Even wealthy Kurdish youth I knew expressed
frustration with their low place in the social and political hierarchy, which for many
families still centers on the dȋwanxane, a room for receiving relatives and other guests.

116

More than once, I heard a Kurdish young person complain that their presence was
welcome in the dȋwanxane, but not their opinions. Kurdistani society generally did not
regard young people as social or political actors, or at least not agents of consequence.
My sense is that the dismissive talk about the political agency of Kurdistani youth
that I heard during my fieldwork represents a fissure in Iraq’s collective memory and
contemporary experience. As Hanna Batatu (1978) notes, many protests throughout
Iraq’s history have been youth driven. In the years since my fieldwork, protests in
Baghdad (Barbarani 2019; Bobseine 2019), as well as in the Kurdistani city of Slemanȋ
(Saadi and Chomani 2020), have consisted largely of youth. On the one hand, members
of older generations criticized youth because they seemed to shirk their political duties as
agitators and revolutionaries. On the other hand, negative commentary about youth
referenced not only the moral shortcomings of seemingly apathetic youth and their
families, but also the state “failures” which produced them. Chief among those failures is
national unity.
The problem was not that Kurdistani youth were unaware of their political
potential; I knew from their conversations with me that many believed it would not
matter. In this chapter and in the following chapter, I center the voices of people
belonging to two groups: The first group is comprised of teachers, most of whom came of
age during the sanctions era and who are critical of their students’ moral and political
behavior. The second consists of young people who are surprisingly articulate about how
state failures and national disappointments have created an aura of apathy, but not exactly
as their teachers perceive it.
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To demonstrate how people envision and critique Kurdistani statehood vis-à-vis
Iraq’s, I offer ethnographic vignettes observed during a semester I spent in Kurdistan
Civilizational School (KCS), a private school in the city of Erbil. I found the Kurdistan
Civilizational School to be a microcosm and laboratory of the aspirational Kurdistani
state: As microcosm, the internal dynamics of the school illuminate the imaginaries,
subversions, and evasions of statecraft and its subjects; as laboratory, the administration,
teachers, and students experiment with potential socio-political futures within the
relatively safe space of the school. While I observed some of these dynamics at work in
other private schools and in government schools, the demographics and power struggles
within KCS uniquely reflect those of Kurdistani society and state. I suggest that this
private school is unique among the dozen or so private schools I visited in the region
because its founders and education program invited religious plurality and promoted
critical thinking. KCS presented an unparalleled opportunity to witness the complexities
and subtleties of Kurdistani statecraft and emerging sovereignties in a transitional
moment for the country.
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Figure 4. Youth walk through Sami Abdulrahman Park, facing the Kurdistan Regional
Government Parliament building. Photo by the author.
Negotiating identities at KCS
Before moving to examine how the Kurdistani state is produced and contested in
educational settings like Kurdistan Civilizational School (KCS), I first provide some
context about education in general in Kurdistan, as well as historical context for KCS.
The majority of Kurdistani students attend government schools, while less than 3% attend
private schools (Vernez et al. 2014). My interlocutors tended to categorize private
schools either as “local,” meaning government-run schools, or as “international,” which
referred to private schools. For example, the Choueifat school belongs to an international
organization which establishes schools across the Middle East, and every school operates
according to standardized policies, procedures, and curricula. Other “international”
schools are based on a foreign, national education program, such as that of the United
Kingdom. For example, the British International School of Kurdistan (BISK), followed
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the same sequence of courses and exams given in the U.K., with the goal of preparing
students for higher education there, or perhaps elsewhere in Europe or in the U.S. I
regularly encountered Choueifat and BISK students, and sometimes their teachers, at the
gym where I worked or at popular cafes. The impression these students and teachers gave
me was that their schools were hyper-focused on their respective international curricula
and exam systems and gave little importance to Kurdistani government curricula.
The KRG Ministry of Education mandates that private schools incorporate
Kurdistani curricula into their programs (interview with KRI Director of Private Schools,
2012), but it appears that this policy has been applied unevenly. Some people speculated
that certain private schools with connections to wealthy and politically powerful families
were exempt from the KRG Ministry of Education’s requirement to teach Kurdistani
courses like komalayatȋ (social studies). In these allegedly exempt schools, it seemed to
me that there were few opportunities for students to explore controversial religious or
political topics. Private school students told me they sometimes discussed sensitive
subjects among themselves, but these topics rarely arose in the classroom, and certainly
they were not the focus of lessons as they often were at Kurdistan Civilizational School.
Another network of private schools in the Kurdistan Region followed the Gülen
hizmet model which originated in Turkey and advertised its religious tolerance,
opportunities to learn Turkish and travel to Turkey, and strong STEM training. It was no
secret that Turkey exerted influence in Iraqi Kurdistan. In June 2016, the Turkish
government blamed a violent, attempted coup on Fetullah Gülen and his supporters.
(Fethullah Gülen, from his exile in Pennsylvania, denies this and instead accuses Turkish
president Recip Erdogan of staging the coup to consolidate power.) Consequently, the
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Gülen schools in the KRI became suspect; it was said that connections between the
Kurdistan Region and Gülen were dangerous. These Turkish schools were “taken over”
(that is, the schools were sold and some administrators and teachers were replaced) and
alleged ties with Turkey were severed. Being shut-down or taken-over was a fate the
administrators of KCS likely feared.
The copresence of government courses and government trained ethnic Kurdish
teachers alongside the private school’s “classical Christian” curricula and ethnically and
religiously diverse faculty presented a challenge. To understand this challenge and the
religious ethos of the school, I first offer some historical context. In 1991, after the First
Gulf War, the United States established a no-fly zone over the Kurdistan Region, as well
as in the Shiite south, to prevent Iraqi aircraft from entering those airspaces. In 1992, the
Boutros family, who are Arab Christians, emigrated from Baghdad to Kurdistan with the
goal of opening a private Christian school to serve local, Kurdish children. The Boutros
family asked their American, Christian humanitarian aid acquaintances to help them
establish the school through a partnership with a sister school in Tennessee and through a
Tennessee-based NGO. These partnerships provided American classical Christian
education curricula, which follow the classical Trivium of grammar, logic, and rhetoric
under the umbrella of a “Christian ethic.” Additionally, each year a few American
volunteers moved to Kurdistan to teach in the schools. During an interview in 2012 I
asked KCS cofounder Yakub Boutros what his initial “vision” for the schools was:
In 1992 I moved from the south and came to the north to stay with the [Kurdish]
nation. And I saw many NGOs and different groups of people including churches,
including ministries, Christian ministries, trying to help, working, spending
money, time, people. But a lot of things needed to be changed, specifically in the
lives of a lot of people. I think the way to do that, education is the best way to
touch the heart and mind of people. Not just any kind of education, but a specific
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kind of education which will be in addition to any scientific subject. The ethic is
very important. Read, write, and be exposed to real ethics in the world, including
Christian world, the Christian ethic, as well as world ethics. To help those
students in a new generation to understand life, real life, that’s one hand, and
number two is that they can affect their home, their mother, their father, their
brothers, their sisters, and that’s how education can help impact. That was the idea
when we started.
The Iraqi family-American NGO partnership eventually opened three campuses
across Kurdistan, one in Duhok, on in Erbil, and one in Slemanȋ. A steady stream of
American Christian evangelicals volunteered to teach in the schools. The current and
former teachers I spoke with understood their teaching assignments as opportunities to
contribute to the development of an “under-served group” (Kurds) through education
with a strong Christian influence. Whether their activities inside and outside the school
constituted “evangelism,” or proselytization, is contested and highly individualized. My
sense is that any activities that could be construed as Christian “evangelism” were
tolerated for many years, until a tragic event occurred that involved the death of a foreign
teacher and a local student.
Boutros asserted that the school always had been open about its Christian content,
and that parents knew this when enrolling their children. When I asked most students and
parents about this, first during preliminary dissertation research and later during my
dissertation fieldwork, most parents acknowledged they knew about the Christian
orientation of the schools, but they did not mind it as long as no one was “forcing it” on
the students. Besides, the English language education and perceived quality of its
curricula relative to the Kurdistani government schools were very attractive to local
parents.
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One could argue that the three Kurdistan Civilization Schools were “colonizing”
the KRI, and that is what some critics, both local and foreign, suggested to me in private.
During our interview, Yakub Boutros showed me a thick stack of publications
condemning the schools. He held up one Arabic language article written by a mullah,
titled “Replacing Islam with the Cross.” Boutros tossed this article in the direction of the
stack and said, “Moushkila” (A problem). Some Europeans and Americans working in
the Kurdistan Region also told me privately that they considered the KCS approach as
“cultural imperialism.” It was not incidental that all three KCS campuses opened during
periods of American intervention in the country. However, these periods of international
intervention, both war and humanitarian aid, also made possible the many, other private,
“secular” schools, as well as a variety of business opportunities. One could assert that,
collectively, international schools were “colonizing” the Region. As far as I know, most
of the international private schools opened with the invitation and participation of local
Kurdistani people.
What Kurdistani people I spoke with considered objectionable about the KCS
approach was that the schools were teaching Christian religious content to a student body
that was majority Muslim. In the Kurdistan Region, people are accustomed to
government schools offering religion and language courses corresponding to the student
population’s ethnoreligious identity. For example, in the Christian majority township of
Ainkawa there are government schools designated for the majority Christian population
there; these “Christian” schools offer some instruction in indigenous Syriac language, as
well as Christian religion classes. Across the Kurdistan Region, Turkmani, Arab, and
Kurdish students receive the majority of their education taught in their first language;
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additionally, schools offer some courses in other languages, like English. Students
customarily are not subjected to religion classes that do not match their family’s religious
identity. Older generations reportedly dealt with religiously diverse student populations
in places like Baghdad by simply asking the Christians to leave the classroom during
Islam classes, or vice-versa, and another teacher would offer lessons about Christianity.
This was not always the practice, as some people told me about their own experiences of
having to stay in the classroom during the majority students’ religion class or being sent
outside without another teacher to offer alternative lessons.
Boutros argued that these practices of “separation,” or, what many might call
“sectarianism,” plagued Iraq. In response to public criticism, Yakub Boutros responded
by emphasizing that KCS modeled religious plurality, to the benefit of society:
We told some papers saying that yes, we are Christian schools. They know I’m
not just a Christian but a pastor. I speak, I disciple, I preach, I travel and so on.
But [I’m] not using the school to do that, let’s say, to convert kids to
Christianity…The curriculum and the school, because of the moral actions, is
Christian based. The Bible is one of the resources, that’s one. But the ethic is that
the students will be exposed to a wide range of religions in the world: Judaism,
Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, and you know, Hinduism, and Yezidism, all that.
So in this case it’s not the issue of directing the students of what to choose, but the
reality is to educate the students about different kinds of belief, different kinds of
religions, different kinds of holy books. You know in Islam they believe they
have their prophets, and in Christianity they believe they have their prophets, and
Judaism they believe they have their own prophets and holy book and so on. So
it’s kind of neutral on one hand, but to focus on the positive sides on each. It’s not
our business to convert this or that, and really the statement I have [about] the
school is to educate the students to be what they want to be. When they will be
18, when they will be legal age, when they will be in college, when they will be
adult age, they decide whatever they want to be. That’s the philosophy we have.
We do have books about the world religions. That book is shown to the
Parliament, and shown to the Minister of Education, and to the curriculum
department of the Ministry of Education. Parents, parliament, [government
education] ministers – they are happy about the program as it’s neutral...They
suggested, “Christians can read the Bible, Muslims can read the Qu’ran.” And we
said, “No, that is the nation’s problem, separating people. We don’t care what
outside the school will happen; inside the school is private. Everybody will study
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Islam. Everybody will study Christianity. Everybody will study Judaism.
Whatever they will do at home is not our responsibility.
Boutros’ suggestion that students will be able to “decide whatever they want to
be” is counter-cultural in Kurdistani society, as in much of the Middle East. Religious
and ethnic identity is understood to pass patrilineally from fathers to their children, which
is reinforced by the state’s strict recognition of inherited ethnoreligious categories on
residents’ national identity cards. The state automatically registers its residents according
to the father’s ethnoreligious category, and people are not allowed to change
ethnoreligious identity on government documents. Having a religion, preferably
monotheistic, is normative, and state recognized identity categories do not include
“atheist.” Personal status laws enforce heritable ethnoreligious identity through strict
regulations about inheritance, property ownership, and business. Furthermore, there is
intense social pressure to remain within one’s inherited ethnosectarian category, as well
as to socialize and marry within it.
KCS’s vision, or at least Yakub Boutros’ vision, celebrating the values of
religious pluralism and individual agency produced tensions in the school. Tensions
emerged especially when these broadly “Western” or “Liberal” values crossed with social
practices that reinforce the conference of ethnoreligious identity through patrilineal
kinship and a pervasive majoritarian “Islamic” atmosphere in the school. Later in the
chapter I examine these tensions in more detail. Perhaps the way Boutros presented his
school to me was a reformulation of the school’s educational mission following the
aforementioned tragedy. Perhaps the formerly more explicit Christian content and
practices were recast as general character education in a monotheistic, pluralistic society,
as some teachers and students suggested to me in private interviews. KCS had become a
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laboratory for exploring social and political experimentation through evolution of the
curricula, practices, and sovereignties. Perhaps due to the impending Kurdistani
independence referendum, the war with ISIS, and the economic crisis, experimentation at
KCS seemed to be at its peak during my fieldwork. How the contest of values and its
tensions affected individual teachers and students varied greatly.
The KCS campus in which I conducted field work enrolled around 800 students
from Kindergarten through grade 11 (in 2016 there was not yet a grade 12). The principal
was a member of the Boutros family that had been instrumental in founding the network
of Kurdistan Civilizational Schools. Most of the KCS administrators and teachers were
Iraqi. In the high school building, there were 6 international teachers at the time: one each
from Brazil and Pakistan, and four from the United States. The high school faculty also
included at least four IDPs, including Christians and Muslims, and several local,
ethnically Kurdish teachers. These ethnic Kurds were recent graduates of government
Kurdish language colleges or universities. Subsequently they were employed to teach
Kurdistani Ministry of Education mandated courses like Kurdish language and literature,
Human Rights and Genocide, and Komalayatȋ (social studies focused on Kurds and
Islam). Incorporating the government required courses in addition to the private school’s
American-style curriculum based on classical Christian education produced tensions in
the school.
When I conducted fieldwork in KCS in 2016, the Kurdistan Region was hosting
some 2 million refugees and IDPs, a serious strain on its 5 million Kurdistani residents.
KCS likewise absorbed many internally displaced people belonging to different
ethnosectarian groups. The school’s population included people displaced from Baghdad
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and Mosul during the 2003-2011 war, while other people, such as those from Christian
towns like Qaraqosh, more recently joined KCS after fleeing the Islamic State and
resettling in Erbil. At the time of my fieldwork, the student body was comprised of a
Sunni Kurdish majority but had enrolled significantly many more minority members than
in previous years, including Shi’i, Assyrian and Chaldean Christian, Turkoman, Baha’i,
and Mandean students. In some ways KCS was able to accommodate minority students,
such as by enrolling non-Kurdish speakers in remedial Kurdish language classes. Still,
these same students were required to be present in the government-mandated courses
taught in Kurdish, such as komalayatȋ (social studies) and human rights and genocide,
despite not being able to follow the lesson. In many cases, other students translated for
their non-Kurdish peers as needed, while some non-Kurdish students were permitted to
work on material from other courses.
The increased diversity of the student body, the faculty, and other school staff was
a source of tensions in the school, particularly as competing views on Kurdistan and Iraq
clashed in komalayatȋ and civics courses. Some teachers, especially those who had been
displaced from elsewhere in Iraq, made a point to incorporate their experiences and
opinions into their lessons.
Relative to their government counterparts, KCS students and teachers enjoyed more
freedom of expression. Teachers, while subject to many curricular requirements, had
enough instructional time and autonomy within the classroom to incorporate their
experiences and opinions into their lessons. This may have been the case because the
school’s administration considered “ethics” and religious plurality central to the school’s
educational program. KCS instructors expounded upon the curriculum by incorporating
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moral or ethical commentary, whether they taught social studies, civics, history,
literature, or even math and science. Some teachers guided ethical discussions by sharing
their own experiences and views and by encouraging students to do likewise. For
example, teachers reminded students to be mindful of the diverse experiences and views
within their school and society, particularly when those diverse experiences stemmed
from ethnoreligious differences.
In some courses, such as Civics, discussions about ethics were built into the
lesson. In other classes, such as Komalayatȋ (Social Studies), the teacher sometimes
diverged from the required textbook, which included Kurdish ethnonationalist content, to
foster critical thinking in the classroom. Consequently, many class sessions involved not
only explicit lessons about ethics, nationalism, and the state, but also implicit lessons on
the virtues of evasions and subversions of the state and on the nature of sovereignty.
Teachers and students employed various strategies in these lessons, such as humor,
proverbs, or narratives about personal experiences. In this way, the school functioned as a
laboratory experimenting with competing identities and obligations in a society and state
said to be fragmenting and failing. I observed these experimental lessons most often in
the Komalayatȋ and Civics classes.
Outside of the classroom, KCS students regularly encountered Kurdish
ethnonationalism in mandatory patriotic ceremonies, like the one described below, and
sometimes at other school events. For example, KCS organized a Newroz (Kurdish New
Year) party for high school students, but required everyone in attendance, including nonKurdish students and teachers, to wear jli kurdi, or traditional Kurdish clothing. Many
students, including some Kurdish students, bristled at the requirement and chose not to
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attend the party. Patriotic ceremonies and observing Kurdish holidays with mandatory
Kurdish dress seemed performative, demonstrating that KCS, despite its “Christian”
educational model and many non-Kurdish administrators, teachers, and students,
nevertheless retained a generally “Kurdish” atmosphere. Intentions aside, performing
Kurdishness was strategic during a time of heightened Kurdish ethnonationalism due to
the war with the Islamic State and ongoing conflict with the Iraqi government in
Baghdad. Moreover, because KCS was a private school based on a “Christian” education
model, it was subject to some government scrutiny. Members of the Iraqi Arab Christian
family who had been instrumental in founding KCS and who worked in administrative
positions at KCS lead by example in performing “Kurdishness.”
Additionally, the war and political infighting produced economic stagnation and
put government salaries on hold. Some KCS families were reconsidering whether KCS
was worth the private school tuition when there were alternatives like cheaper private
schools and basically free government schools. Thus, performing “Kurdishness” in part
concerned maintaining the approval of the majority Kurdish school population, as well as
the representatives of the Kurdistan Regional Government Ministry of Education who
inspected the school and sometimes attended formal events at KCS. Performing Kurdish
culture and Kurdish ethnonationalist ideology produced discomfort among many nonKurdish students and teachers, as they were drawn into production and contestation of the
Kurdistani state, or into efforts to remake the “failed” Iraqi state.

Sara’s brotherly love
At Kurdistan Civilizational School (KCS), teachers, staff, and students, though they

came from all over Iraq and from different ethnoreligious communities, had one thing in
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common: They were “stuck” in the Kurdistan region, whether they liked it or not (and
most did not). By necessity they were employed or enrolled in KCS, under pressure and
trying to make the best of the situation. One can almost trace the pressures coming down
from the Iraqi state, to the Kurdistani statelet, to its Ministry of Education, to this
particular private school and the family that ran it, to the administrators, teachers, hall
monitors, and cleaners who populated the school. This diverse group’s daily interactions
seemed to me like an impressive juggling act of ethnicity, religion, language, political
affiliations, and competing sovereignties.
KCS had absorbed many students and teachers displaced, first by the Second Gulf
War, and later by the conflict with the Islamic State. I came to know Sara, one of the
displaced teachers, well during my field work. She first appears in Chapter 1 as she
volunteers in the Yezidi camp in the abandoned construction site near Dream City. Sara
was a Christian woman in her early twenties from the Christian village of Qaraqosh. She
had been teaching at KCS for one year before I arrived to conduct field work there. At
university, Sara had majored in English and aspired to earn a master’s degree in English
Literature. When the Islamic State invaded in 2014, Sara and her extended family fled to
Erbil, taking only what they could fit in their vehicles. They left behind their homes, land,
and livelihood. The expensive agricultural equipment which the family used in largescale farming was destroyed by ISIS.
At KCS, Sara taught English language and literature with warmth and enthusiasm.
Her large, expressive eyes shone with genuine concern for her students. They frequently
came to her in the teachers’ room for advice, both academic and personal, and texted with
her outside of school hours. Sara had formed an intense friendship with “Shams,” a
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Muslim woman who was close in age and was displaced from Baghdad. Like Sara,
Shams was a lover of books and an English teacher, and the two were almost always
together, inside and outside the school. Sara and Shams bonded over their shared interests
and their experiences of displacement and dreams put on hold. Sara struggled with her
own, deep disappointment at how her life had been impacted by war, and this was the
subject of many conversations between Sara, Shams, and their fellow teachers. Among
the Christian and Muslim teachers there was a kind of interfaith dialogue about God’s
will, faith, and how to make the best of their situation. Sara was the most vocal in urging
the other teachers, as well as her students, to believe that there was a meaningful reason
for their suffering.
Over the course of my field work semester in KCS, I witnessed many dialogues in
which people critiqued Kurdistani society by comparing it to their experiences in preinvasion Iraq (pre-2003) and questioning whether one could be hopeful about Iraq’s
future. Sara had many disheartening encounters with students, which tested her ability to
maintain a sense of hopefulness about her students’ future, as well as about her own.
Once, a difficult student confronted Sara in the middle of a lesson, shouting, “Why do
you hate me?!” Sara recalled, “It was just two months after Daesh [invaded Mosul and
displaced Sara’s family], and I had so much teaching, grading, and work. I couldn’t help
it, when he said this word ‘hate.’ I couldn’t take it. It hurt me. I don’t hate anyone. I just
started crying.”
As we sat together in the teachers’ break room, Sara spoke at length about her
struggles to reach her students:
If you pass them in the hallway they will just [bump, push past] you. I remember
when I was in school, we didn’t dare look the teacher in the eye. Now they look
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straight at me and interrupt, “What? Why?” These kids, they are so selfish. Last
year we asked them to give some donations because we are building a school for
refugees in Dohuk. We told them they can bring something used; it doesn’t even
have to be a new thing. Something they already have. And the students didn’t
want to. They said, “Why should we do this?” I told them, “We are all human,
God created us all the same. You are not different from these people. You have
maybe 4 or 5 bags. What are you going to do with all these bags? After some
time, you will throw some of them away because you can, because you will buy
new. So you can just give it to someone who needs it now.” And they are racist.
In my class [today], they are all Kurdish. One is from Duhok. And I said
something to them about being one family, “You are all brothers.” And one from
Hewler said, “I don’t want the Duhoki for my brother.” And the Duhoki said the
same of the Hewleri. I said, ‘What is this? You are all the same. You even look
like you could be brothers.” But they said, “I would never be his brother!” And
they don’t respect the old people either. Last year we read a book that had a
character named the Ancient. And I asked, “Why do you think this character is
named the Ancient? What can we learn from old people?” And they said things
like, “Old people don’t know what they’re doing. They are useless. They have a
meaningless existence.” I couldn’t believe it. I loved my grandparents, respected
them, even more than my parents. Because that is how I was taught, that I should
respect them the most because they are the oldest.
Hearing this, I commented that I hoped her country would not become like the United
States, “where old people are put in nursing homes and sometimes abandoned by their
families.” Sara nodded and continued,
This is why I miss Qaraqosh. I went to America for two months, you know. And
when I was there, I saw how people lived. I had a host family. The father got up at
5am and went to work and came home maybe 5pm or 6pm and only had 2 hours
with his kids. I understand that people work like this sometimes to afford the
living. And his wife didn’t work, so of course he should work hard like this. But I
want more than two hours with my dad. So I said I wanted to go back [home].
And people said are you crazy? How could you not want to stay here? But I
missed my home, the life there, so much. [Pause] I am afraid of what is happening
now. This generation is being ruined. There is no future.
In response to the disheartening exchange between the Hewleri boy and Duhoki boy, Sara
selected a poem, one not in the students’ textbook, to share with her students: James
Kirkup’s
“No Men are Foreign.”
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Remember, no men are strange, no countries foreign
Beneath all uniforms, a single body breathes
Like ours: the land our brothers walk upon
Is earth like this, in which we all shall lie.
They, too, aware of sun and air and water,
Are fed by peaceful harvests, by war’s long winter starv’d.
Their hands are ours, and in their lines we read
A labour not different from our own.
Remember they have eyes like ours that wake
Or sleep, and strength that can be won
By love. In every land is common life
That all can recognise and understand.
Let us remember, whenever we are told
To hate our brothers, it is ourselves
That we shall dispossess, betray, condemn.
Remember, we who take arms against each other
It is the human earth that we defile.
Our hells of fire and dust outrage the innocence
Of air that is everywhere our own,
Remember, no men are foreign, and no countries strange.
---I recorded Sara’s lesson with her students and present it below:
Sara: I chose this poem because I have seen so many situations in this school where
people need to learn this lesson. We should learn that we were all created by God. He
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created everyone of us to resemble who? Him. So when we look at each other who do we
see? God. In every person you see the reflection of God. You don't have to be from the
same religion, the same color, the same country. God loves us all. He wants us to know
one thing: God is love. He wants us to learn to love each other. If you hate a person...
Boy: I hate my sister...
Another boy: Everyone hates his sister...
Sara: It’s not hate, it’s not the word you should use. Annoyed maybe. Ok. Maybe not all
of you know where I am from...
3rd boy: Mosul!
Sarah: No, not Mosul.
4th boy: Qaraqosh!
Sara: I lost my house, everything. My future is on hold. While I was escaping, we had
final exams, and now I have only one paper that says I graduated. I cannot apply to
master’s programs, and I want to do my master’s. Should I hate ISIS?
Students all together: Yes!
Sara: No, because God is love. I cannot hate my enemy...
Girl: Then why do we have wars?
Sara: Because we are stupid. Do you think if I saw a person from this group or that group
who needs help should I not help?
Students: Never help your enemy!
Sara: No you should because you will show them they are wrong. Our actions can change
them for good or bad.
2nd girl: Miss, but if you say that to a Kurdish guy, you should love your enemy, ISIS,
you think cutting heads [off] is ok?!
Sara: And love is not about the things you say but what you do or don’t do. If my friend
is absent and I say bad things about her, how could that be loving her? Also when you see
[refugee] people selling in the streets, tissues or something like this, and you say “ugh”
[disgusted sound], Why? They are doing their best to survive. What about war? Can we
win a war?
Students: Yes!
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Sara: How? By fighting and killing and cutting heads you will win a war? Peshmerga are
fighting furiously every day. Do you think about these people, these people who are
dying every day, they are losing their lives, their families, what will happen to their kids?
To their families? If you start with yourself it will make a lot of change. [Pause] My best
friend is who?
Students: Miss Shams!
Sara: I have another best friend who is not at this school and is a Muslim too - my best
friends are not even my religion. Should I treat them or you any differently?
3rd girl: Miss, what if they treat you differently?
Sara: Then it’s their problem if they do. I have a friend in this school - you don’t know
her, she works in the elementary building - we were in college together for four years. I
helped her a lot when she was in college. I used to help everyone in college. We studied
together. When we left Qaraqosh and came here, I found her a job in this school. I am not
saying this because I am saying I am a better person. No, I helped her because she is my
friend. But something happened during phase 2. She stopped saying hello to me. I would
wave and say hello to her, and she would say nothing. Even my friends were asking, why
does she not say hello to you? But I had no problem with her. It hurt me, but I kept saying
hello to her and gave her a hug. God’s teaching of forgiveness is that God wants me to do
this. Because he told me through his word that I should forgive. Why should I ask for
forgiveness from God, or anything from God, but I don’t forgive? If some person comes
to me for help, I shouldn’t ask if he or she is Sunni, Shi’i, Christian. He is a person. If I
didn’t do this myself, I would be a hypocrite. You know what that means? God not only
sees what we are doing but he knows our thoughts, what is in our hearts. In all situations,
you will learn that when you are helping others you are doing a good thing.
In many lessons as in the lesson recounted above, teachers like Sara and Mariam
the Civics teacher encouraged their students to resist divisions within their communities
and country. Sara presented sectarianism as a threat not only to the social and political
health of Iraq, but also to the spiritual health of her students. “Hating” one’s “brother”
would impede students’ moral progress, Sara argued. Because her students did not accept
their classmates belonging to different ethnic or religious communities or different
political parties as their “brother,” Sara’s appeals to the ethical “golden rule” did not
appear to me to persuade her students to reconsider how they viewed their fellow Iraqi or
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Kurdistani citizens. In the section following, another teacher named “Naila” joins Sara in
reflecting on their childhoods in Iraq. The teachers contrast their childhood experiences
with those of their students, questioning whether any “love” for Iraq has survived the past
three decades of war and sectarianism.
Naila’s Dark Age
Naila entered the grade 7A Humanities classroom and arranged her things at the
desk in the front, where she always sat facing the class. She preferred to sit rather than
stand, and she rarely wrote on the board. Her method was to follow the textbook closely,
often reading passages aloud. Before the lesson began, a female student asked if Naila
heard about some recent government regulation. “No, I don’t like to watch the news,”
Naila crisply replied, waving her hand dismissively. “I don’t want to know about wars.”
Naila, like many of her fellow school employees, had been displaced by war. Turning to
the lesson, Naila asked, “Do you know why the Medieval era was sometimes called ‘the
Dark Ages’?” A boy answered “lack of education.” She agreed, noting that “dark” means
“without education.” Naila then compared the Medieval period to present day Iraq. “Here
we have many children who have left the school and beg in the streets. This is a Dark
Age,” she concluded.
Naila conveyed a pessimistic, no-nonsense attitude whether in the classroom or in
the teachers’ break room. In the break room she often sat at a table alone, reviewing her
lesson plans. Sometimes she joined in discussions with other teachers, especially if they
were commiserating about a problem student. Otherwise, she mostly listened to her
coworkers’ discussions about family matters or issues of faith, periodically looking up
from her lessons and frowning without comment. Naila shared little information about
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her personal life, especially not with students; she argued there should be a professional
“boundary” between teacher and student. She often expressed annoyance with her
students. “I don’t like children,” she explained to me. Naila tolerated them because she
relished learning and sharing her knowledge with other people. Thus, it was a surprise to
see laconic Naila become so animated when I interviewed her in an empty classroom one
afternoon.
She talked at length about her esteemed family history: How her great, greatgrandfather served in the Ottoman military and traveled extensively. His descendants
were adventurers, as well as photographers, poets, and engineers. Her family ran a
printing press in Basra, and her grandfather took tango dance lessons there because “the
people of that time were so open-minded.” When she looked at her family members’
photographs from throughout the 20th century and observed their less conservative,
Western-style clothing, Naila lamented the loss of freedom of thought and expression.
Now Basra was a place where people “refused to develop.” As the political and religious
landscape shifted in Basra, Naila and her “open-minded” family moved to Baghdad,
where she received most of her education. Many women in her family worked as
educators, and Naila said that she felt from a young age she was destined to become a
teacher. She remembered distinctly the moment she first learned to read, laughing as she
recalled her father catching her reading furtively in the middle of the night. Reading
English literature transported her to faraway places, as her ancestors had traveled before
her.
Like many people I met during my field work, Naila spoke nostalgically about a
difficult but contented childhood in the 1990s. Conflict and sanctions helped people
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appreciate the little they had; an orange from the freezer on a hot day was a luxury. Nalia
recalled,
In a way it was nice. It was innocent. Our generation is not like this generation we
are teaching now. They don’t care. We lived in that time...In that time if we had
sugar, we were so rich. And my dad was just a normal person. He worked in a
factory that belonged to the government. He used to work in a factory that made
copybooks for students. Very quality copybooks! [Laughs bitterly] I think
yesterday or the day before, I saw someone who still has this kind of book. It was
recycled paper. Too dark. He took a picture of it and on Facebook said do you
remember this? Most people who made a comment said that we didn’t like it at
that time, but it is much better than what our children have now. The government
used to give us those [textbooks] for free. Now our children have everything, but
they are not happy. My father was poor, you can say, but we were ok. We never
took money from somebody. We lived with dignity. And we were happy
alhamdulliah, thank God...After, especially 1999, 2000, things started to be
wonderful. Higher salaries, a little bit for all of the people who worked for the
government. And things started to come, and factories started to work again. Like
factories which were closed in the ‘90s, factories, dairy, sugar, so it was good
until 2003.
Focusing on scarcity and hardship while narrating childhood experiences was a
way for people to reflect on and reaffirm their own moral or ethical formation that still
serves them as adults. In such narratives, people often contrast their successful childhood
moral formation with that of the present-day youth. In recalling the low-quality paper of
government-issued textbooks during her childhood, Naila remarks ironically that they
were better than contemporary school textbooks produced with better paper but lacking
good educational content. Like many other internally displaced people I knew, Naila
described the dangers of commuting to and from university classes in Baghdad during the
2003-2011 war. Narrowly missing explosions or having classes cancelled was a regular
occurrence. In 2006, her cousin was “savagely” killed, and the family moved to Erbil.
Naila recalled her grief at parting with some of her books when the family moved. During
her first couple years in the Kurdistan Region, she worked odd office jobs, where she felt
her Kurdish co-workers did not respect her. Finally, she found a job opening at a
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relatively new private school, teaching grade 2 Humanities. As the school added a grade
each year, she moved with her students, teaching the same group for six years. I asked
Naila to reflect on the school’s curriculum and students:
Here I think the curriculum is much better, because it has a focus on different
civilizations, ancient and modern. As I said, before it was all about Arabic
civilization in public school...revolutions and so on, and later, First and Second
World War with no details. Only [sighs] in a dry way. It was written in a dry way.
And the other years about Islamic history and then again about Arab civilizations.
Now I think it is nicer. It is written in a very nice way. But the students, I don’t
know. I have so many things to say about the students. I am always complaining
about this generation, they don’t care about anything. The blessings that they have
now. When I was their age, we couldn’t buy sugar. Not just me, all of my
generation, we couldn’t travel, we couldn’t choose anything. We had to live like, I
don’t know, the horse when they put [the bit and harness] around its face. But
now they don’t appreciate what they have. The curriculum is good, the teachers.
We didn’t have school like this. They have AC [air conditioning]. We didn’t have
AC at that time...Anyway, here they don’t understand when I tell them that you
have to thank God for what you have, appreciate your parents, your teachers.
They don’t even respect books. They step on them sometimes. The problem is
also about the parents who are careless, who are saying we are paying the money
so my son or daughter should pass. [Lowering her voice] I asked my students
once, that 20 years after this, or 30 years later, what will happen to the earth?
Because it seems that it’s not just in this country or this part of the world, but
everywhere is like this. What will happen when we pass away and you will be the
older generation and you have to raise your kids, what are they gonna learn from
you? And they didn’t understand. And they started to laugh. When we talked
about culture, and we had this exercise about culture, we said each one should
write about their culture. And they said the smartphone is our culture. I couldn'’t
even answer them. I said you can find [smartphones] here, but they also use them
in China, and the United States, so where is [your] culture?
Naila described her students as completely unmoored from national identity and
culture; they lacked moral sensibilities, failing to comprehend, and mocking the ethical
lessons teachers offered. In her childhood, Naila recalled how every day her mother read
stories to the family and how they discussed the stories and their morals. “We would say,
‘Is it ok to say [what that character says]? Is that good behavior? Can we say this in our
community or not? What will happen if we face the same situation that happens in the
novel?” Naila encouraged her students to ask similar ethical questions, but they seemed
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to lack empathic ability, perhaps due to a failing of the imagination, an idea to which I
return later in the ethnography.
The day following our interview, Naila and I sat with Sara in the teachers’ break
room. Naila and Sara were discussing how their country had changed:
Naila: In my grandmother's time when she was teaching, her salary was 12 dinars.
Sara: Wow...
Naila: It was something, she could buy gold with it and travel.
Sara: But in my mom's time in the 90s [the teaching salary] was so little it
wouldn't even buy a set of eggs, you could not buy even shoes.
Naila: 75 dinars per one piece of bread, so we used to bake our own bread at
home. So many died because of explosions of the oven. My cousin died because
of that.
Sara: I remember when there was a time that you didn't even have proper food to
eat. They would eat barley and mix something with it. My mom kept one and
showed it to me saying, see this is how we would eat.
Naila: I told [Diana] yesterday about how we didn't even have ice cream.
Sara: But even with all this it was better than now. We were happy. We had
peace.
Naila: We didn't have this thinking like who is Christian? Who is Muslim?
Sara: I even thought [Naila] was Christian...
Naila: This always happens. People say happy eid on Christian holidays and I say
to them too. Sometimes I explain [that I am actually Muslim]. Maybe because I
don’t cover [her hair].
Sara: So we had no problems at all. Even though there were not much resources,
at least we were happy. And simple things would make us happy.
Naila: We had hope for the future.
Sara: And people were educated more than now. People liked to learn. Now
people don't care about education. Before, even though the salaries were low, but

140

people cared about education. They wanted their kids to have good education.
Even the teachers wanted to give more than their salaries...
Naila: Because they loved their students and wanted to serve their country.
Sara: Exactly.
Naila: Now nobody loves the country.
Sara: Like, I do this [teaching] for money and nobody cares. I go to this college so
I will be employed and that's it.
Naila: Before 2000 things started to be better. Salaries were higher.
Sara: We were talking about the early 90s...
Naila: From ‘90 to ‘96...
Sara: But later it was good. It became very, very good and people were eating
well. I don't think Saddam destroyed the country at all. It is the opposite for me.
Naila: Maybe if he stayed by this time we...
Sara: ...would be better...
Naila: Be better, but we would have another war with another country [waves
hand dismissively].
Sara: But not war inside, not [civil war].
I heard countless conversations like the one above. Many of my Kurdish
interlocutors, though they did not share Sara and Naila’s views about former Iraqi
president Saddam Hussein, agreed that the education system had declined, and people no
longer “cared” about learning. As Ashti observed, people had become docile and easier to
manipulate in politics and in religion. It was this apathy and docility which produced a
dejected spirit among many of my interlocutors. True, chronic war and economic
stagnation also contributed to a shared sense of hopelessness, but the lack of proper moral
sentiment and hope seemed the most daunting obstacle of all. Naila said that when she
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began to hope, something bad would happen that would discourage her anew. Toward the
end of our interview, I asked Naila what actions she might take in light of her general
discouragement and hopelessness about the future. She replied, “I just am passing the
days. If God wants me to travel, I will. If not, I will stay here, and maybe it's better for
me. There are so many people who want something, but later they regret it or something
bad happens. So I will wait and see. I believe in destiny.”
Discussions between teachers and students illuminated intergenerational tensions
about hope and futures. My interlocutors who came of age in the 1980s and 1990s talk
about how war and sanctions shaped their difficult childhoods, which were and are
central to their continuing projects of ethical self-making. For my interlocutors in their
20s and 30s, generational memory often takes the form of narratives about how war and
its effects shaped their childhoods. Difficult memories are softened by nostalgia for small
or simple pleasures, such as eating an orange from the freezer on a hot day. Members of
the 80s and 90s generations expressed appreciation for how hardship early in life fostered
the fortitude and perspective that enabled them to make sense of and to endure their
current difficult situations, perhaps even to feel hopeful. Perhaps not incidentally, many
of these hopeful people in their 20s and 30s worked as teachers.
Many times, I observed teachers trying to help their students cultivate similar
strategies for coping and for generating hope in trying times. Many lessons could be
summarized as “We survived and you can, too.” Students typically did not accept their
teachers’ narratives and perspectives. In private conversations with me, students would
comment that many of their teachers were displaced and that teaching was a stressful,
low-status, low-income job. How could anyone feel hopeful in those circumstances? I

142

cannot recall many students expressing a desire to become a teacher; they aspired to
medicine, engineering, and other higher-status type jobs. Both the private school and
government students I spent time with typically did not feel hopeful about their futures,
though for different reasons. Privileged students anticipated leaving Iraq upon graduating
high school or college, and poor female students anticipated early marriage and
childbearing. Teachers who survived harsher childhoods than their students became
exasperated and discouraged by their students’ refusals to adopt hopeful attitudes.

Declaring independence
The civics teacher, Mariam, was not easily discouraged by her students’ negative
attitudes about Iraq. For its classical Christian education model, Kurdistan Civilizational
School imported American textbooks, including an American civics textbook. Curious
about how Mariam would use these American books, I joined her class as often as I
could. Mariam, like some of the other teachers, permitted me to sit in the back of the
classroom with my laptop and transcribe everything that was said. Mariam and her family
had been living in Erbil for a few years since they fled their home in Baghdad during
some of the worst sectarian violence in the Iraq War. In civics class she often described
her experiences and expressed her personal opinions, allowing the students to disagree
with her and to debate. In the semester before I conducted fieldwork at KCS, Grade 10
students began learning about the formation of the American government. Mariam
announced that this semester, students would study the U.S. Constitution and then the
Iraqi Constitution and would compare the two documents.
On the first day of the new semester, Mariam opened her lesson with a question:
“Do you think it is important to declare independence?” At that time, there was
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widespread discussion about whether the Kurdistan Region could and should declare
itself independent from the federal Iraqi government in Baghdad.
Gulistan: It’s not always important. It depends on the country and if it’s ready. There
should not be any economic problems.
Mariam: Ok, so you're saying there should be certain conditions...?
Rozhan: Unity
Mariam: We should agree on everything or on one point?
Kamil: Not agreeing on everything but standing as one...
Hawar: There should be one idea and they work together...
Mariam: But this one idea - let's talk about Iraq.
Ashur: We don't even have the definition of independence here. Everyone has a different
subject, a different party. They have debates and discussions, ok, but each has his own
idea, so they leave the party and make a new party.
Mariam to a confused student: He's [Ashur] talking generally. He doesn't mean a specific
party.
Hawar: Unity means working together and being as one.
Mariam: [To Hawar] You are a Kurdish Muslim, and I am a Chaldi Christian. How can
we solve this if we are different?
Hawar: We have a discussion, a debate...
Layla: Can’t we put away our differences even if we are different races?
Mariam: What if these differences are in our blood? We have so many different religions
here: Ba'hai, Chaldi, Yezidi, Muslim...how can I reach the end of this conflict without
hurting what you believe?
Hawar: Secularity!
Mariam: Respect.
Kamil: We can form a system that benefits both sides!
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Mariam: How?
Kamil: If you want to be part of something with me, let’s form a system that involves
both Christians and Muslims.
Mariam: [This semester] we will compare the Iraqi constitution with the American one.
The Iraqi constitution writers did not think about the Ba'hai or Christians. They only talk
about the majority. What do I believe? I’m a human. We don’t have to believe the same
thing. Respect. We should share. Serbest, you have all the resources you need to declare
independence. What will you do?
Serbest: Who gives me this authority?
Mariam: I give the authority to declare independence. What will you do?
Serbest: Here [in Kurdistan]?
Mariam: Leave Kurdistan, leave Iraq.
Serbest: I will first check my qualifications...
Yakub: You have none! [class laughs]
Serbest: Ok I will check the economy, see what resources I have...
Mariam: What else?
Zayna: Laws
Serbest: Resources...nuclear weapons!
Mariam: I expect this kind of answer from Yakub not from you! What else does a country
need?
Rasim: Education
Rozhan: What about religion?
Mariam: That is part of culture.
Mariam wrote the following list of students' answers on the board: 1) Economy, 2) laws,
3) people, 4) education, 5) government, 6) culture, 7) power, 8) flag, 9) national anthem
Medya: A coat of arms?
Serbest: A name for your country!
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Mariam continued writing: 10) Name, 11) Land (Mariam’s suggestion, after the students
failed to think of territory)
Mariam: Serbest, will you immediately declare independence if you have all these
things?
Zayna: What about army?
Mariam writes 12) army.
Mariam: Who should you go to first if you want to declare independence?
Hawar: The neighbor countries, the border countries
Mariam: Ms. Diana, what do you think?
Diana to class: In your human rights class, didn't you just learn about an international
organization?
No one takes my hint. Mariam says, "Yes, what is this international organization?"
Thomas: United Nations
Gulistan: We don't need them.
Mariam: For sure you need them. Let's go through the list to see why. What about
economy? Ashur, why do you need an economy? What do you need?
Ashur: I need...[looking at his desk] stationary? books? [class laughs]. I mean, I need to
buy these things. Where do we get the books? America, right? [Indeed, much of the
school’s curriculum was shipped from the United States through a connection with a
sister private school.]
Mariam: Ok, so yes, you need to buy these things. Tell me about your parents, what about
the things they need?
Rayna: Jobs because if there is no salary, business will go down...
Mariam: No more shopping...
Serbest: ...the price drops...
Hawar: …then protests....
Mariam: Economy is very important so we can work, eat, live. What about law?
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Kamil: Law is to keep the country moving without problems.
Rozhan: Law is designed to protect liberties.
Zayna: Without law there will be chaos.
Mariam: Yes, there will be chaos. Yakub said that without law, he will be the first one to
kill and steal. [class laughs]
Farhana: We need law to keep humanity... [students chatter excitedly]
Hawar: No, it is a nice thing she said, to keep humanity...
Farhana: ...because in this country men think they are superior to women, so law will
make us equal.
Hawar: Laws are designed for justice, equality, and freedom.
Kamil: Objection! Objection! Justice doesn't mean equality. There are higher powers...
Mariam: For any society we need equality, justice, and freedom. These three are
connected to each other. In America, for example, I don't know if I can have justice, but
the other two I can have [equality and freedom]. I can have more freedom. But for
Middle Eastern countries this is a problem. And freedom doesn't mean you can do
anything, like something wrong. The problem is we don't have it [freedom and equality]
from the time we are kids. It starts with the family, the religion, the society. If the family
is not having the relationships of equality, then zero [equality outside the family in
society].
Rozhan: But tradition?
Mariam: We have to respect certain traditions, rules, but if we are to be equal, we start
with the family. Then there will be justice. So if Farhana and Serbest are my daughter and
son and come to me, it doesn't matter if [they are] girl or boy.
Rida: Justice is related to equality...
Mariam: If I have a ticket to freedom and I give it to you, what will you do?
Kamil [grinning]: Sell it for a higher price. That's how you make a profit.
Mariam: But what about the people who are victim to this buying and selling? Laws need
to suit every single person. Ok, let's talk about people.
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Kamil: People are basic to the country. [Unclear discussion among boys at the front of
the room]
Mariam: The murderer is basic? We have countries that don't have these crimes...
Serbest: In those countries the people are good.
Mariam: No, the laws are good.
Hawar: If the laws are good, who makes them [follow the law], who scares them?
Mariam: The state.
Kamil: If we have criminals, we can't have a proper country...
Mariam: We have a proper country...
Kamil: ...But all the points [gesturing to the board] must agree with each other.
Mariam: There are countries without [a lot of] crime! I don't remember the names now,
but there are. Ok, let's talk about education. What is it for?
Rozhan: To keep our country in a forward position.
Mariam: Be realistic. You have to improve yourself for your country? You are in school
for your country? Be realistic. [touching the wall, indicating an imaginary framed degree]
You will take a degree for your country? Seriously? No, first you improve yourself. What
do you want to be in the future?
Basma: Famous
Mariam: For what?
Yakub: A communist [students laugh]
Mariam: Thomas, why are you here?
Thomas: My parents made me [class laughs]
Mariam: I agree with you, Thomas. You have to go to school until age 18. We are forced
to come to school. I was like you. My family forced me to be in school. Why?
Hawar: I want to be something. When you are a student you are nothing! You want to
grow up and be something.
Mariam: My dream, remember what I told you?
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Students: You wanted to be a lawyer.
Mariam: When I was younger I wanted to be a teacher. But then I discovered I have the
ability to be a lawyer. But my father kept asking me, "Why do you want to be a lawyer?
Will you be an ambassador?" Finally he used his authority and said, "This is the end of
discussion. No more lawyer." Ok. I finished high school and decided to go to the English
Language department. I got good grades. I decided it was ok to be a teacher. I don't know
why I changed, because my dream is still to be a lawyer. But still I love teaching. This is
a blessing. I'm sure some of you are following your parents who are telling you to study
medicine, engineering, whatever. But I have a friend who quit medical college. Her mom
forced her to go. After 8 years of study she quit, said bye, went to France and studied
engineering, which is what she wanted. Getting [an] education without getting what you
really want, to me, it's nothing. [Bell rings, class disperses]

Judgment Day and the national government
Early in the semester, Mariam distributed photocopies of the United States
Constitution to her 10th grade civics students. Her method was to ask different students
to read through the chapter aloud in class. Mariam would stop the student reading aloud
to discuss important points in the chapter or to ask discussion questions. She opened class
with a question, “Why did they [the U.S.] need a national government?” Silence. She
asked again, and still the students were silent. "You know what?" she asked. "You need
to start watching the news."

Serbest: Miss, we have too much homework to watch the news.
Mariam: So what? Since 1991, when I was 7 or 8 years old, I kept hearing about the
“judgment day.” People were saying what was happening was the judgment day. This is
always the case when something bad is happening. For example the Armenians after
World War I said that it was the judgment. One day it will be judgment day for you. You
don't know and I don't know when. So I just live my life and try to know what is going
on. [pause] So why do we need a national government?
Zayna: To prevent chaos.
Mariam: That's it?
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Gulistan: What do you mean by national government?
Serbest: In Kurdistan we have our own government.
Mariam: But still Kurdistan is part of Iraq. What else? You know why we have brains?
To think with them. Think: What do I need by a government?
Rasim: A system of laws.
Zayna: A country.
Gulistan: A system that organizes a country through rules and laws.
Mariam: Ok, but what does government mean to you? In one word. [silence] Thomas,
what does it mean to you?
Thomas: It's supposed to be a like a parent watching over you, supervising you...
Mariam: Good.
Ashur, [from the back, sitting tall and struggling to be heard]: I think of it as a large
company that produces...
Serbest: A factory!
Layla: ...especially for oil.
Mariam: Ms. Diana, what do you think?
Diana: Does it have to be one word or can I say a phrase?
Mariam: Ok, a phrase.
Diana: Protection of liberties.
Mariam: Wow, that is a good answer, but we don't have this in the Middle East! If you
were to find an Iraqi woman Ms. Diana's age and ask her, she would never say this
phrase.
Hawar: What did she say?
Diana, louder: Protection of liberties.
Mariam: We can compare the two [Iraq and the U.S.]: The difference between Thomas [a
white American citizen whose parents were employed in Erbil] and Hawar [a Kurdish
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local] is what they learn and how they will think. Why did Ms. Diana give me this
answer?
Yakub: Because she is in university!
Ishtar: Because this is what she learned in school, what her parents taught her...
Mariam: What else?
Ishtar: ...and this is her experience of living in America.
Yakub raises his hand and says almost exactly what Ishtar has just said.
Mariam: Yes, her experience. [Brief interruption] I want you to keep thinking about this
question about why we need a national government.
Gulistan resumes reading the textbook chapter aloud. Mariam instructs students
periodically to underline things in the text, especially dates.
Hawar: Miss why do you make us learn all these dates?
Mariam: Dates are important. Do you know when is Army Day? [Silence] No one. Of
course you know the date of Newroz because you have a holiday, you have a celebration.
Do you know the date of the liberation of Baghdad? [Silence]
Serbest: We only know the Kurdistan dates! We don't study Iraq in school.
Mariam: You can't blame the school because you don't know! [Pauses, shakes her head]
To be honest, I have full respect to the United States. The people who live there deserve
it.
Zayna: And we don't deserve it?!
Mariam: No, we don't. [The students look shocked.] The regime of Saddam Hussein, if
you said your opinion [makes throat slitting motion], bye bye. We asked for help to get
freedom and democracy, and this is the result? We have greedy people in the
government. And what do we do about it? So, I will do my best to earn what I want. It is
the same with you. Like, when you cheat, what do you get?
Serbest: You pass!
Mariam: Then?
Yakub: You go to university!
Mariam: And after that?
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Rasim: You get a career!
Mariam: You can't get the career if you didn't work to earn it. You can't become a doctor
without studying.
Serbest: Miss, I don't want to be a doctor. I only want to pass. [laughter]
Ishtar: Miss, do you really believe that what we learn here in school is going to help us?
Mariam: Yes!
Ishtar: Mr. Bjar [their math teacher] told us that he worked as an engineer. And what he
studied in school did not help him on the job. He had to learn on the job. He said he was
“lost” because what he learned in college was not the job.
Mariam: My sister is studying physics right now. You're telling me what she is studying
"isn't real"? Physics is how things work. Math is how things work. History is how things
happened. What you study IS REAL. The people who are lost are the people in villages
who don't study.
Hawar: None of us will graduate from this school and get [into] a good university.
Zayna: Speak for yourself!
Mariam: If you have a dream, a goal, you have to put a plan for yourself.
At Mariam’s instruction, Gulistan resumed reading aloud.
Mariam: One of the things about having a new country is that you have to be organized.
This is one of our problems.
Gulistan resumes reading aloud. A brief discussion about slavery follows, then Gulistan
reads aloud until Mariam stops her again.
Mariam: It's normal when you start a new country to have struggles. Being part of the
struggle is normal. But what happens after the struggle is important too.
Gulistan resumes reading a passage about the electoral college.
Mariam: This is the same as the example I told you about yesterday, where you have the
village agha or sheikh who represents the village.
Gulistan resumes reading the passage, which is about the delegates not agreeing about the
Virginia versus the New Jersey plans.

152

Mariam: Why is it always going nowhere?
Serbest: Because people have different opinions.
Rozhan: They did not reach a conclusion.
Mariam: Yes, they didn't. Why?
Serbest: No one is willing to change how they think.
Mariam: Let's use school as an example: I say school is important. Someone will disagree
with me. At the end we will not have a conclusion. Why? Because I want something to
serve my own interests. [Yakub says something in Arabic.] English, Yakub.
Yakub: I don't know how to say it in English.
Mariam: Sometimes the disagreement is over something silly. [Pause]
Mariam tells Mamiz to pick up reading where Gulistan stopped, a passage about the
Supreme Court.
Mariam: Is it right or wrong that we have certain [politicians]? Do we really know them?
Let's say we have certain names here [makes a gesture like list-making] Is it right for me
to elect people I don't know? What do you think? [Silence]
Serbest: It is better for people to choose. Because someone on the committee may bribe,
or they pick their cousin.
Mariam: The time of Nouri al-Maliki was like this. [Pause] Hadi, what do you think?
[Hadi mumbles something.] Ok, I will come back to you. Malek, what do you think?
Malek: It is better to know the people.
Hawar, turning to Malek: Why?
Georges: The politicians can be bribed or biased. If you don't know the person...
Mariam: The only time I voted I was at university. It was my first and last time to vote.
When I decided to vote for [Ayad] Allawi, it was because I saw what he did [his record].
Yakub: What did he do?
Mariam: Many things! I felt safe then. As a woman I could go out from the university
[into public places]. He helped the poor. And many properties that REALLY belonged to
the church he gave back.
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Zayna: Was it the only good time?
Mariam: Yes. [Pause, silence. The bell rings.]
In the class session transcribed above, the civics teacher and her students are
reformulating sovereignties and notions of personal agency in a strained socio-political
environment. Mariam frames their discussion with the concept of a “judgment day,” a
time of testing which “everyone” will face. Spurred on by the imminent judgment day,
Mariam impresses upon her students their roles and responsibilities in, if not preventing
the judgment, then responding appropriately to it. The civics classroom served as a “safe
space” for students to express their opinions and disagree. Because their teacher was a
displaced Iraqi Christian, her perspective differed from other teachers in the school. The
government Kurdish courses particularly seemed to present only Kurdish ethnonationalist
perspectives; other teachers, such as in math or science, were simply very focused on
their course content. When Kurdistani students protested learning about “Iraq” because
they are in Kurdistan, Mariam reprimanded them. She reminded students that they remain
subject to federal Iraq, however flawed it may be. In the class transcript below, Mariam
continues to ask students probing questions about the nature of government and calls
them to action against corruption.

Corruption and a call to action
The photocopied chapter from the U.S. Civics textbook was titled "Struggle for
Ratification." Mariam began class by asking a student read the text aloud. The text
outlined the debate between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists. After a few sentences,
she stopped the student reading and asked the class, "Which do you prefer? Federalists or
Anti-Federalists? And why?"
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Hawar: Federalist because they want a strong national government.
Mariam: What about citizens' rights?
Hawar: They will be there.
Mariam: Are you sure?
Sara: With a bill of rights.
Thomas: If you take a little from both it will be better.
Mariam: We will get to that later. A strong government needs limits.
Gul: I'm with the Anti-Federalists. They showed more care for the people.
Mariam: Don't you think you need a strong national government though?
Gul: I don't see...
Ahmed: It depends on the government.
Mariam: What about the people of this government? [pause] I should teach you all
philosophy.
Hawar: [Government] should have limits.
Mariam: What are the things that should have limits? You should have a list.
Gulistan: No tyrants. Abuse of power.
Mariam: Even when the country has a democracy a tyrant can be there.
Hawar: No greed.
Mariam: Georges, if you are going to choose this list of rights, what should they be.
Georges: I don't know.
Hawar: Maybe so someone will not lose their job by force...
Mariam: Ok, what else?
Thomas: Freedom of speech.
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Mariam: After Saddam Hussein, they said you will have more freedom, you will have
these freedoms, freedom of speech.
Yakub: We have!
Mariam: No, we don't. Many journalists in Baghdad had this freedom of speech, and they
are dead now. To me, if we have a little of both - because they both have positivity and
negativity - I think they will reach not only a strong national government but also the
rights of the citizens.
Nergiz resumed reading. Mariam stopped her and asked why the text said, "America was
an immature nation." It was a comprehension question. Nerqiz answered that it was "not
much time since the Declaration of Independence." Mariam said , "Yes." Nergiz
continued reading.
Mariam: We can see that it's not just declare independence and that's it. Iraq has been
struggling how many years? Since 2003. And still, it's not a stable country. Each person
wants something for himself. That's why it's not stable. It's not just I have land, I need a
government. There will be many killed, many victims. And I think - maybe it depends on
the way that the Middle East people think. It's in our blood that we are selfish people.
[Several students nod, say “ay wallah.”] If you get power, you will forget your beliefs,
your principles.
Serbest: Greed!
Mariam: Not only greed. You are the generation that we depend on to change something.
[The class falls silent.] Not just politics. If you are a teacher, doctor, engineer - it doesn't
matter - you don't need power to change society. You should have your own beliefs and
your own principles. You live in Iraq, so what? Change your beliefs. Maybe you can't
see it now, but you can change something. I depend on you. Ms. Jamila [their literature
teacher and school administrator] depends on you. Don't give up your hopes and dreams
because of the society. Our society is not correct. Maybe 40 percent of it is, but..
Rasim: But we have corruption.
Mariam: It is corrupt. But don't corrupt yourself. It's not about having power or an army.
You can set your own rules. Be the citizen that we can depend on. It's not only about
getting a degree or the college you want.
Georges: What do you think of the U.S. society?
Mariam: To be honest, most of us look at the U.S. according to the movies. But for
example, if you want to change your religion, in the USA no one will kill you, judge you.
You still have the rights of a citizen. What we need is a real freedom. We don't have it.
Still there are certain things you cannot say or do. My uncle, my relatives live there [in
the US] and to them it is heaven. They lived in Iraq. They didn't have their rights here.
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There are negatives, sure, in every society. But as a citizen no one can touch you or hurt
you.
Georges: But no one has touched or hurt me.
Mariam: Maybe you say that now. But grow up, go to university, get a job and then see if
you still feel that way.
Ahmed resumes reading. Mariam stops him to emphasize the phrase "a more perfect
union."
Mariam: Of course there is no perfect country. But they were trying. [Continuing her
interaction with Georges] So what I see here, Georges, is no protection for the citizens.
No protection from the attacks of other people. Why did I move here from
Baghdad? [Some students say freedom or because your family did.]
Serbest: Freedom, for protection.
Mariam: They threatened us. [pause] Yeah, they did.
Georges: For what?
Mariam: For being Christian. Ms. Diana, can someone threaten you for your religion in
the U.S.?
[I asked her to repeat the question.]
Diana: If someone threatens you for your religion, you can go to the police. [That's all I
said, unsure about how to introduce complexity into this conversation.]
Mariam: My brother was in Rome studying theology. If [sectarian militants in Baghdad]
found out they would have killed him.
Georges: What about now? [Other students ask if Baghdad is safe now.]
Mariam: All of the Christian families in that area are gone.
Georges: Couldn't you just move to another area [of Baghdad]?
Mariam: Maybe we would face the same people.
Ahmed continued reading aloud from the textbook chapter until the bell rang.
When students attempt to shirk their moral and political responsibilities by
pointing to state failures, Mariam insists that such failures do not absolve students of their
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civic and political duties. While Mariam agrees that corruption and greed plague their
government, she also acknowledges that new countries endure struggles, which is
“normal.” Although she critiques those in power who are “corrupt” and “greedy,” she
does not condemn power itself. Rather than adopting a defeatist attitude about said
corruption, she encourages her students to “not corrupt themselves.” Instead, students
must choose to work hard in school and in a career, for which their current classes are
preparing them, until they come of age to vote and take other political action. “Be the
citizen that we can depend on,” she implores them.

Writing their own constitutions
By April, the 10th grade civics class had moved on to analyzing the Iraqi 2005
Constitution. Mariam distributed copies of the constitution in English. She instructed her
students to look at the Preamble and asked Hawar to read aloud. Hawar read, “In the
name of God, the Most merciful, the Most compassionate…”
Mariam: It starts with this one because it's an Islamic country. Second, we have the sons
of Adam [referring to the second line, “We have honored the sons of Adam”]. These are
the circumstances of this country, the fighting. It means we honor all of us, Muslims,
Christians, Jewish, whatever races, whatever religion.
Hawar continues: “We, the people of Mesopotamia,…
Mariam: So far, they didn’t separate the people of Iraq [into sects] but considered [them]
as one.
Hawar continues reading, “...the homeland of the apostles and prophets, resting place of
the virtuous imams, cradle of civilization, crafters of writing, and home of numeration.
Upon our land the first law made by man was passed, and the oldest pact of just
governance was inscribed, and upon our soil the saints and companions of the Prophet
prayed, philosophers and scientists theorized, and writers and poets excelled.”
Mariam: Here we can say, “Wow, what a country we have!” Filled with religions,
prophets, philosophers. Meospotamia was the first to write. We have this history; imagine
what is happening now.
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Hawar continues reading, “Acknowledging God's right over us, and in fulfillment of the
call of our homeland and citizens, and in a response to the call of our religious and
national leadership and the determination of our great authorities and of our leaders and
politicians, and in the midst of international support from our friends and those who love
us, marched for the first time in our history towards the ballot boxes by the millions, men
and women, young and old, on the thirtieth of January 2005…”
Mariam: For the first time since Saddam Hussein's regime, people have a right to vote.
But later we will find out about what the people who represent us, the leaders, what they
did. [There is a guest at the door. Mariam steps out for a moment and then reenters.] So
you will say I will vote for this one because he or she will do something for me.
Hawar reads, “...invoking the pains of sectarian oppression inflicted by the autocratic
clique and inspired by the tragedies of Iraq's martyrs, Shiite and Sunni, Arabs and Kurds
and Turkmen and from all other components of the people…”
Mariam: Shia, Sunni, Arab, Kurd, Turkoman, and from all others...What is missing here?
Layla: Christian
Mariam: Yes. They have suffered a lot. I don't mind that I live in a religious country as
long as they say I can keep my rights. To me, I prefer the secular countries. It will
guarantee the same rights for all citizens. We are the people from this land. Syriac,
Assyrian, Chaldi. We are from here. Why did they not mention us? Iraq consists of many
races, religious groups. Mark this section. Put a sign on it.
Hawar reads on about sectarian conflict and the suffering of various ethnoreligious
groups until he comes to the phrase "hand to hand, shoulder to shoulder," which is meant
to symbolize unity, but Mariam stops him. She repeats the phrase sarcastically, making a
clashing motion with her hands and shoulders. One student jokes by making a selfflagellation movement in reference to Shi’i religious practices.
Mariam: This is the difference between people who learned from the past and those who
did not. If we go back to ancient times, we were more developed then than now. Imagine
it: We are blessed in this country because we are part of this land, but we are cursed, too.
For example, I am 33 years old. My mom keeps worrying about me, about my
grandchildren. If we stay here there will be no future, she says. Shall we go or shall we
stay? Shall we act or shall we be like a people just watching, waiting? But we have this
faith in each one of us. It will make us have hope.
Yakub [sneering]: Inshallah
Mariam [seriously]: Yes. Inshallah.
Hawar resumes reading aloud and asks, "Miss what does 'sectarianism' mean?”
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Mariam: It means sects, like Sunni, Shia, madhhabiyy in Arabic, I don't know the word in
Kurdish.
There is some brief discussion about diversity.
Hawar continues aloud: ...[We] have taken upon ourselves to decide freely and by choice
to unite our future, to take lessons from yesterday for tomorrow, and to enact this
permanent Constitution, through the values and ideals of the heavenly messages and the
findings of science and man's civilization. The adherence to this Constitution preserves
for Iraq its free union of people, of land, and of sovereignty.
Mariam: [Our experience] is below the expectations. Because, let's be honest, maybe at
that time...what grade you were in 2003?
Students: Miss, we were not even in school! [Students chatter]
Mariam: [Claps hands] It was the dream of all Iraqi citizens...
Hawar: for Saddam to go...
Mariam: Yes, I am telling you: many families suffered, many families lost their members,
moms, dads, kids, and we all know what happened in Halabja and Anfal. [Pause] Some
of them - the ones that supported him, they didn't want to - but when they had decided
was that Iraq should be changed, it should be better. But what I see is that is that it turned
worse. My dream is to go back to Baghdad, the place where I was raised, the place where
I spent my childhood, my university was there, my friends are there. And I keep
dreaming of my own house, of our garden, the big one, and the tree in the middle of the
garden. And I keep dreaming of how I used to ride the bicycle in the middle of the street
with my friends and still I want [trails off]...but when will this come true? [Pause] When I
am reading this [constitution preamble] it is perfect, and then as I continue reading it is
missing something. And then as Hawar said, it is lies. [Politicians] should not blame the
citizens if they [politicians] did not do their duties.
Yakub: But Saddam was the most powerful...
Medya: Why do some people believe in his reign, say that it was all safe?
Hawar: It was safe, wallah, it was safe!
Mariam: I will answer you [Medya],but let us go back to that one [section].
Serbest: [Under his breath, beside me] Hawar is talking like he was the cousin of Saddam
Hussein...
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Mariam asks another student, Belend, to read aloud “Section One: Fundamental
Principles.” Belend reads, “Article One: The Republic of Iraq is a single federal,
independent and fully sovereign state in which the system of government is republican,
representative, parliamentary, and democratic, and this Constitution is a guarantor of the
unity of Iraq…”
Mariam: Article one is very important. They mention many important features:
republican, representative, democratic. Well. Which one of these points we can see that
they did not [achieve]? Is it a republic? [Students shake heads no.] I agree with you:
Failure. When we saw on TV the fighting, stealing, killing, and where is the money?
[Imitating politicians] Blah blah blah. And we can go and see [the politicians’] castles,
some of them are in London, some of them around the world.
Belend reads, “Article Two:
First
Islam is the official religion of the State and is a foundation source of legislation:
1. No law may be enacted that contradicts the established provisions of Islam
2. No law may be enacted that contradicts the principles of democracy.
3. No law may be enacted that contradicts the rights and basic freedoms stipulated in
this Constitution.
Second
This Constitution guarantees the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi people and
guarantees the full religious rights to freedom of religious belief and practice of all
individuals such as Christians, Yazidis, and Mandean Sabeans.”
Mariam [raises eyebrows, speaks in a sarcastic tone]: Oh really? [Pause] I prefer
separation of religion [and state]. Because here Islam is the official religion, but it is not
the same of Christianity, Yezidi, Jewish; it is not the same with other, different religions.
[Pause] I'm sorry, but you know my ideas. I am very free and open. There will be
struggles. There will be clashes. There are certain points, like, getting the Iraqi ID is
against Christianity. [Pause] Here the Constitution guarantees the Islamic identity of the
majority and guarantees the full religious right and practice of all individuals such as
Christians, and, by the way, the Mandeans are the people who follow Yahya....
Rasim: John the Baptist
Mariam: There are certain ceremonies we have - as Christians we are proud to be, and the
Muslims are proud and the Jewish are the same. And believe me, I can tell you it
happened that many families in Baghdad prevented Christian families to put the cross on
their doors. Why? [They said] “we are Muslims, you have no right.” It happened at
university, I remember this: I used to wear a short skirt. And one of the girls wearing a
veil, she said, “Why you don't wear a long [skirt]?” And I said “Why?” And she said,
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“Don't you have respect for our religion?” And I said, “Respect your religion first and
then come and respect our religion.” And my friend, he was a Shii Muslim, and he said
[to the veiled girl], “You have no right to ask her to do something that her religion is not
asking her to do that.” And it happened with many: the security of that university at that
time tended to be more religious and they kept writing “to respect yourself as a girl, you
have to wear a veil and reduce your makeup, and it is better if you are wearing gloves.”
Hawar: But, miss, Islam does not say wear long skirts like this. It is only an idea...
Mariam: I know. I can see the real Islam in Mihriban [gesturing to her]. I can see the real
Islam in you. But the majority, I don't know what they think of themselves. So I don't
agree with this [point in the Constitution]. They did not guarantee my religious practice.
Or my rights. They did not. [Speaking rhetorically] Why am I here? Why I am here in
Kurdistan? Why did I not stay in Baghdad? [silence]
Belend continues reading aloud, “Article 3: Iraq is a country of multiple nationalities,
religions, and sects. It is a founding and active member in the Arab League and is
committed to its charter, and it is part of the Islamic world.”
Mariam: You can see they keep repeating "the Islamic world". Ok. We got it.
Hawar: Miss, what is wrong with that?
Mariam: You will see that they do the opposite of what they say.
Belend reads aloud, “Article 4: The Arabic language and the Kurdish language are the
two official languages of Iraq.”
Mariam: Did they achieve something? Well, yes. Before [2005] only Arabic was official
[language]. And now Kurdish [is an official language]. But still, there are Assyrian and
Chaldean, and they are not [official] languages; they should mention them here.
Belend continues: “The right of Iraqis to educate their children in their mother tongue,
such as Turkmen, Assyrian, and Armenian shall be guaranteed in government educational
institutions in accordance with educational guidelines, or in any other language in private
educational institutions.”
Mariam: I studied Kurdish. I was in grade 10. But did they really apply [Article 4]? Are
Christians and Assyrians studying in their mother tongue?
Rasim: But now there are restaurants having names in Assyrian...
Ashur: Miss, they are in Ainkawa...
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Mariam: No, I am talking about the school. I studied Kurdish in grade 10, one year, yeah
I studied, only one year. Did I study the Syriac one? No, I did not. My sister studied for a
very short time, and they decided we will change it for something else.
Hawar: Miss, now it is really better. In Duhok there are schools who teach Christianity.
Mariam: I am talking about Baghdad.
Ashur: For example, I studied in grade 1 through 6 in Syriac in Ainkawa (a township
within Erbil).
Mariam: Guys, I am talking about Baghdad and the South!

Throughout her lessons, Mariam returned to the same themes: She and her family
enjoyed a good life in Baghdad until the 2003 invasion, the subsequent war and sectarian
violence, and her family’s eventual displacement. In her narrative, she emphasized that
Christians and other ethnoreligious minorities had been targeted, citing this as evidence
of the failing Iraqi state. While still living in Baghdad, she witnessed the spread of
sectarian political culture and violence, which she associated with a corrupt and failing
government that had betrayed its citizens. Although Mariam initially desired to become a
lawyer, her father disapproved, and she chose to become a teacher instead. With time,
Mariam had begun to see her role as a teacher as an opportunity to contribute to
rebuilding her country. She told her students that they could make the best of their
situations, just as she had done and continued to do during the (then) current economic
crisis and war with the Islamic State. Students could choose what to study and discern
how best to improve themselves and their country. Like Sara and some of the other
teachers, Mariam’s expressed hopes for the future largely rested on her students’ success
– if she could persuade them to not give up hope and abandon Iraq, either by emigrating,
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or, if they remained in their country, by resigning themselves to cynicism or apathy and
withdrawing from political, and to some extent social, life.
Mariam’s students received her lessons unevenly. Some students questioned
whether the situation in Baghdad, and in Iraq as a whole, was really “that bad.” Her
students had not directly experienced any violence in their relatively insular, privileged
lives in the Kurdistan Region. Some found it difficult to empathize with their displaced
teachers’ stories and to respond to teachers’ appeals to morality and duty. When I asked
students during private interviews to tell me what they thought about their teachers like
Mariam and Sara, a few described them as role models or inspirational and expressed
appreciation for their teachers’ apparently genuine concern for their students. Other
students, however, complained that they did not want to stay in Iraq, where they might
end up in a “lower status” job like teaching. Others aspired to medicine and engineering
but conceded that these were careers their families desired for them. Instead, many
students hoped to emigrate to Europe or to the United States, where they could escape the
“failed” Iraqi state, the “failing” Kurdistan Region, and perhaps family pressures, too.

“The history of where you are from”
During my semester in KCS, I conducted several class wide group interviews.
These usually occurred when a teacher was too burdened with administrative work or felt
unwell and offered me the opportunity to interview their students. Teachers were never
present during group interviews. I sat at the front of the class typing furiously on my
laptop while students answered my questions.
Diana to grade 8 class: What have you learned in komalayatȋ class?
Dana: The history of our country.
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Chira, correcting him: The Islamic history of our country.
Dilvin: Komalayatȋ in this school isn’t taken seriously. This is the first year we’ve
had a proper teacher and book. We should have started from grade 4, but nobody
paid attention to it. Komalayatȋ is about your country and where you are from, and
you should know it. But no one in this school does. In other schools they
memorize it.
Diana: When you say “country” which country do you mean?
Ahmed: Iraq
Many students: Kurdistan
Diana: How many of you consider your country to be Iraq? [Ahmed raises his
hand.] And the rest of you?
Other students: Kurdistan! [15 raise their hands. The remaining 4 students had
lived outside Iraq and thus considered themselves to be foreigners, e.g. Canadian.]
When I interviewed the fifteen or so students in grade 9, my asking their opinions
about Komalayatȋ provoked them, leading to a heated debate:
Zina: Yes, we need to learn about [komalayatȋ]! They teach us “Human Rights
and Genocide” [another Kurdistan Regional Government mandated course], so
why not this?
[Students begin to speak over each other]
Rebwar: ...it’s important to keep a culture alive...
Halo: ...It’s a really good class but some students hate it...
Gul: ...it’s horrible because in this type of school we are in now we really don’t
need it…
Yusuf: ...It’s a waste of time, we don’t do anything real…
Cejne: ...The teacher is really nice, but the lesson is boring...
Rebwar: ...The info is useful, but the majority of the class doesn’t care...
Lunja, unable to stay silent any longer, stood up and turned to confront Yusuf:
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Lunja: So you think it is unnecessary to study komalayatȋ?! So, when someone
asks you the history of where you are from, what will you say?
Yusuf: I am from Iraq!
Several students speak over each other arguing about the definition of “their country.”
Gul to me: Miss, if you come to the truth of it, there is no Iraq, there are Kurds,
there are Assyrians...
Halo, rising from his desk: Your history is who you are, your identity. If you
don’t know your history, you don’t know who you are.
[Students cheer and clap]
Arjin, a petite, outspoken student stands up and faces her classmates.
Arjin: Let me tell you about my country: First of all, there is no gender equality!
[Some female students vigorously clap] Second of all, they force religion upon
you! They are close minded!
Just as in Mariam’s civics lessons, the Grade 9 students could not reach a
consensus on national identity. Their criticisms of Iraq and Kurdistan referenced
sectarianism, gender inequality, economic crisis, and government corruption. They were
especially cynical about Kurdish ethnonationalism and the campaign for an independent
Kurdistani state. When Bailen, one of the more patriotic Kurdish students tried to defend
his political party, the other students heckled him. Bailen moved aggressively toward
Yusuf, and students stood between them to prevent a fight. Frightened, one of the female
students left the room and informed Ms. Helin, who entered the classroom and
commanded everyone to sit and be silent. That was the end of my interview with Grade 9,
and thereafter I interviewed students in smaller groups.
After the fight in Grade 9, some students told me privately that they were
disturbed about what happened. There had been previous tense episodes like the one I
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witnessed. The students had learned to avoid controversial topics to keep peace among
the relatively small student body. Many had grown up together in the school, and now the
school was more diverse than before. The komalayatȋ class, as well as my presence in the
school, seemed to exacerbate tensions about controversial topics. When I created a space
for students to express their opinions, their discussion quickly deteriorated into a brawl.
Not incidentally, Karza, who incorporated political critique and secular philosophy into
his lessons, was not invited to return to teach komalayatȋ the following semester. Students
once again did not have a social studies teacher.
Teachers like Sara and Mariam strove to help their students cultivate an ethical
sensibility premised on religious or humanistic “brotherly love,” as well as on shared
national identity. Over the months I spent in KCS, I observed their moral efforts in the
classroom and later listened to their dispirited conversation in the teachers’ break room.
No matter how hard they tried to reach their students, it seemed that students generally
were not receptive; rather, they were antagonistic or evasive. In school, and in social and
political discourse, young people were instructed to desire a functional state, whether
Iraqi or Kurdistani. The cause of rehabilitating national identity, however, did not
motivate students, especially ethnically Kurdish students. They simply “[did] not love
Iraq.”
But these youth did not appear interested in an independent Kurdistani state
either. They expressed disenchantment with all forms of political life, and not just the
forms available to them, but also those forms they were encouraged to imagine and aspire
to in their civics and komalayatȋ lessons. Perhaps these private school students’
comfortable and insular lifestyles rendered them apathetic and selfish. That would be a
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partial explanation, one favored by some of my interlocutors, but not applicable to all
students. Some had experienced the effects of war, displacement, financial insecurity, and
discrimination in the Kurdistan Region. Through their lessons in school and their family
histories, young people knew that cycles of war and genocide had plagued their homeland
for well over a century. That knowledge, and the pervasive gloom due to war, economic
crisis, and political disappointments, produced a kind of emotional fatigue.
In addition to historical knowledge and emotional fatigue, young people also
expressed skepticism about their own agency. In lessons, and in private conversations,
students discussed how “culture” or society limited their abilities to realize personal
goals. They experienced restrictions on friendships, relationships, mobility, and choice of
career. They expressed little hope, if any, in any potential individual efforts to affect
changes in society or in politics. And yet, their teachers repeatedly insisted that students
not only possessed the necessary abilities, but that young people had a moral duty to use
these abilities to the aid of their family, community, and country. Teachers like Mariam
and Sara drew upon a particular model of ethical life presented at Kurdistan Civilization
School (KCS), premised upon individual autonomy and heavy responsibility for one’s
own moral progress.
When students resisted their teachers’ appeals to this model of ethical life, they
were not merely shirking responsibility, if they were avoiding it all. Rather, I believe that
their resistance reflected their skepticism in the feasibility, and not necessarily the
desirability, of individual autonomy in Kurdistan and in Iraq. Since my field work, I have
observed some of these young people express solidarity with youth in Baghdad, and more
recently in the city of Slemanȋ, protesting government corruption. On Instagram and
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Snapchat, they have shared news stories with the hashtage “SaveTheIraqiPeople.” My
sense is that, although these young people expressed solidarity with protestors, they were
nevertheless skeptical about the “goodness” of the nation and the “goodness” of the state.
Ethnonationalism was problematic; they had observed this at school. And desiring a
functional state was not enough. Countless times I heard older people speak of the Iraqi
state as being “better” during the regime of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, not
because they enjoyed more freedoms, but because the state provided more economic and
political stability.
Young people I listened to were acutely aware of what was at stake in talk about
the nation and the state. They had heard people express nostalgia for an authoritarian and
genocidal regime, and they had observed how their classmates and teachers had suffered
from “sectarian” violence and discrimination. Now, they were being instructed to
“desire” certain forms of political life, when they knew well that these political forms had
not protected their friends or communities. Is it any wonder, then, that they questioned
whether the nation or the state were ideal political forms, not just for achieving protection
or stability, but for advancing human flourishing? Desiring freedoms and desiring the
state are not the same thing, especially when one is a member of an ethnoreligious
minority community, or when it is unclear who is friend and who is foe.
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Figure 5. Mural depicting schoolchildren carrying the Kurdistani flag, painted on the wall
of a school in Erbil. Photo by the author. 2017

“Oh, my enemy!”
On a chilly February morning, Kurdistan Civilizational School students hurried
from their buses to the basketball court. Students and teachers were assembling for a
patriotic ceremony. Inside the court there were four groups: Grades 9 and 10 stood
together as one unit; grades 7 and 8 stood together; and grade 11 stood by itself. The
fourth group was comprised of three students who had been selected to march toward the
flagpole and raise the Kurdistani flag. The flag-raisers stood beside a handful of students
chosen to sing the national anthem into a microphone. I noticed Muna from grade 8 was
one of the singers.
Muna was born into a well-educated Arab Muslim family in Baghdad. Both her
parents earned advanced degrees in science and engineering. When Muna was 10 years
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old, the family moved to Kurdistan. The move was difficult for Muna. In her new,
Kurdish-majority school she was bullied by some kids who said, “Go back to Iraq, we
don’t want you here.” Their taunts puzzled Muna: The Kurdistan Region of Iraq is an
autonomous region within the federal Iraqi state; it is subject to the federal government in
Baghdad, and it is located within Iraq’s national borders. Strictly speaking, the Kurdistan
Region is part of Iraq. But Muna’s bullies spoke of Kurdistan as many people do – as a
separate country. The disputed nature of the Kurdistan Region’s political borders and
character is one of the major themes, not only of this chapter, but throughout the
dissertation.
It had been three years since Muna moved from Baghdad and enrolled in
Kurdistan Civilization School. Now people rarely said negative things about Muna’s
“Iraqi” identity. It seemed to me that she had adjusted to living in Kurdistan and her new
school as well as one could hope. She made every effort to be cheerful around her
teachers and peers. When I visited Muna’s classes, she eagerly waved me over to the
empty desk beside hers; she enjoyed surreptitiously writing notes to me during
komalayatȋ (social studies) which was taught in Kurdish. She did not know enough
Kurdish to follow the komalayatȋ lesson, so she worked on other assignments, doodled, or
passed notes back and forth with me. In Muna’s remedial Kurdish language class, the
teacher wrote example sentences about the peshmerga (Kurdish military) and the Kurdish
nation, and he asked the students to do likewise. Muna worked hard to learn Kurdish. “I
hate feeling left out,” she said about everyone around her speaking a language she did not
understand.
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At the patriotic ceremony, Muna and her fellow singers waited for their signal. A
male voice instructed the students to stand at attention; they became quiet and stood tall.
Only a few placed their hands over their hearts. The three flag raisers marched to the
flagpole and hoisted the Kurdistani flag. A recording of the Kurdistani national anthem,
“Ey Raqib” (“Oh My Enemy”) began playing; it had a tinny sound, reminiscent of
children’s songs. The students began singing. Most appeared to know the words and sang
with blank facial expressions. I saw Marwa, the Mandean girl I often sat beside on the
school bus, standing in the grade 8 block and looking very uncomfortable. Literature
teachers and close friends Shams, an Arab Muslim from Baghdad, and Sara, a Christian
from Qaraqosh, stood with grim expressions. I wondered what emotions the Kurdish
anthem stirred in Shams and Sara, both displaced and unhappy. I stood beside Liloz, one
of the Kurdish language and literature teachers. She bore an inscrutable expression.
Leaning close to her, I asked if she knew all the words (yes), and how often they sang?
“Once a week,” she replied quietly. Turning to look at me with a serious look, she added,
“It’s necessary (Payweesta).” During the anthem, she stood silently at attention.
Meanwhile, the chosen female students sang the anthem haltingly. Muna looked
around the gym, her wide eyes full of uncertainty. After the girls finished singing the
anthem, high school administrator Ms. Helin took the microphone and said a crisp
“bayanitan bash” (good morning) which received a weak “bayani bash” reply from the
crowd. Ms. Helin routinely spoke in Kurdish to the students, unlike most of her fellow
administrators who spoke English. She announced that she would be visiting the
classrooms for inspection today, “bashe?” (ok?). We were dismissed. I hurried to catch
up with Muna, who was standing with a friend. I asked if she volunteered to sing, or was
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she chosen? Muna said she was chosen, and her friend added, “Yeah she had to [sing]
unless she wanted minus on her marks.” Muna said she was “really embarrassed.” She
wondered why she was chosen considering that, “We [non-Kurdish students] don’t even
understand the words because we don’t know Kurdish.”
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Ch. 4 “This is the life here”: Ethical life among bodybuilders and gym-goers
“Brother, don’t build your city of dreams. Help the people of this city to escape
even more sadness. We fantasise to forget our suffering. Imagination acts as a
shield in this city.” - Bakhtiyar Ali, I Stared at the Night of the City

The coach’s atrophied body
From an early age, Rashid wanted to be a bodybuilder. He was born in the late
1980s in the city of Mosul, a hub for Iraqi bodybuilding. In elementary school, he drew
bodybuilders while other kids drew trees and flowers. At age 12, he did 200 pushups a
day and lifted any heavy object he could find. Although relatively small in stature, Rashid
was determined to build muscle. In his teenage years, he joined a bodybuilding gym and
admired the guys who worked out there because they “loved to be big.” By 2010, Rashid
was coaching in that gym, following the example of Fahd, the head coach and a
professional bodybuilder.
In 2012, Rashid left Mosul and moved to the city of Erbil, also called Hewlêr, the
capital of the autonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). During the day Rashid
worked in an accounting office, and in the evening, he taught fitness classes and offered
personal training in a new gym. A couple years later, Fahd also moved to Erbil, where he
reconnected with Rashid. When Rashid saw the physical condition of his old friend and
former coach, he was shocked:
When [Fahd] was in Mosul, he was in prison for a while for something that he
didn’t do, and he got tortured there. Before he got caught by the police, no, the
government – I don’t know what part captured him – he was a really huge guy. I
first saw him after he came out of prison. I didn’t recognize him when he came
out. He was so thin, 45 kilograms. So it was weird seeing that big guy turn into
this small guy. Since then, he was always afraid. He was not able to see any
police.
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Rashid also recalled standing with Fahd on a busy street in Erbil when a nearby car
braked loudly and startled the coach. “He got scared, he snapped up. I felt sorry for him.
Anyhow, thank God he has a gym [in Erbil] now,” Rashid concluded. State violence had
reduced Fahd from a champion bodybuilder and local hero to a malnourished and
nervous immigrant in a city where he knew very few people. Although Fahd recovered
enough to open his own gym in Erbil, the traumas he suffered in Mosul haunted him.
In contemporary Iraq, the effects of violence inscribed on individual bodies like
Fahd’s make visible the legacies of war and the disintegrating Iraqi state. In speaking of
individual debilitated bodies, Iraqis also speak of violence committed against the
fractured body politic. Everyday encounters with visibly traumatized bodies, individual
and collective, make the discourse of broken bodies especially salient in the Kurdistan
Region of Iraq. The Second Gulf War (2003 – 2011) and the conflict with the Islamic
State (2014 – 2017) not only injured countless Iraqi people, but also sent waves of
internally displaced Iraqis and Syrian refugees into the Kurdistan Region. During my
fieldwork, approximately two million IDPs and refugees were living in the KRI – a
staggering forty percent increase in the Kurdistan Region’s population. Water and
electricity shortages became more frequent. The burden of hosting IDPs and refugees
also exacerbated problems between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the
federal Iraqi government. When the KRG independently and “illegally” negotiated oil
sales with international buyers, Baghdad responded by withholding the KRG’s share of
the national budget. For months on end, the KRG reduced or ceased paying public sector
salaries, which supported an estimated sixty percent of the population. However, in this
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same period of violence which decimated so many Iraqi bodies, bodybuilding and the
fitness industry in Kurdistan were flourishing.
In this chapter, I examine how bodybuilding and gym-going narratives contribute
to a larger discourse about broken bodies, state violence, and ethical life in Iraq – or, as I
heard many people put it, “this is the life here.” I argue that the convergence of war,
state-making, and the global fitness industry upon the sporting body make it a site of
resistance and ethical self-formation. Because the sporting body typically symbolizes the
“positive” powers of the state or empire, discourses about strength mask the sporting
body’s vulnerabilities to these same powers. They also obscure the contested symbolic
life of the sporting body in everyday experience and in contexts of violence. In the
Kurdistan Region, individual athletes and gym-goers speak of their fitness practices, not
as success symbols of the nation or state, but as a means of personal recovery from
sectarian violence and failures of the state. Although some version of the victorious
athlete trope remains in the narratives of individual Iraqis, it is often transformed into a
neoliberal success story inflected with modernization discourse: Individuals compete, not
for the sake of the nation or with the aid of the state, but for the sake of becoming a
stronger and more “modern” person with the aid of the global fitness industry. By
understanding how Iraqi bodybuilding narratives both employ and critique tropes about
national strength and “modernity,” this chapter demonstrates how the spread of the global
fitness industry offers individual athletes and their fitness communities a set of ethical
practices and an interpretative framework in the wake of the collapsing Iraqi state.
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From bullets to bodybuilding
It was June 2017 and the middle of Ramadan when I met “Georges,” a
bodybuilder involved in opening “Fitness World,” a new gym in the city of Erbil. I was
surprised to hear that a new gym was opening in this period of what seemed like total
stagnation: The war against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) dragged on. The
Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) faced a deepening economic crisis and the Kurdistan
Regional Government (KRG) had reduced or ceased paying public sector salaries.
Consequently, most projects had halted. Marlana, a fitness instructor I met while visiting
various gyms, had invited me to see Fitness World, which was not yet open to the public.
She knew the owner and was friendly with the staff. Her brother Yusuf, a self-described
“gym addict,” was already working out there despite the lingering construction litter.
Fitness World sat along 100 Meter Road, one of the major roads that loops around the
city of Erbil. The side of the building facing 100 Meter Road had floor to ceiling
windows, displaying cardio machines and the people using them to the busy street below.
The hall contained neat rows of gleaming new cardio equipment and orderly weight sets.
Georges was mild-mannered and not as bulky as some of the other bodybuilders I
had met in Erbil. He had an unassuming smile and soft voice. Born into a Chaldean
Christian family in Baghdad in 1982, Georges left school in grade 11 to earn money for
his family. At age 19, he was conscripted into the Iraqi army, where he became
accustomed to the physical exercise and discipline around which he still organizes his
life. After completing his military service, Georges trained with a well-known coach and
participated in a few bodybuilding competitions in which he medaled. In 2006, during
one of the worst periods of sectarian violence, his coach was assassinated in a terrorist
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attack. Georges’ friend was shot dead beside him, and Georges was shot in the back. He
and his family, like so many other Iraqis during the war, fled north to the relatively safe
Kurdistan Region.
After two months in the hospital and one year of physical therapy, Georges
returned to bodybuilding. In 2015 and 2017 he placed first in competitions in Erbil. As
we sat in the gym office and talked, he gathered his many certificates, trophies, and
medals from a display case and spread them across the desk between us. The sun’s rays
shimmered on the medals and trophies, and Georges smiled as he told us about each one.
“I want to do this forever,” he said.

Figure 6: Georges’ trophies. Copyright by the author.

Gyms and sports in the modern Middle East
Gymnasiums and bodybuilding have contributed to the creation of the modern
Middle East in ways that scholars only recently have begun exploring. Historians have
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documented the role of sports in producing “fit” and patriotic citizen subjects and in
creating new spaces of intimacy. Empires and states were envisioned as strengthened
through citizens’ contributions to the body politic through sports. In the 19th century
Ottoman Empire, physical education in schools and in private sports clubs, as well as
through the transnational circulations of exercise culture, contributed to the creation of a
shared physical culture among Jews, Christians, and Muslims (Yildiz 2019). European or
American notions of “muscular Christianity” circulated throughout the Middle East,
inspiring the “muscular Islam” of scouting organizations (Krais 2019).
Paul Silverstein (2019) notes the tendency to over-attribute the genealogy of
sporting masculinity to imperialism and colonial missionary activity. There is an older
and broader “ongoing intimacy” between sports and religious movements (483). In Iran,
for example, the “ancient” martial arts practiced in the zurkhaneh (house of strength) are
believed to have religious origins, possibly in Zoroastrianism. The zurkhaneh also
incorporates Islamic virtues and understandings of the body, which continue to inform
notions of modern, virtuous, and masculine Persian subjects (Smith 2016; Ridgeon 2007).
“Physical exercise, and even competitive sports, have long been integrated into the daily
practices of committed Muslims,” Silverstein observes (2019:483). Sports follow the
rhythms of the religious calendar: Soccer offers a welcome distraction from fasting and
abstaining during Ramadan (Schielke 2009). At the gym where I worked, one
bodybuilder broke his Ramadan fast every evening with a protein shake before working
out.
The co-presence of more traditionally masculine sports like bodybuilding with
mixed-gender gyms in the Middle East, or the co-presence of the religious with the
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secular, is not a bug of “development.” These are features of modernity itself, of ethical
self-making and modern state-making. Silverstein observes that,
More religiously committed Moroccan men build their Islamic ethical selves in
homosocial settings of dojos and bodybuilding gyms, much as other upper-class
Moroccans develop secular aesthetics alongside their visible bodily form in
mixed-sex urban fitness centers. In both of the latter cases, athletic facilities are
not just body factories but advanced technologies for self-making (2019:484).
Modern Middle Eastern states have excelled at nation-building through sport.
Murat Yildiz argues that the creation of a popular sports culture was “central to the
formation of the modern” in the Ottoman era (2019”468). Thereafter, the early Turkish
state promoted programs of gymnastics for both men and women to “modernize” the
nation and to promote Kemalist values (Özyürek 2006). The Pan-Arab games were
organized to advance Arab cultural and political unity (Henry, Amara, and Al-Tauqi
2003) and were modeled after the ultimate spectacle of nationalist sentiment amid
international cooperation, the Olympic games (MacAloon 2013). National and
international competitions reify national or state boundaries and essentialize the
discursive national character of states and athletes within those states. Even nations
without states advance their cause in international sporting events: For example, Kurdish
nationalism and aspirational statehood are promoted by the Kurdish soccer team depicted
in the documentary Desert Fire (Losh and Rabas 2016). Likewise, Kurdish bodybuilders
and mixed martial arts (MMA) practitioners who live in Europe or the United States
drape themselves with the Kurdistani flag at competitions (Kurdistan24 n.d.).
Among sports, bodybuilding exemplifies the cultivation of individual strength and
symbolic national strength. Bodybuilding has been a popular sport in Iraq for decades,
second only to soccer. In 1972, when bodybuilding in the U.S. was still a nascent, “freak”
hobby, Iraq hosted the International Bodybuilding Federation’s World Congress. It was
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the same year that Iraq nationalized its petroleum industry. Around 3,000 spectators
attended the week-long championships in Baghdad, which were broadcast to millions
inside and outside Iraq. The President of the International Federation of Bodybuilders,
Ben Weider, memorized and recited an Arabic translation of his opening ceremony
speech. Every sentence was met with “overwhelming applause,” and Weider cheered
“long live the Iraqi Sportsman!” (Weider).
Recently, re-injections of bodybuilding culture have come to Iraq and the
Kurdistan Region through U.S. military presence and international actors working in the
humanitarian and private sectors (Dennehy 2017). Many of my interlocutors worked as
translators or security personnel with the U.S. military or with NGOs, where they had
access to gyms and trainers. Some of my interviewees drew connections between U.S.
global power, the strength of its military, and the perceived high-quality of its gym
equipment and knowledge of exercise science.
Kenneth Saltman (2006) analyzes military and fitness industry connections in his
article “The Strong Arm of the Law.” While “the built body promises safety, security,
and freedom,” Saltman argues, the built body also “[contributes] to the militarization of
society– a process at odds with democratization” (50). In conditions of war and
instability, strength sports offer an appealing “fantasy of security” (53). English language
news media perpetuate this fantasy by reporting their surprise at finding bodybuilding in
wartime Iraq (Londono 2008). The Western “discovery” of Iraqi bodybuilding is similar
to Western media fascination with female Kurdish resistance fighters, and reflects a
broader fascination with gender stereotypes of the Middle East (Abu-Lughod 2013) .
Perhaps interest in these gender stereotype-reversal stories also stems from a desire to
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believe that Iraqis will survive the destruction of wars which Westerners, particularly
Americans, brought to the region. In a 2017 Washington Post photo essay on Sadr City’s
female weightlifters, Emilienne Malfatto (2017) writes,
For me, this story is a way to show how different Iraq can be from what we
imagine. Yes, it is Sadr City. Yes, it is violent and conservative. But you also
have life — in a very strong and simple way. And you also have girls — young
women — challenging stereotypes.
Many of my interlocutors also expressed hopefulness at seeing women exercising in
gyms and challenging stereotypes. Some, like the journalist, expressed a desire to show
how strength can be cultivated despite the enervating effects of war. But bodybuilding
itself exerts violence upon the body through grueling training and steroid use. Many of
my interlocutors described bodybuilding as backward and outdated. Strength sports like
CrossFit and global fitness culture, on the other hand, appealed to those hoping to build a
more “modern” society.

Fit for statehood
In recent years, the fitness industry has grown rapidly in the Kurdistan Region.
The KRI has become a new regional destination for bodybuilding training and
competitions, and several new fitness centers have opened in the city of Erbil. These
developments are said to evidence the Kurdistan Region’s development and “fitness” for
statehood. On the other hand, some of my Kurdistani interlocutors expressed concerns
that mixed-gender gyms might foster illicit relationships, distract young people from their
family obligations, and thus destabilize the social order. People who are critical of the
social order, that is, critical of the status quo, were frustrated by the “moral panic”
surrounding mixed-gender gyms. These critics pointed to moral panic as evidence that
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the Kurdistan Region is not “modern” or “progressive” enough, and thus not yet “fit” to
become an independent country. Similarly, many of my interlocutors criticized the
deepening ethnoreligious, class, and political divides in the Kurdistani body politic.
Bodybuilding and gym-going can make visible these divides; or, as some hoped, they can
help heal the personal and political wounds of war.
In Iraqi Kurdistan, global fitness culture and bodybuilding emerged from the
intersections of war, economic sanctions, displacement, and humanitarian interventions.
After the 1991 Gulf War, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France imposed a
no-fly zone (NFZ) over the Kurdistan Region to protect the ethnic Kurdish population
there. The NFZ effectively opened the Kurdistan Region to international commerce and
enabled the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to expand its autonomy and
governance of the KRI. The same destruction of the 2003-2011 war that crippled much of
Iraq boosted construction in the Kurdistan Region. Umut Kuruüzüm (2018) has shown
how the war’s wreckage produced scrap material that was transported north to the
Kurdistan Region, along with a growing labor force of internally displaced Iraqis,
refugees from Syria, and migrant laborers from Turkey.
Many Kurdish people who had been living in diaspora in Europe and the United
States returned to the Kurdistan Region during a period of relative stability and economic
growth (2011-2014). Additionally, with the war and subsequent humanitarian relief came
employees of international companies, humanitarian agencies, and military personnel,
many of whom brought their knowledge of global fitness culture and bodybuilding to the
Kurdistan Region. During my fieldwork (September 2015 – July 2017), the Kurdistan
Region was experiencing an important, transitional moment: The end of the war against
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the Islamic State, or Daesh, was in sight. Many people were looking forward to
September 2017, when they could vote in an independence referendum that would gauge
support for a Kurdistani state. But for many other Iraqi people, the declaration of an
independent Kurdish state would crush any hope of a unified Iraq. Most examinations of
sport in nation-building and modernity demonstrate how sports serve as a unifying,
productive force in constituting the community or nation. Conversely, what can sports
and the sporting body reveal about a state that is said to be disintegrating?
Bodybuilding, of course, has a long history in the building of empire and nation in
the Middle East. In twentieth century Iraq, bodybuilding enjoyed a widespread popularity
second only to football (soccer). The recent introduction of “global fitness culture”
(Andreasson and Johansson 2014) has brought with it criticism of traditional, malecentric and spectacular bodybuilding. Instead of muscles for “show,” global fitness
culture promotes “modern” and “functional” strength training for both men and women.
In Iraqi Kurdistan, traditional bodybuilding and newer global fitness culture compete in
the growing fitness industry.
Three population flows specifically have contributed to the recent growth of the
Kurdistani fitness industry: First, the return of many Kurds living in diaspora in Europe
and the U.S., where they encountered global fitness culture. The relative stability of the
2011-2014 period encouraged many Kurdish people to return to their homeland. Second,
the steady stream of international employees of the humanitarian sector and U.S. military
personnel into the Kurdistan Region also brought knowledge of global gym and fitness
culture. Many Kurdistani residents have worked as translators or specialists alongside
humanitarian and military personnel who had access to gyms and equipment. And third,
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the Kurdistan Region has absorbed many people displaced from elsewhere in Iraq, such
as Baghdad and Mosul, which were centers of bodybuilding culture. (Historically Erbil
hosted small bodybuilding clubs and competitions, although nothing on the scale of the
bodybuilding networks in Mosul and Baghdad.) Displaced bodybuilders and coaches
brought their expertise and experience to the Kurdistan Region, where some found
employment in Kurdish-owned gyms and others opened their own gyms. While the
traditional, male-only bodybuilding gyms, like the one pictured below, continue
operating in the Region, the growing Kurdistani fitness industry can be characterized by a
“professionalization” of bodybuilding, as well as a shift from male-centric exercise
culture to one increasingly including females.

Figure 7: A bodybuilding gym near the Erbil Citadel. Copyright by the author.
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The rapid growth of the global fitness industry in Erbil is apparent in “Doctors
Street,” a commercial area specializing in medical and health products. Prior to the recent
introduction of global fitness products, Doctors Street sold mainly standard medical
supplies, such as pharmaceuticals, eyeglasses, and wheelchairs. Now Doctors Street
contains several shops advertising bodybuilding equipment, supplements, consultations
with coaches and nutritionists, and all manner of imported weight loss and muscle gain
supplies. Doctors Street shops attract not only bodybuilding enthusiasts but also
Kurdistani residents interested in weight loss, a common concern among my female
friends at the gym where I worked part time during my fieldwork. For example, I
regularly participated in group fitness classes with an overweight teenage girl “Muna,”
who followed a nutrition regimen “prescribed” by a Doctors Street shop whose company
was based in Dubai.

Figure 8: Inside a bodybuilding shop in Doctors Street. Copyright by the author.
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Figure 9: Products at a Doctors Street shop. Copyright by the author.

While most of the available fitness industry supplies were concentrated in Doctors
Street, gyms opened across the Erbil landscape. Even some of the oldest quarters of Erbil,
such as near the citadel, have bodybuilding gyms. Traditional, male-only bodybuilding
gyms were easy to spot by their larger-than-life photos of bodybuilders displayed in gym
windows; mixed-gender gyms did not display these types of photos. As the city expanded
outward, so did the gyms. During the last few months of my fieldwork in 2017, a
CrossFit-style gym called “Lion’s Den” opened on the outskirts of Ainkawa, the
Christian township of Erbil. “Lion’s Den” is in an area that soon will no longer be the
outskirts if the city continues to expand in that direction. In Spring 2019, another new,
large fitness center opened along the recently constructed “120 Meter Road,” which is
now the largest of the ring roads encircling Erbil.

187

Strength sports for a “modern” Kurdistan
“That was when my Dad said I had to go out [and leave the gym], because they
were always trying to give me hormones, steroids,” Nasir said as he perched on the edge
of a boxing ring. I met Nasir while conducting research in secondary schools. He was a
lanky teenager and a diligent student who wore glasses and spoke softly. I was surprised
to run into him at “Lion’s Den,” a new gym offering CrossFit-style classes and mixed
martial arts (MMA). A couple years prior to our interview at Lion’s Den, Nasir joined a
bodybuilding gym in Erbil. Initially he was impressed by the spectacle of big muscles,
but he grew weary of gym members constantly advising him to use steroids to bulk up his
slender body. People did not hide their steroid use, injecting in front of other gym
members, including Nasir. He jokingly claimed that some steroid users even injected
their dogs to make them bigger. “The people that came there were the low-level people,”
Nasir explained, “with bad smell, bad language, bad way of thinking.” He believed “low
people” were attracted to that gym because it was small, located in a residential area, and
relatively cheap at 40 dollars a month.

Figure 10: MMA training at Lion’s Den gym. Copyright by the author.
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Membership fees at “old-style” gyms were about one third of the cost of
membership at new, elite fitness centers such as the “Lion’s Den.” Nasir’s father
inspected Lion’s Den before agreeing to let his son join. Since joining, Nasir persuaded
five of his schoolmates, including one girl, to train at Lion’s Den. “You feel you are
strong and no one can touch you. You feel confident,” Nasir explained. “And these MMA
sports actually are the only sport that you can feel strong. Not like taekwondo or anything
else about feeling light. We concentrate on power and quickness. So you feel nobody can
touch you. Not even bodybuilders can stand against them, no matter how big they are.”
Nasir was proud to train with Coach Aashif, a popular MMA instructor and
competitor. “I have seen many trainers, like at championships,” Nasir said, “And they
were cursing and insulting their players when making any mistake. That’s the opposite of
my coach. He encourages us and advises us. [Other MMA coaches] train like a dirty way,
a street way. They think that’s the way, but it’s not.” Coach Aashif’s manner with
trainees was gentle but firm. He seemed willing to coach anyone who was interested,
including some very overweight people and some women, and he was patient with all.
The coach’s wife worked as a personal trainer in a women’s gym, and sometimes she
trained with her husband at Lion’s Den while their young son ran around the gym
clambering over equipment and playing with gym members.
“I don’t know why,” Nasir reflected, “but I’m like the most religious person [at
the gym].” Nasir belonged to a well-known Christian family who had immigrated from
another country to Erbil. Nasir’s coach also was from outside the Kurdistan Region and a
pious Arab Muslim. Nasir explained,
Coach Aashif fasts [during Ramadan] and prays every day. I guess it’s only me
and him. It’s either religion or sport. One or the other. I don’t know why Iraq is
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that way. They can’t combine them. They either leave their religion, or they leave
their sport. They can’t mix them.
Nasir was not sure why the religion versus sports opposition existed, but he knew about
religious strife from his experiences in various private schools. School administrators
typically did not allow students to discuss religion, “because you know in Iraq the most
sensitive subject is religion,” Nasir explained. “It just starts fights everywhere, so they
don’t [discuss it].”
Coach Aashif’s example as a pious person committed to his family, religious
practice, and career was especially important to Nasir; the coach was a model for
“modern” manhood. The Coach was not embarrassed to be seen spending lots of time
with his wife and child, and he openly and seriously practiced Islamic piety, although
traditional Kurdistani society considers such expressions of religious piety characteristic
of women, not men. Coach Aashif and his followers were practicing a “new” kind of
masculinity others have observed emerging in the Middle East (Inhorn 2012) and in the
Kurdistan Region of Iraq (King 2018) while upholding traditional ideals of male physical
strength. The Lion’s Den and Coach Aashif represented a new model for physical
education in Kurdistan: it was clean, well-equipped, had a “tolerant” atmosphere, and
employed certified trainers who drew upon “modern” and “scientific” knowledge
circulating through global networks of professional trainers and athletes. Some Lion’s
Den members formerly participated in bodybuilding but quit. These ex-bodybuilders
adopted a new “fitness” lifestyle that prioritized “natural” nutrition over supplements and
rejected any substances or practices that harmed the body.
People who exercised at “modern,” mixed-gender fitness centers often
condemned traditional bodybuilding gyms and their practices, particularly for their
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violence. Bodybuilding exerts violence upon the body through intensive dieting and
grueling training to “shred” the body. Additionally, the prevalence of steroid use and
other questionable “supplements” which may harm the body sullies the sport’s reputation.
Many of my interlocutors spoke of the sport, its practitioners, and its gyms as backward
and abnormal. Critical discourse also linked bodybuilding to a “lower” class
characterized by low level of education and poor personal hygiene habits. Most of all, the
self-inflicted violence on the body through training and steroid use disgusted many of my
interlocutors. There was enough external violence in Iraq, so why inflict violence on your
own body?

Narrating violence and recovery
Violence is central to many bodybuilders’ narratives. While grueling training
looks like self-inflicted violence to the sport’s detractors, for bodybuilders it is a heroic,
virtuous effort to overcome the effects of violence perpetrated by others. Georges’ story
in the beginning of the paper is one of many tales of survival and recovery through
physical exercise and sports. My interlocutors’ embodied experiences of the failing Iraqi
state and the emerging Kurdistani state shape their stories about physical training. The
periods before, during, and after the Second Gulf War bookend the various chapters of
their lives. just as they generally do for the people of Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan who
suffered through those events.
Violence and displacement permeate “Zayn’s” story: In Erbil, Zayn was known as
a friendly and popular bodybuilder and fitness coach for both male and female clients. In
his former home in Baghdad, Zayn’s family was known by their prominent tribal identity

191

which put them at risk. His family lived in Baghdad until the 2003-2011 war, when they
became the target of sectarian violence, as well as of US military personnel: In a case of
mistaken identity, U.S. troops entered Zayn’s home and detained his father multiple
times; eventually the family decided to move to the Kurdistan Region. At that time, Zayn
traveled to Europe to study exercise science, earning bachelor’s and master’s degrees. In
2012, he moved to Kurdistan to rejoin his family. There, as an Arab and an outsider, he
felt almost constant tension with the majority Kurdish residents. He suffered many
unpleasant encounters, which he attributed to his Arab ethnicity and known tribal
affiliation.
I visited Zayn and his wife, Hiba, in their home, where Zayn could speak more
freely than in the gym. Not only had he suffered racial discrimination; he also was
cheated out of medaling in bodybuilding competitions in the Kurdistan Region. Zayn and
Hiba told me that they gave up on making a life in Erbil after one particularly
disappointing bodybuilding competition: The winner was physically the least impressive,
smallest competitor; everyone was shocked when the winner was announced. Later, they
heard that the winner had political connections and had bribed the judges, making visible
the corruption, discrimination, and failed state that Zayn knew from personal experience.
Bodybuilding had been a passion for Zayn, one that allowed him to connect with people
from different countries, ethnicities, and religions. The reverse was true in Erbil; corrupt
bodybuilding competitions seemed to reinforce sectarian and political differences.
Without bodybuilding, Zayn felt stifled. When I last heard from Zayn and Hiba, they
were planning to emigrate to Canada.
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Georges, the Christian bodybuilder who survived an assassination attempt in
Baghdad, believed that bodybuilding had become a more important sport after the 20032011 war. Before the war, there was less corruption, Georges explained. The war had
exacerbated sectarian differences and weakened state and social institutions. Georges
observed that the sport of bodybuilding also suffered because of the war. Judges chose
their own trainees to win competitions. According to his award certificate, Georges
placed first in a competition, but at the competition, another competitor paid a bribe to be
announced as first place.
Other gym-goers shared similar stories of escaping violence elsewhere in Iraq and
settling in Erbil, where many felt alienated and frustrated. Gyms and exercise routines
offered safe space and “therapy” (one person even used this word in English). Gym
therapy was said to remedy not only traumas of war or lingering effects of malnutrition
during the sanctions era, but more generally the stresses unique to living in Iraq, one of
the perennially lowest ranked countries for quality of living. People linked their
bodybuilding and fitness practices with the conditions of their country. When I asked
Hadid, the Turkomani bodybuilder, to explain the mentality of bodybuilding, he replied
that, first, “people like to be big.” But, he continued, bodybuilding is also a response to
“stress, electricity problems, salary problems, and water shortages.” These stressors were
unique to bodybuilding in Kurdistan, Hadid argued.

Modern fitness in the modern state
Some of my interlocutors, such as Zayn, discussed the growth,
professionalization, and failures of Iraqi and Kurdistani bodybuilding as markers of the
strengths or weaknesses of the Iraqi state and the aspirational Kurdistani state within it.
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For example, Rashid, the bodybuilder from Mosul, drew connections between the growth
of bodybuilding in Kurdistan and the struggling Iraqi state:
I think the bodybuilders here are a bit more educated, especially in the last 5
years. In the past it was much better in Mosul than in Kurdistan. But in the last 5
years it got much better in Kurdistan. They are following the scientific ways for
bodybuilding. Here they read more about bodybuilding. In Mosul they just follow
the rumors, or something they heard. In Mosul it is like “bro science.” They don’t
know who is the source, just by trial and error sometimes. Many guys do the site
injections, for localized muscle growth, something really awful, just a swollen
area, you can google it. Many guys do that unfortunately. But recently in the
bodybuilding university [through the Iraqi bodybuilders association] they tried to
stop these kinds of things. They try to prevent many guys from participating in the
championships. And sometimes they also do the site injections with the steroids.
Which does not work! I don’t know why they do that.
Diana: It’s so bad for you. How old are most of the bodybuilders?
Rashid: Uh huh. For the age, I think it’s from 16 to 30, 35 something in between
that. Not all of them are working out to be professionals, but most of them are,
like, you know, most of them are passionate about bodybuilding. They are not
trying to go for professional [status], but they like to be big. I think it all started
when the Iraq championship was held here for the first time in Kurdistan.
Diana: When was that?
Rashid: In 2011 or 2012 it was held in Sulaymanȋyah [a city also known as
Slemanȋ], in 2013 and 2014 in Erbil. Three years in a row. They are not used to
seeing those big muscular guys in Erbil or Suli. They became fascinated about it.
Since then, all the Iraqi bodybuilders were here. When it was held here in Erbil,
the stage was full. They were sitting on the floor. In Baghdad it is a very popular
sport, very popular. So they all came to cheer for their champions, for their
friends. The theater was full. Many bodybuilders were walking around the city
and being noticed by the people. That was good marketing for them. Since then
[bodybuilding] got a much better reputation in Kurdistan.
In 2012, Rashid moved from Mosul to Erbil, where he witnessed the growth of the
bodybuilding industry he describes above. Erbil offered not only more “professional”
bodybuilding opportunities, but also more safety and freedoms than Rashid had
experienced in Mosul:
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I loved Erbil so much, because in Mosul we had to be at home at 8pm, not in the
streets because it was dangerous. I remember going to the gym [in Erbil] at 8 or
9pm, and I was smiling all the way because I was so happy that I could go out at
night and see cars in the streets. I was always smiling. I loved the freedom of
going out in the night, because I haven’t experienced that, never.
Additionally, Rashid appreciated that many Erbil residents were interested in health and
fitness, unlike Mosul, where “nobody works out for health.” Rashid complained that in
Mosul, “I haven’t seen a single person who cares for this, just caring for being big.” For
example, “many people would like to go for a morning run, and everybody would stare at
them, like, what the hell are you doing?” Rashid attributed Erbil residents’ interest in
health to the city’s recent prosperity and expansion of the private sector, which brought
people and gym culture from all over the world. Rashid also pointed out that
globalization proliferated sedentary and stressful desk jobs, which necessitated exercise
and increased interest in health and fitness.
Erbil society, though it had progressed much, was not without flaws in Rashid’s
estimation. Rashid admitted he sometimes encountered “racist” people in the bazaar, for
example, because they were “uneducated.” But this did not happen in the gym, he
stressed to me; he felt accepted there. Not long after the Islamic State invaded Mosul and
surrounding areas, a time during which some of my ethnic-Arab interlocutors
experienced anti-Arab sentiments, Rashid had a warm exchange with two Kurdish young
men at the gym. One man asked Rashid where he was from, and Rashid replied, “Mosul.”
In reply, the Kurdish guy said, “Inshallah it will get better and we can visit you at your
home [in Mosul].” To Rashid’s surprise, the other Kurdish man corrected his friend and
said to Rashid, “No, kaka [sir], this is your home.” Rashid was touched by the exchange
and said he often reflects on it.
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Rashid and Zayn, as non-Kurdish “others,” sometimes experienced racism, but
their knowledge of English and expertise in bodybuilding and fitness gave them an
advantage in the growing bodybuilding and fitness industries in Erbil. Rashid observed
that the majority of resources about bodybuilding and fitness were in English, and many
were in Arabic, whereas very little was written in Kurdish. Many coaches and gymowners displaced from elsewhere in Iraq brought their expertise to Erbil. Although the
Kurdistani bodybuilders association exam for personal trainer or coaching certification
was written in Kurdish, Arabic speakers like Rashid and Zayn were permitted to write
their answers in Arabic.
“Outsider” bodybuilders like Rashid openly critiqued Kurdish “culture” for its
sedentism, restricted mobility for women, and fattening, “traditional” oil and rice heavy
dishes like dolma. They observed that urbanization and war increased sedentary jobs and
stress levels. War and a stagnated economy depressed their clients, and personal trainers
struggled to motivate people to set goals and work hard toward them. Rashid and other
personal trainers saw themselves waging a difficult war against these forces, against
apathy, and against the lingering interest in “outdated” and “backward” traditional
bodybuilding cultures. While traditional male-only bodybuilding gyms in Erbil still
attract clients, my interlocutors generally described the newer mixed-gender gyms as
professional and modern in their preference for “fitness” and not “bodybuilding.”
For my interlocutors, “fitness” was all about living a “modern” healthy lifestyle,
characterized by a commitment to gym-going and to proper nutrition. Global fitness
culture brought not only health benefits, but also a space for people who felt marginalized
in Kurdistan – non-Kurdish residents, youth, and women. Through gym-going, people
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enjoyed more mobility and could pursue self-actualization. Gym-going facilitated
friendships, significantly across ethnosectarian lines. A pair of female friends, one
Christian and the other Muslim, emphasized to me that, although their families pressured
them not to associate with people from other ethnoreligious groups, at the gym the
women felt comfortable socializing. They regularly spent hours hanging out there, as I
observed many young people, particularly women, enjoying the relative freedom of the
gym. Fitness centers also facilitated some romantic relationships: One gym ownermanager was proud that his mixed-gender gym had produced some “good marriages”
between clients. Gyms offered a space in which mainly young people, who otherwise
typically kept their opinions private around older relatives and acquaintances, could
criticize social, economic, and political issues.
Furthermore, gyms provided an experimental zone in which people challenged
deeply rooted social organization, such as power and status based on tribal affiliation. In
one memorable episode, a woman belonging to a well-known tribe and political party
was banned from the gym. For some time, she had been antagonizing a foreign worker
employed to clean the women’s locker room and exercise area, making demands and
ridiculing the employee. When the foreign worker finally informed the gym manager,
Amir, he publicly confronted the accused woman in the gym lobby and told her that such
behavior was unacceptable in his gym. Furious, the woman loudly threatened that she
was from an important family, to which Amir replied that he also had tribal and political
connections who would back him. But that was not his point; he did not accept
“backward” behaviors, such as using one’s tribal affiliation to flout the rules of his
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modern gym. My gym co-workers agreed with the manager’s assessment of the situation,
and we never saw the angry woman in the gym again.

Modern gyms make modern subjects
When Hadid the Turkomani bodybuilder first opened his gym in Erbil, he
permitted both women and men to become members and to use the space simultaneously.
Hadid’s gym was in an older, residential-style building, upstairs from a sweets shop.
Hadid managed to cram an impressive amount of weightlifting equipment and some
cardio machines into one room, with a small office enclosed in a transparent plastic
cubicle. At present, the gym served only men. “Why no women?” I asked, uncomfortable
at being the only female in a crowded male-only gym. I was sitting with Hadid and his
friend in their tiny office visible to everyone in the gym. Men exercising glanced toward
us. Hadid and his friend chuckled at my question. It was “annoying” ( )مزعج, Hadid said,
having to monitor his clients’ behavior. He explained that the “large and expensive” gym
where I taught indoor cycling charged high membership fees so that it would attract
“rich” people who knew how to behave in a mixed-gender space. A gym should
correspond to its intended clientele; it should have the appropriate “type” (Ar.  نوعalso
can mean gender). His type of people were the “old” type, men who will “stare if a
woman comes to the gym. They will not exercise.”
Gyms dealt with the “problem” of gender in two ways: Some gyms operated in
shifts, with women (people whose social position is “female” or “female-presenting”)
using the gym in the morning and early afternoon and men using the gym in the late
afternoon and evening. Gyms with separate shifts for men and women were not
considered “mixed-gender” or “mixed” (people used the English word “mixed” or
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Kurdish “tȇkala”). Mixed gyms typically featured a large hall in which men and women
exercised together, as well as a smaller hall designated for women only. During my
fieldwork, there were at least five “mixed-gender” gyms operating. Newer, “modern”
gyms, particularly mixed-gender gyms where men and women exercised in the same
space, offered a template for a modern Kurdistan that values women’s experiences and
contributions: Gym-going was said to remedy stressors unique to women, such as
childbirth; one woman cited her botched cesarean surgery as evidence of the collapsing
state healthcare system (Dewachi 2017) and her primary reason for gym-going. More
generally, gym-going provided an outlet for women frustrated by cultural practices that
restricted their mobility. Gendered experiences also were linked to “modernity”: Women,
and men, typically contextualized gendered aspects of bodybuilding and gym-going
within a larger discourse about modernity in the Kurdistan Region.
A “modern” healthy lifestyle was characterized by a commitment to gym-going
and to proper nutrition. Global fitness culture brought not only health benefits, but also a
space in which youth and women enjoyed more mobility and could pursue selfactualization. Gym-going facilitated friendships, significantly across sects. A pair of
female friends, one Christian and the other Muslim, emphasized to me that, although their
families pressured them not to associate with people from other ethnoreligious groups, at
the gym the women felt comfortable socializing. They regularly spent hours hanging out
there, as I observed many young people, particularly women, enjoying the relative
freedom of the gym. Fitness centers also facilitated some romantic relationships: One
gym owner-manager was proud that his mixed-gender gym had produced some “good
marriages” between clients. Gyms offered a space in which mainly young people, who
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otherwise typically kept their opinions private around older relatives and acquaintances,
could criticize social, economic, and political issues.
Furthermore, gyms provided an experimental zone in which people challenged
deeply-rooted social organization, such as power and status based on tribal affiliation. In
one memorable episode, a woman belonging to a well-known tribe and political party
was banned from the gym. For some time, she had been antagonizing a foreign worker
employed to clean the women’s locker room and exercise area, making demands and
ridiculing the employee. When the foreign worker finally informed the gym manager,
Amir, he publicly confronted the accused woman in the gym lobby and told her that such
behavior was unacceptable in his gym. Furious, the woman loudly threatened that she
was from an important family, to which Amir replied that he also had tribal and political
connections who would back him. But that was not his point; he did not accept
“backward” behaviors, such as using one’s tribal affiliation to flout the rules of his
modern gym. My gym co-workers agreed with the manager’s assessment of the situation,
and we never saw the angry woman in the gym again.
Amir presented his mixed-gender gym as a “clean” and “healthy” space, unlike
the male-only bodybuilding gyms marred by steroid use, weightlifters’ loud grunting, and
Eastern-style toilets that smelled bad. The first attempts at opening mixed-gender gyms in
Erbil, Amir explained, lacked “good hygiene” because they continued using Eastern-style
toilets and lacked professionalization because steroid use was rampant. Conversely, the
intentional design of Amir’s fitness center instructs clients in navigating a modern space.
For example, Amir said that people will see that the gym “invested a lot of money
installing Western style bathrooms” and would understand that gym members likewise
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should practice good hygiene. Gym members would complain to me sometimes if a new
member did not practice what they considered good hygiene, particularly if a person’s
body odor indicated she did not use deodorant or wash her gym clothes frequently
enough. Especially during the blisteringly hot summer months with infrequent air
conditioning, body odor was a problem. Often, the deliberate non-use of deodorants was
said to be a habit of pious Muslims who did not believe in using them or was said to be a
result of poor education. I frequently overheard gym members evaluating the correctness
of others’ grooming and behavior.
The mixed-gender design of the space also suggested where and how men and
women could interact: A common entrance, reception desk, and shared lobby was open to
all. The sleek layout included cushioned chairs for lounging and tables for men and
women to sit together if they chose, with flat screen televisions broadcasting sporting
events from Europe or the Middle East. This spatial arrangement was very unlike the
typical restaurants and cafes which segregated customers into a male-only section and a
“family section” intended for males with females accompanying them. Young people
often hung about the lobby in mixed-gender groups, talking, enjoying a beverage,
casually observing other gym-goers, or taking a rest before or after exercising. From the
lobby, separate entrances discreetly led to women’s and men’s locker rooms and
bathrooms.
Adjacent to the lobby was an expansive exercise area enclosed in glass and
available for both men and women to use for cardio, weightlifting, and personal training
sessions. Passing through the lobby and into the female-only section, women had access
to lockers, toilets, showers, a steam room, and an area to apply makeup or style hair. For
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a time, a couple women offered nail salon services and hair styling there. Beyond the
locker room was the “women’s gym,” a female only exercise room shielded by walls and
hallways from the rest of the gym and the unwanted male gaze. On rare occasions and
during the off-peak hours, the women’s area would be “closed” and empty of females, so
that a man could service a piece of equipment or clean (if the female cleaner was absent).
Some women pointed to the smaller space and older equipment as evidence that less
importance was placed on the female-only area and female clients. Others suggested that
this was because the gym management expected more women to use the mixed space.
Amir explained to me that, although government regulations mandated that the gym be
gender segregated, and that technically the “mixed area” was a male-only space, in
practice Amir and the staff encouraged female clients to use that space.

Figure 11: Weights in the women’s section. Photo by the author.
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Figure 12: Defunct stationary bicycles moved from the mixed-section to the women’s
section. Photo by the author.
Before fitness centers opened in Erbil, the only public access to gyms was in
hotels. Women-only gym spaces had become necessary, Amir explained, because female
clients could not use the fitness rooms in hotels:
Girls can’t go to hotels, you know. You can’t train in a gym in a hotel because
people might say she is going in the hotel for sex, so you have these little
restrictions all over. How are you going to meet [potential romantic partners]? At
university? It’s a closed-off society. Maybe here they are trying to open up a bit.
It’s like push and pull. On the one hand, alcohol shops are opening up, and clubs,
and still they make the gyms segregated. I just think religion shouldn’t have
anything to do with business and politics. It should be completely separated.
Amir refers to government regulations which stipulate that gyms must be gender
segregated, although at the time of my fieldwork there were, in practice, multiple gyms
with mixed-gender exercise spaces.
Amir also complained about the official “bodybuilders’ association,” which
licensed and inspected all gyms. He said this association was unused to dealing with the
new, modern fitness centers and knew only how to deal with the traditional male
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bodybuilding gyms. The stereotypical view of male bodybuilding gyms, Amir explained,
was that they were unprofitable enterprises and fronts for steroid use; one member of the
bodybuilders’ association even asked Amir for kickbacks in the form of steroids for
issuing a license. Recently the association had been pressuring Amir to install two
separate entrances for two separate gym lobbies for men and women, and to enforce
complete gender segregation. Outraged, Amir said there are “whorehouses operating on
this same street” and the government was doing nothing about them while his mixedgender gym had facilitated some good marriages. (Indeed, not long after my interview
with Amir there was a police raid on some of the nearby businesses which employed
foreign women, allegedly for prostitution.) Gender segregation was “abnormal” and
“culturally forced,” Amir argued, and inane government regulations and corruption
demonstrated a backward mentality.
My sense is that having a functional, mixed-gender exercise hall was very
important to Amir, and perhaps to other mixed-gender gym owner-managers in Erbil,
because it validated his vision of a modern gym and a modern society. The gym served as
a template for a modernized Kurdistani society, while at the same time relying on
“traditional” social structures and cultural practices to maintain order. For example, the
mixed-gender space was visible and easy to surveil because it was one large open space
enclosed in glass. At any given time, at least one personal trainer was working in the
mixed-section, and they reported any undesirable behavior to gym management. One of
the employees told me that any time a male gym-goer appeared to focus on watching
female gym members exercise rather than focusing his own exercise, a staff member
quietly asked the man to stop watching female gym-goers or leave. The mixed-section
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space, designed to be “modern” and intended for “modern” clients, was not for
“checking-out” other gym members.
Gym management told me they tried to prevent inappropriate behavior by
“screening” gym membership applicants. Membership application forms collected
information such as education level and employment status. Management also could
evaluate potential gym members based on their name and tribal or political affiliation, as
these kinds of categories and relationships “are strongly relevant in people’s everyday
experience in the region” (King 2018: 305). Often, this information was common
knowledge, or it could be obtained quickly and discreetly by asking around.

The women’s gym
During peak evening hours, as many as 30 or 40 people, men and women,
exercised together in the mixed hall, with each person usually focused intently on his or
her individual training. Conversely, in the women’s only sections of gyms I visited, the
atmosphere was relatively quiet, even lethargic: Women hung about the fitness
equipment in groups, sitting on weight benches and chatting. Maybe one or two women
would be exercising. It seemed to me that in the gym where I worked, the female
personal trainers and some members discouraged socializing if it interfered with others’
ability to use space and equipment.
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Figure 13: Women socializing in a very small female-only room inside a mixed-gender
gym. A camp for IDPs can be seen through the gym windows. Photo by the author.

In my gym, when the women’s area was crowded in the evenings, women who might be
there primarily to socialize were displaced by women who came primarily to exercise.
Some of the more “serious” members complained to me about “lazy” women who were
not trying hard enough and taking up space.
I learned that many allegedly “lazy women” came to the gym to socialize and to
take a break from social obligations related to family, neighbors, or guests. The gym (and
women’s area especially) was one of the few spaces where young people were allowed
(by their family) to hang out for hours, albeit in the confined and monitored space of the
women’s section. Some women I met were attempting to lose weight, control their diet,
and sometimes make changes to their lifestyle. Many of these women were discouraged,
often because of the central role traditional, “unhealthy” foods played in bonding with
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family and friends. It was difficult to avoid eating these foods without offending others. I
learned from conversations with these women that they sometimes compensated for their
unwanted caloric intake by regularly participating in two or three group fitness classes in
a row, or by using cardio machines for long periods. (Some of my most insightful
exchanges at the gym happened when I hopped on a cardio machine beside a woman who
was exercising for an hour or more and was interested in talking.)
Some of the more ambitious women who regularly frequented the gym used the
mixed-hall and hung out in the mixed-gender lobby; they seemed to enjoy more mobility
in general than their peers who used only the female exercise room. Ambitious women
typically were university graduates, from wealthy and well-connected families, pursuing
careers and delaying marriage. Often their gym-going stemmed from what I consider a
“modern” disposition in which self-actualization was championed, sometimes at the
expense of other areas of one’s life.
Many women (and some men I talked with) found it difficult if not impossible to
reconcile their personal health goals with cultural practices that restricted their mobility
and promoted an undesirable diet; in some cases they were straining relationships with
others to a breaking point. From my conversations with these “ambitious” women, an
ideal type of “good” person emerged: The ideal, modern Kurdistani female takes charge
of her life in whatever ways she can, such as pursuing a “healthier” diet and exercise
routine. Higher education, sometimes for the express purpose of delaying marriage, was
more accessible and feasible than making changes in other areas, such as moving out of
her family of origin’s household and renting her own place. Other potentially contentious
individualized acts included wearing Western-style clothing, driving, riding a bicycle,
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and pursuing a career. Young women engaged in these kinds of self-actualization
activities often found like minded people at the gym, where they formed moral
communities to support each other.

Exercising for self, society, and nation
Self-actualization is central to the “ideal” or “modern” Kurdistani young person,
though the means of self-actualization vary based on gender as well as class. Becoming a
modern person did not necessarily mean abandoning all aspects of cultural or religious
identity and practices. Although some people avoided certain traditional foods deemed
unhealthy or challenged cultural norms, they nevertheless accepted, and in some cases
celebrated, their ethnoreligious or ethnonationalist identities. One of the more radical
young women I knew, Tablo, explained to me that she undertook both higher education
and physical fitness training “for her country.” When Tablo earned her Masters degree in
2019, she posted on social media that she “did it all for Kurdistan.” Like many Kurdish
people of her generation, her family was displaced and she spent the majority of her
childhood in refugee camps or communities in other countries. Aware of the high
possibility of renewed conflict, Tablo trained at the gym so that she would be physically
fit and prepared to “defend” herself and her country. Although Tablo may have been
exceptionally positioned and patriotic, I heard many young Kurdistani residents express
similarly assertive attitudes toward self-actualization. Many young men and women
considered their participation in mixed-gender spaces like the gym as their contribution to
improving the health, gender equity, and development of Kurdistani society.
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Figure 14: “Women-only” section within a “mixed-gender” gym. Photo by the author.
Gyms provided an experimental space for women, and men, to push boundaries
and sometimes to flout them altogether. Most female gym members arrived quietly, only
pausing in the lobby to greet acquaintances, and immediately proceeded to the women’s
locker room to change into their exercise clothes. For some women, the gym lobby and
the mixed-section were their catwalk. (The same could be said of many men who seemed
to make a show of their weightlifting and muscle-flexing.) Sometimes a woman arrived
wearing a flowing, sequined abaya and gold jewelry. Less frequently, a woman might
enter the lobby wearing tight Western-style clothing, stilettos, and sport heavy makeup,
manicured nails, and coiffed hair like she had just gotten a blow-out at one of the many
salons in the affluent neighborhoods near the gym. After changing into tight leggings and
tops, these heavily-made up women might proceed to the mixed-section. There they
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selected a cardio machine facing away from the rest of the room. Their ears were
enveloped by the large, colorful Beats-style headphones so popular at the time,
suggesting that they were not at the gym to interact with anyone (but probably there to be
seen). Kurdistani women who worked out in the mixed-section provided fodder for
gossip over in the women’s section, where many women were nevertheless just as
carefully or elaborately groomed.
As I regularly spent hours in the lobby typing-up fieldnotes, I observed the
rhythms of the gym. Early afternoon very few people visited; staff paced around, chatted,
or played on their phones. A couple women might use the women’s section during this
time. The gym traffic gradually picked up, peaking between 6 to 8pm. Because men often
traveled to and from the gym wearing their exercise clothes, it was difficult for me to
ascertain whether or not those men were employed. I also had the impression that
employment didn’t matter for these well-connected, wealthy youth who parked their
luxury vehicles in the best spaces outside the gym. But career-women who entered the
gym wearing Western-style professional clothing were easier to identify. Bahoz, for
example, often arrived impeccably dressed in pantsuits and heels. She worked as a
personal assistant to a high-ranking government official whose staff included several
women. Bahoz gushed about how kind and respectful her Kurdish boss was with his
female staff; she was proud that he held progressive views.
Despite being ethnically Kurdish, Bahoz once held a very low view of Kurdish
culture and Erbil society. She arrived in Erbil in the mid 2000s, after her brother was
killed during a wave of sectarian violence and the family fled to the Kurdistan Region.
Bahoz was shocked by her new home, a “small village” compared to cosmopolitan
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Baghdad, where she was accustomed to going out and mingling with a diverse group of
friends and acquaintances. Baghdad was so “free” for Bahoz and her family that her
father drank alcohol with his friends in public. However, Erbil at that time had no public
places for unchaperoned women to socialize, and public alcohol consumption was
shameful. Bahoz spoke only Arabic because all her family had been educated in Arabic
and living in Baghdad for generations; she spoke Arabic with her parents, not Kurdish.
Erbil residents gawked at her blue jeans and shorter skirts. “They thought I was an Arab,”
she laughed.
Bahoz adapted to life in Erbil, dressing more conservatively and learning not only
Kurdish language, but also cultural appreciation and political views. Her experience of
growing up Kurdish in Baghdad was positive overall, so when her Erbil colleagues and
friends criticized former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s regime, Bahoz was quick to
defend it. She soon realized that politicking, such as expressing empathy and
participating in criticism, was crucial for her career advancement. She smiled wryly,
saying to me, “Sometimes you have to go the way of people. Sometimes you have to
change.” In Kurdistani society, especially in her government job, Bahoz carefully
moderated her speech, dress, and behavior. Bahoz was 30, unmarried, ambitious, and
seemed content with how her life in Erbil had unfolded, largely because of how much
Erbil had developed in the decade she had been living there.
Development brought restaurants, cafes, and gyms, public spaces where women
with means could express themselves more freely. “I think [the gym] is the only place
where I really feel free,” Bahoz reflected. Gym members created what Bahoz called a
“different society,” in which men did not stare at women, and people belonging to
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various ethnoreligious groups and competing political parties exercised politely, if not
amicably, together. Bahoz was excited to see similar progress in Sami Abdulrahman
Park, a large green space in the center of Erbil with running and walking paths, a rock
climbing wall, gardens, fountains, and ample space for picnicking. In the cool evenings,
Sami Park offered a fresh, green retreat from the otherwise dusty, polluted, and hot city.
Increasingly, women used the park’s walking and running paths for exercise and
socializing.
The mixed-gender gym represented a possible future for Kurdistan, one in which
women might increasingly be accepted in other public spaces and roles. Although Bahoz
enjoyed her political job, she was considering shifting to another career. For years Bahoz
had struggled to find acceptable Western-style professional clothes, such as pantsuits, to
wear in her high-status government job. She dreamed of opening a store specializing in
outfitting Kurdistani career-women. Several shops for men had opened in the past couple
years. “Mr. Erbil,” for example, offered the latest European fashions for dapper young
Kurdistani men, as well as a barber shop and luxury cafe. Nothing like this existed
exclusively for women, who would need such services if their roles in Kurdistani society
continued to expand.

Romancing and cloistering at the gym
My friend Viyan, Kurdish and in her mid-20s, also expressed an interest in
opening more female-centered businesses. She had the necessary social and political
connections to obtain a business license and attract investors easily, she told me. From
the way she dressed and carried herself, I suspected Viyan was important from the first
time I saw her sashay into the gym lobby. She belonged to a respected and prominent
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tribe. A recent university graduate, Viyan worked for a Kurdish non-governmental
organization dedicated to helping young people find employment. She drove herself to
and from work, the gym, and mixed-gender cafes where she liked to socialize with
friends. Although women increasingly drove cars in Erbil, it was still considered new and
still attracted unwanted male attention. Many times, when a female friend was driving
and I sat in the passenger seat, men would stare at us at intersections or as they passed us
in their vehicle. My friends would apologize, saying it happens to them all the time and
they hate it.
Like many young women I encountered at gyms, Viyan described her family as
both progressive and protective. Working at an NGO with political connections was
commensurate with her status, which also seemed to protect her reputation while driving,
gym-going, and cafe-hopping. She dressed tastefully but conservatively. She seemed
equally comfortable wearing suits in modern, urban public spaces; wearing slinky outfits
at house parties; or wearing a glittering, traditional Kurdish dress in the lush countryside
surrounding her ancestral village, which she visited on holidays and weekends. Wherever
she was, she acted like she owned the place and played the role of gracious host or
patron. Her family trusted her greatly in permitting so much independence, though she
sometimes tried to bend the rules.
Viyan was in a secret relationship with Rebwar, a Kurdish guy who also worked
out at the gym. If they were at the gym at the same time, they interacted very little, giving
the impression they were only acquaintances. They communicated mainly by phone, text,
and private social media messages. About halfway through my fieldwork, Rebwar went
abroad to continue his education and began acting evasive toward Viyan. He admitted to
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her that he was going clubbing and “dating” women, but that nothing was “serious.” He
repeatedly asked Viyan to promise that she would only use the women’s section of the
gym, so that men would not look at her or talk with her. Outraged and hurt by Rebwar’s
behavior, Viyan did the opposite: She ensured that she was seen hanging around the
mixed-section and gym lobby, knowing that Rebwar’s friends would report this to him.
Antagonizing her long-distance boyfriend was the only power she had in the relationship.
She considered visiting Rebwar abroad; her older sister offered to cover for Viyan and
travel with her, but not to allow her to stay overnight with Rebwar.
One evening Viyan and I were smoking sheesha (flavored tobacco in a waterpipe) at an expensive, mixed-gender cafe near the gym. We sat in the outdoor area,
visible to the main road crowded with Land Rovers. With its expensive restaurants, cafes,
and shops, the area was very much a “see and be seen” place. Viyan puffed serenely on
her sheesha, talking about her upcoming work projects and her ideas for developing
Kurdistan. I mostly listened. Then she mentioned Rebwar; it had been weeks since she
said anything about him to me. She had agonized, cried, and confided in me about her
woes. Now, in a dispassionate tone, she declared her relationship with him over; her
family never would allow her to marry him anyway, preferring a more prestigious match.
Before I could formulate a sympathetic response, Viyan gestured to a cafe that had just
opened across the street. “We should go there next time,” she said, taking another drag of
the sheesha. I recognized that this meant Viyan was finished being vulnerable with me,
even if her experimental relationship with Rebwar may not have been severed
completely. This was the kind of interaction I learned to expect with my young and
wealthy interlocutors: One day they might express something radical to me, and the next
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act as if they never said anything out of the ordinary. The mixed-gender gyms and
burgeoning mixed-gender entertainment sector were places for experimentation, but
perhaps not for implementation.
The gym, rather than being a revolutionary space, reproduced cloistering practices
typical of Kurdistan and more broadly the Middle East (citations). Cloistering was
achieved through using gender segregated schedules and spaces. Gym management
promised hyper-vigilance and removed male members who apparently wanted to “look at
women.” Although a group fitness classroom was shared by men and women, during
women-only classes the room was locked to keep males out, allowing women to remove
their hijab and wear less conservative exercise clothes. I learned how important these
practices were to female clients when I once taught a female-only cycling class and
forgot to lock the group fitness room door. To my and my female clients’ horror, a male
staff member entered with a group of men interested in the gym. The women quickly
averted their faces and reached for jackets. I rushed to the door to wave the men out, who
were slow to leave. All the spaces in the mixed-gender gym ultimately were under
constant male supervision; there was always a risk that something untoward might
happen.
Cloistering practices extended to social media. Most young women I met were
careful with their social media accounts. Many posted no self-identifying information,
using a pseudonym and a stock photo like a rose for their profile picture. Women who
posted images of themselves often obscured their faces and those of their friends. Some
feared having their images circulated without their knowledge or digitally altered. I heard
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cautionary tales about women whose images were digitally-altered by superimposing one
woman’s face on another woman’s scantily-clad or naked body.
A few women I knew at the gym were bold, posting selfies wearing tight leggings
and showing their faces, likely to a carefully curated social media audience. Those who
could afford the exorbitant shipping rates ordered trendy activewear from Europe or the
United States. Fitness instructors and personal trainers featured the latest activewear
brands and trends on their social media. Social media increasingly circulates global
fitness culture. Many of the gym-going women I knew carefully crafted a modern, stylish
persona, constantly remaking themselves with every new opportunity that the city of
Erbil presented. Their experimentation remained nonetheless limited and protected
through cloistering practices in physical places as well as in social media. Attempts to
push back against cloistering practices were risky, as in the Zumbathon story below.
The Zumbathon
Ziyan shares a lot on social media: her latest fitness apparel, haircut, cafe-outing,
or social or political cause. Most recently she has shared several clips of her appearances
on Kurdish-language talk shows. As with many people, social media is the main platform
for sharing her self-actualization efforts. Advertising herself as the “first Kurdish Zumba
instructor” and the “first female Kurdish bodybuilder,” Ziyan attracts a strong following,
including some detractors. Ziyan’s followers loved to tell me about Ziyan’s success story:
while living in diaspora in Europe she became very overweight and unhappy with her
life. She began attending Zumba group fitness classes, lost a tremendous amount of
weight, and decided to become a Zumba instructor. Like many Kurds, she returned to
Iraqi Kurdistan during the stable 2011-2014 period to make a new life for herself there.
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When I first met Ziyan in Erbil, she had been leading female-only group fitness
classes, primarily Zumba, at different gyms for a few years. Her classes were popular,
and some of her clients followed her from gym to gym. I also began attending her
classes; her enthusiasm was infectious. She joked, shouted, called out half-hearted
participants, and praised women who were visibly working hard. During class she moved
among the women, acting silly to make someone laugh or correcting someone’s form.
She deftly code-switched between Kurdish, Arabic, Farsi, and English for her diverse
clients. Exercising alongside the class participants, she seemed to work harder than
anyone, drenched in sweat by the end of every class. She also offered personal training,
both at the gym and in private sessions, usually for women who wanted to train in the
privacy of their homes. The location tags on her social media posts indicate that most of
her personal training sessions are with women living in wealthy residential areas.
I had known Ziyan for a little over a year when her relative, a peshmerga soldier,
was killed in the conflict with the Islamic State. Soon after this tragedy, Ziyan organized
a “Zumbathon for Peshmerga” charity event. She produced a three-foot tall banner
advertising a “female only” 2-hour event, and displayed the banner in the gym lobby. In
the days leading up to the event, several women posted supportive comments on the
Facebook event page. “My thoughts and peaceful wishes for all and most importantly for
the brave lions and lioness[es], the Peshmerga,” wrote one woman.
A local, English language radio station promoted the Zumbathon and hosted it in
a large parking lot adjacent to the radio station. It was, much to my surprise, an outdoor
event: In the parking lot, the organizers assembled a stage with lights. Crew members
paced around with audiovisual equipment. To the side of the stage, a couple tables were
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arranged for collecting donations and distributing water and snacks. The event banner
and donation box flyer requested that people give “with their heart,” suggesting a
minimum 5,000 dinar (about 4 US dollars) donation. Judging by the dozens of plates with
bananas and oranges, the organizers expected a crowd.
The turnout was hardly a crowd: By 4pm, the event start time, only a handful of
women had arrived and stood quietly chatting with their arms clasped across their chests.
Beside me, Maha suddenly said, “This country will never change. This is all the people
who come to this event? There should be more.” Maha, an Arabic speaker displaced from
Baghdad, worked for a large humanitarian relief organization and attended group fitness
classes almost every night. “Why do you think more people didn’t come?” I asked.
Maha: Because these things are still new, and many are too embarrassed.
Diana: Because it is outside?
Maha: Yes. Look, there are men around! [Pointing to a large delivery truck now
parked at the edge of the parking lot, blocking the view of the event from a busy street] I
asked them to put that lorry there so we could have some privacy. [Some of the women
chuckle]
Indeed, several men were watching us from the grassy area across from the radio
station. The station stood near the intersection of two busy roads. By Western standards,
most of the women were dressed modestly in long-sleeve, tunic-length, loose-fitting
shirts with loose pants or leggings; however, they felt exposed. Radio station staff asked
the unwanted spectators to leave, but the men did not move. Throughout the event, they
were joined by a few more male spectators. Ziyan mounted the stage wearing
camouflage-print leggings and a highlighter-yellow sleeveless top that showed off her
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powerful biceps. She beckoned the participants, now totaling 18 women, most of them
Zumba class regulars, closer to the stage. Three women joined Ziyan on stage to lead
choreography. Ziyan, in a quieter voice than usual, thanked everyone for coming to the
event.
We began marching in place to a drumbeat, imitating Ziyan. The first song had a
distinctly militaristic sound. The remainder of the tracklist I recognized from previous
Zumba classes. We exercised/danced for two hours with a very short break halfway. As
the sun set, the temperature dropped and the stage lights were glaring. A radio station
drone buzzed overhead, recording the event. (I never learned whether the footage was
made public in any form other than a couple short clips of the stage dancers on Ziyan’s
social media accounts.) Ziyan led most of the songs, sometimes trading her spot at the
front of the stage with another dancer. English and Spanish pop songs included overt
references to sexuality, per Zumba’s “Latin dance” ethos. “I’m sexy and I know it - I
work out!” blasted from the speakers. Another trainer at the gym led us in a dance with
an embarrassing amount of hip-gyration, excessive even by Zumba standards. Ordinarily,
in the privacy of the women’s-only group fitness room, I would not have minded and
would have found it to be silly, fun even. With so many strange men around, however, it
was uncomfortable and cringeworthy; this spectacle might contribute to the “bad”
reputation of Kurdistani females who behaved in any way deemed too Western or
inappropriate. Several of the women took a break during this dance.
By the end of the event, we were sweaty and shivering in the cool evening air.
The transparent donations container was conspicuously under-filled. We posed for a
group photo on the stage. Several women rallied around a disheartened Ziyan, reassuring
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her that the event went well and that more people would participate next time. The group
quietly dispersed, and one of the ladies offered to drive me home. She agreed that it was a
disappointing turnout and shrugged. I suggested that it was too different from the regular
Zumba classes, which were held in a female-only, protected space consistent with other
cloistering practices I observed. Despite being advertised as a “female only event,” the
Zumbathon was held outside, inexplicably, in a public space, exposing women to
unwanted attention. Overt female sexuality was on display: Women, a few wearing tightfitting exercise clothes, dancing to provocative Western pop songs, and shaking their hips
for the peshmerga, the Kurdish nation, and potentially the internet, not to mention the
unwelcome males watching from the sidelines.
Although it was a “female only” event, the Zumbathon seemed to be performed
for a general Kurdish male gaze during a time of crisis for the nation: On the event
banner (depicted above), Ziyan’s active pose mirrors the image of the male soldier
bearing a Kurdish flag. The militaristic aesthetic of the event’s opening song and Ziyan’s
camo-leggings suggested that the female participants marched in solidarity with the
Kurdish nation. While many of the participants were ethnic Kurds, several of the women
were Arabs displaced from Baghdad, or Iranians living in Erbil. I had the feeling that
everyone was there primarily to support, not the Kurdish nation, but their role model and
friend Ziyan.

Embodying the nation and gender anxieties
The Zumbathon drew upon heavily circulated and popular imagery of Kurdish
female militia fighting the Islamic State, images popular during my fieldwork. For
example, in 2015 Kurdish performer Helly Luv released her English language
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“Revolution” music video, which opens with a dramatization of ISIS attacking a village
and Kurdish peshmerga fighting back. Female militia members feature prominently in the
video. Helly, in a full face of makeup and acrylic nails, alternately marches in official
military uniforms and dances in sexy camouflage attire with golden bullet-shaped jewelry
and golden pistol-shaped heels. Western media outlets touted her as a “Kurdish warriordiva” (Fordham 2015) “fighting the Islamic State with songs” (Austin 2015), noting her
intentionally provocative displays of female sexuality, such as gyrating on top of a
burned-out car amid shelling and machine gun fire.
Western media outlets and audiences, characteristically fascinated with images
and stories of females defying stereotypical Middle Eastern patriarchy (Abu-Lughod
2002), played a large role in circulating Kurdish female fighter imagery. It is difficult to
say how much of this originated in Kurdistan and how much was (re)circulation of an
idea initially presented to a receptive Western audience. Nevertheless, the female fighter
image resonated with many Kurdish people: Some of my first Kurdish acquaintances
joked that I was in Kurdistan to learn the language so I could join a female Kurdish
militia. They went so far as to organize an outing for me and my husband to practice
firing weapons and dine with a couple of peshmerga soldiers. Sometimes I heard people
speak about female Kurdish combatants with admiration. In the bazaar in the city of
Slemanȋ, I noticed a couple shops selling memorabilia of Syrian Kurdish People’s
Protection Units (YPG) and Women’s Protection Units (YPJ). One seller displayed a
large photograph of a rifle-bearing Asia Ramazan (Viyan) Antar, a famous female fighter
killed in action, and, for many people, a symbol of the Kurdish cause and women’s
rights.
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It is well-known that nationalist discourses commission women as mothers,
laborers or fighters in nation-building. Women are called upon to bear and to educate
future citizens, to ensure the reproduction of an interiorized, sacred “culture” (Chatterjee
1993), and to perform modernity and signal the nation’s progress (Kanaaneh 2002;
Özyürek 2006). Ziyan’s Zumbathon linked Kurdistani women’s participation in the
emerging fitness industry to the cause of the Kurdish nation and more subtly to women’s
emancipation: Women not only contribute to the national cause, but also could and
should do so in very public ways which defy traditional cloistering practices. Female
participants, such as Maha, commented on the public nature of the event and how the low
turnout reflected the conservative public order and failures of state-led modernization.
Although the Zumbathon event did not generate as much buzz and participation as
its organizers hoped, social media offers an efficient platform to link a person’s
individual cause(s) the national cause. During the time that I was getting to know Ziyan,
she was getting more involved in the bodybuilding scene. She was training with a coach
specializing in the sport and planned to compete in an international bodybuilding contest.
Ziyan already promoted her Zumba classes and personal training sessions on social
media. She also began posting frequently about her bodybuilding training: She
demonstrated exercise methods; shared videos of herself working with her coach; posted
professional photos of her flexed muscles; linked articles and video clips in which she
was interviewed about her training; explained her strict diet; and promoted the
supplements she took. In many of her posts, she reminded her audience that she was “the
first female Kurdish bodybuilder.” The “Kurdish” aspect of that identity came to the fore
in the months leading up to the Kurdistani independence referendum.
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During the last months of my fieldwork, many people were talking about the
upcoming referendum for Kurdistani independence scheduled for September 2017. The
referendum would demonstrate how many Kurdistani residents would support declaring
independence from the Iraqi federal state. In August, Ziyan updated her facebook profile
picture: It was one of her professionally-shot bodybuilding photos in which she faced a
gym mirror wearing a sleeveless shirt that showed off her muscles. Like many Kurdistani
people at the time, she applied a popular pro-Kurdistani independence filter to her profile
picture. At the base of the filter were stripes in the colors of the Kurdistani flag red and
an outline of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq with a sunburst. The caption reads “Yes for
Kurdistan independence.” Ziyan also wrote a message in Sorani Kurdish for her
followers:
As a sportswoman I say yes for independence, yes for the referendum, because
success requires freedom and independence. I also want the time that I participate
in a sports competition [bodybuilding] outside the country to say in a loud voice
‘as Kurdistan I participate.’ I will say ‘I am Kurd and Kurdistani.’ Not by the
name of Iraq will I participate.” (Author’s translation from Sorani Kurdish)
Ziyan’s posts are, of course, consistent with countless examples of the sporting
body’s emblematic portrayal as a competitor as fighting for the nation. Kurdish athletes
living in Europe and the U.S. drape themselves with the Kurdistani flag and are admired
back in Kurdistan. When I interviewed Hadid, the Turkomani bodybuilder and gym
owner, I asked if there were patriotic sentiments at competitions or in the gym. “There is
iHtram (respect),” he replied. “They respect the peshmerga by doing one minute silence
for the martyrs before competitions. Sometimes they show the Kurdistan flag at
international competitions.”
Ziyan’s participation in the national cause, however, was met with ambivalence.
Loyal followers like Bahoz praised Ziyan’s strength and determination:
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You see even more women are getting involved. They are paying attention to their
muscles. They want to tone their body and be in shape. I see people visiting the
protein shops, to get proteins, supplements, and vitamins. I think it’s good. And in
Kurdistan we have many athletes, and they are participating in the league, in
bodybuilding championships abroad. And you know Ziyan, [smiles] she is a very
good example for women. She’s interested in bodybuilding, and her ambition is to
be a champion.
Diana: That’s really cool. Is she a model, an inspiration for you?
Bahoz: She inspires me. You feel there is a power inside her. It’s not like she just
wants to show off her body to people, like “I am a woman and want to show my
muscles.” There is something, an energy, a power. She really inspires me.
Others criticized how much attention Ziyan drew to her less-conservatively-clothed body.
People posted negative comments on social media. Some people gossiped about her
private life, speculating about how her bodybuilding and career might affect her marital
status (she was not married).
Ambivalence about Ziyan often resulted from anxieties over her muscled body
appearing “too masculine.” Some women did not participate in her classes or want to
train with her for fear of gaining too much muscle. They preferred another female
personal trainer, Fairouza, who was not a bodybuilder. Although Fairouza did strength
training in addition to cardio, she worked to maintain her curvy figure rather than to
“shred” and build muscle mass. Presenting traditionally feminine was a shared concern
among female clients and instructors: Both Ziyan and Fairouza regularly visited salons to
maintain their blown-out and highlighted hair, substantial makeup, and 100-dollar acrylic
nails. Both posted professionally shot photographs of themselves modeling sexy clothes,
again to a curated social media audience.
For Kurdistani females, the culturally ideal gendered body is cultivated through
traditional expressions of femininity, domestic roles, and a particular aesthetic. Whereas
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some of my female interlocutors aspired to the svelte body popularized by global fitness
culture, others desired the hyper-curvy figure popularized by reality television and social
media influences (e.g., the American celebrity Kardashian family). Slight muscle-gains
were acceptable for women but becoming too muscular was deemed unattractive.
Likewise, the ideal Kurdistani female body must be protected. Long-standing cultural
practices of cloistering restrict women’s mobility in an effort to protect sexual “purity”.
Cloistering practices greatly hinder achieving the kind of body and individuality
valorized by global fitness culture and by Western culture more generally. Global fitness
culture promotes an ideal type of person produced through self-actualization that
prioritizes an individual’s physical health and resulting self-image. Self-image hinges
upon health markers, such as weight or muscle-to-fat ratio, as well as upon a cultivated
aesthetic according to one’s gender and diet and exercise program (e.g., weight loss or
bodybuilding). Messaging about health and fitness are also heavily individualized,
placing the responsibility of achieving this lifestyle squarely on the shoulders of
individuals.
Cultural practices like cloistering and homemaking, however, restrict women’s
ability to pursue self-actualization through going to gyms for exercise and socialization,
especially in mixed-gender gyms. Cultural norms for hospitality and etiquette require
women to be available in the home for the majority of the day. Everyday women spend
hours preparing meals for the family and for guests; meticulously cleaning the home,
especially in anticipation of social visits; and receiving and entertaining guests. Insisting
on eating a non-traditional diet, eating at different times, or being absent from the home
in order to pursue physical fitness all conflict with appropriate (gendered) behavior.
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Kurdistani women, especially unmarried women, said their families worried about their
reputation if they were away from the home too much. How could the family ensure their
daughter would be well-regarded in the community if she is away from home too often,
or does not eat like the rest of the family, or avoids social visits in order to maintain her
diet and exercise routines?
Ziyan’s participation in the male-dominated realms of bodybuilding and Kurdish
ethnonationalism generated anxieties. During the months leading up to the referendum, I
observed women both in conversation and on social media linking their individual
causes, such as pursuing a career or fitness regimen, to national causes, like independence
or developing the society or country. In that liminal period, heightened female visibility
and mobility were tolerated if not celebrated: An independent Kurdistan would be a
pluralistic and progressive society (unlike Iraq, as some of my interlocutors emphasized)
in which the “first female Kurdistani bodybuilder” could be a national hero (albeit, an
ambivalent one).
For a time, women like Ziyan increased their mobility by participating in the
nationalist causes of independence and developing the nation. They did so by pursuing
projects of self-actualization through education, careers, or hobbies, all of which
increased their participation in the public sphere, decreased their time in the domestic
sphere, and in many cases delayed marriage and children. The global fitness industry had
arrived and evolved rapidly in Erbil, and a subset of Kurdistani women had played a big
part in it: They convinced their relatives to permit them to join a gym, to travel to and
from the gym, and to wear Western-style exercise clothing such as leggings. Of course,
there were usually conditions. Some families permitted gym-going only if the gym had
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women-only section; in some cases, families mandated that they only use the women’s
section. A woman might be permitted to travel to the gym with other women or to be
chauffeured by a male relative or hired driver. Many women arrived and left wearing
conservative outfits, changing into and out of their Western-style exercise clothes in the
women’s locker room. It seemed to me that even marginal freedoms led to greater
expectations about women’s position in Kurdistani society. Women looked to the
examples set by female personal trainers like Ziyan, although attaining a highly
individualized and public lifestyle like Ziyan’s required sacrifices many people were not
willing to make, especially after the transitional moment passed.
With the national cause decoupled from personal projects of ethical selfformation, the differences between competing ethical positions in contemporary
Kurdistan became clearer. On the one hand, nationalist and Islamic ethical positioning
typically cast women in more conservative roles as wives and mothers of the nation or
religious community (Adely 2012; Hegland 2009; Joseph 1991; Kanaaneh 2002). During
periods of social change or consolidation of power, states and institutions may elevate
these “traditional” roles to national importance, and even expand them by including
women in development. During such transitional moments, the values and goals of the
state, civil society, and international actors overlap and can appear united in common
cause, such as developing the nation and well-being of its citizens, and in common
sentiment (a broadly humanist ethos).
During the conflict with ISIS, Kurdish ethnonationalist sentiment skyrocketed, as
did distaste for conversative Islam for its associations with ISIS. Kurdistani women
became central to the narrative of the Kurdistan Region as a counterpublic more
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progressive than its neighbors (the rest of Iraq, or the Islamic State). For example, at
Erbil’s first bicycle marathon, officials gave speeches that noted how the Kurdistan
Region was safe and progressive enough to include female cyclists (more about this
marathon appears in the following chapter). In this “progressive Kurdistan” narrative, the
ideal gendered Kurdistani body and the ideal gendered modern citizen overlapped. But
after the failed referendum and the collapse of Kurdistani territorial expansion, the ideal
body and ideal citizen clashed. Women like Ziyan, who had thrived during the liminal,
transitional period, found their experimentations with mobility less welcome.
As scholars have noted (Das 1995), after the liminal, revolutionary moment
passes, women in post-revolutionary societies often revert to their former roles as wives
and mothers and in jobs traditionally performed by women. In the time since the failed
independence referendum, I have noticed my female Kurdistani acquaintances gradually
sharing less nationalistic and forward-looking content on social media. Instead, they have
been posting more expressions of everyday, status quo femininity (new clothes, hair,
makeup, etc.) in the usual social settings (home, salon, social gathering, etc.). Some seem
to have decreased their gym-going or talking about their careers. A couple women, whom
I have stayed in touch with since returning to the U.S., have told me that they have lost
their motivation for self-improvement. Some have married. Of course, these behaviors
are not attributable solely to the events following the referendum, which admittedly I
have watched from a distance since concluding my fieldwork in July 2017. But if social
media is any indicator of shifting attitudes, then it is significant that most of my
interlocutors have fallen silent on these topics.
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When the transitional moment passes (or fails), it becomes clear that these new,
“modern” spaces like gyms and ethical practices like bodybuilding were not radically
pluralistic spaces, but spaces in which people attempted to minimize the powers of
family, sect, and state and to assert autonomy. I see the spaces and practices described in
this chapter as something akin to a reform movement; in this comparison, the “modern”
fitness center stands in for the “state”. In reform movements, people often continue to
draw upon gender norms and social structures, which are, nevertheless, consciously or
unconsciously incorporated into state power and effectively reproduce patriarchy. “While
the state may seem to liberate women from private patriarchy, it may also cooperate with
certain conservative constituencies to perpetuate this control,” Al-Rasheed argues in her
work on the Saudi state (2013:4). The state may incorporate a “tribal ethos” into its
framework, acting as national protector of feminine “honor” (Das 1995). Suad Joseph
(1991; 1999; 2000) also has shown how state apparatuses, such as citizenship regimes,
are predicated on notions of gender. Modern states in the Middle East conceptualize
citizenship and govern family life with reference to patrilineal kinship (King 2018). Thus,
both society and state have been mutually constitutive in reinforcing the boundedness of
identity categories, and all that those categories entail, in legal codes and in social
practice.

Ethical life in breakdown
In this chapter, I have argued that bodybuilding and gym-going in Iraqi Kurdistan
offer their practitioners two paradigms for thinking about ethical life, euphemized as
“modern” and premised on radical autonomy, in Kurdistan: On the one hand,
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bodybuilding and gym-going frame experiences of sectarian political cultures and the
“failed” Iraqi state. In this narrative, the traditional male bodybuilder with muscles
cultivated for “show” represents the old nation-building paradigm of Middle Eastern
states. Kurdish bodybuilders are celebrated as heroes at home and abroad, where they
carry the Kurdistani flag into international competitions. Hosting bodybuilding
competitions in the Kurdistan Region has elevated its status, as it continues to behave like
a state and aspires to statehood. So, the old bodybuilding as nation-building paradigm
still carries weight.
Conversely, the new Kurdistani body politic my interlocutors envisioned would
be pluralistic, tolerant, and modern, just like global fitness culture. Global fitness culture
offers “real” or “functional” strength training to both men and women who exercise
together in “modern” fitness centers, which symbolizes the aspirational “modern” and
“pluralistic” Kurdistani state. Mixed-gender gyms would replace the old nation-building
paradigm of bodybuilding. That hyper muscular bodybuilding paradigm was dismissed as
a site of dirty, smelly gyms, outdated methods, dangerous steroid use, and ethnic,
religious, and gender discrimination. It was all about “show” and not about “real
strength” or “functional fitness” like in CrossFit. In this narrative, bodybuilding was as
fake and corrupt as the Iraqi state.
“Modern” gyms offered a space where people “didn’t talk about religion and
politics,” as many people said to me, because in the gym “they don’t matter.” But until
that vision is realized (if ever), ethnic, religious, and political divides matter still. They
matter in ways that foreign intervention and war have created or exacerbated, leading to a
world that for many has “become unbearable,” as Jarrett Zigon (2018) has described
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societies experiencing breakdown. Zigon argues that one way of dealing with breakdown
is to cultivate “an ethics of dwelling,” which is “the response to an existential imperative
emerging from a world that has become unbearable as a result of a particular situation
that has led to the breakdown of this world.” In the Kurdistan Region of Iraq,
bodybuilding and fitness (as they are understood and practiced there) result from
breakdown and a subsequent struggle to recover. Bodybuilding and gym-going offer
people and society a path to recovery. Many of my interlocutors described their
participation in global fitness culture as their contribution to building a better society.
Through training in mixed-gender, diverse, and “modern” gyms, people removed
themselves from the pressures of sectarian political cultures and from gender and ethnic
discrimination. They advanced a pluralistic vision for Kurdistan with the mixed gym as a
template for a strong, equitable civil society and an inclusive future Kurdistani state.
Bodybuilding and fitness cultures exemplify how state power is being remade in
Iraqi Kurdistan. Although bodybuilding may seem backward or outdated to some, its
performance of mastery and power appeals to the strong current of Kurdish
ethnonationalism in the KRI. On the other hand, the expansion of fitness culture in Iraqi
Kurdistan may seem like the mere encroachment of global capitalism, a new hobby for
wealthy Kurdistani people. My sense is that, more deeply, global fitness culture and
mixed-gender gyms tap into desires to “modernize” Iraqi Kurdistan and to create a more
just and inclusive society.
Writing about Israel and Palestine, Jasbir Puar (2017) has illuminated how state
power is configured through a debility – disability – capacity complex. War and
displacement have weakened the social and political bodies (and in some cases,
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individual physical bodies) through the process of “debility.” These same conditions of
war, however, enable the championing of recovery. In Iraqi Kurdistan, bodybuilding and
mixed-gender gyms are “capacity” success symbols of the strong/modern citizen in the
patriotic/aspirational Kurdistani state. In this way, bodybuilding and gym-going are used,
on the one hand, to frame experiences of the “failed” Iraqi state and sectarian political
cultures. On the other hand, bodybuilding and gym-going are used discursively to
champion the aspirational “modern” and “pluralistic” Kurdistani state. People seek to
work out the weaknesses of self and society through virtuous practices of bodybuilding
and training in mixed gender gyms. And yet these very ethical practices are engendered
by the state and social breakdown which have made them both possible and necessary.
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Chapter 5: “There is no future”
“‘Go and look at all the failures, disappointments, blood and suffering in this
city…My dear brother, imagination is not a path, as you would have it. Rather, it
is a secret door we run through when our houses are set alight.’” – Bakhtiyar Ali,
I Stared at the Night of the City
Field notes excerpts
From my field notes, January 2016
In the cafeteria, 12-year-old Naza sat by herself with her head hung over her bowl
and juice box. I pulled up a chair and sat beside her. We made small talk for a few
minutes. Suddenly, Naza said, “Miss, do you think things will ever get better here in
Kurdistan?" Her eyes were large and solemn. My heart ached to hear her question.
I thought for a moment and said, “That’s a good question. Can I hear what you
think first, and then I will tell you what I think?”
Naza replied, “My parents think we should go to America. If my dad can get the
iqama (residency permit) there, we will go. Maybe we won’t have much money there, but
it is safe. Last year I heard a bomb and thought maybe my dad died. There was a bomb
near these cafes. There was a car that drove up to the [U.S. Consulate] and when they saw
it coming, they made the bomb go off. I was at home and heard the sound and felt the
house move like this. [She made a shaking motion.] I was afraid to move in case the
house fell. My dad was out of the house and I didn’t know where. Then I stood up and
went outside and saw some smoke. I started crying and said maybe our dad was hurt. He
was out of the house. I didn’t know where he was. My [older] sister saw me crying and
said I should stop crying, that it was nothing. She has no feelings. So, I called my dad,
and he was ok. But the street with all the nice cafes that my mom says are like Europe,
they were all destroyed. We went to see them. Mom said that it was too bad because that
was such a nice street and now all those cafes are gone.”
I listened and waited for Naza to say more. When she didn’t, I said to her, “My
wish, my prayer, is that Iraq would have peace.” Naza looked at me expectantly. I
hesitated. After a moment, I continued, “I think Iraq is a wonderful country. I mean, most
of the people here are so nice, so welcoming, so lovely. The land is rich with oil, but the
people are poor. There are so many problems, fighting over the oil, over the money, over
the land…”
Naza interjected, “Yes, we watched a documentary about Mesopotamia, and this
girl in the documentary said, ‘This land is cursed.’”
I waited. Naza’s eyes were so large, so sad. “I don’t want to go,” she said in a
small voice. “I don't want to leave this school or my friends.”

Field note, February 2016
I went to the school cafeteria and ordered a pizza. I asked a group of three girls, seventh
graders, if I could join them. They brought up the topic of diaspora. The most vocal of the
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girls said, “This country isn’t good anymore. It was good, but they’re making it bad for
us. It is expensive to live here. This country has no future. That’s why so many people
are leaving.”
Field note, March 2016
Rezan [ninth grade] saw us from a distance and walked over to join us. I told
Rezan, “We were just talking about the komalayatȋ class.”
Rezan said brightly, “Oh I love that class, Mr. Karza is so good to us. At first, I
thought he was strange, but I really like how he teaches us.” Rezan does participate more
than any other student in her komalayatȋ class; she asks many questions. “We learned
about a man who pushed a rock up a mountain, but it kept falling back down,” Rezan
explained. “Mr. Karza said to keep trying to push the rock back up, it is not hopeless. He
said not to give up just because of the government and the problems in our country.”
Then Rezan mentioned that she will be leaving the school, either for Ishik or one
of the British schools.
“Why?” I asked, surprised.
Rezan said, “There is no future here for us.”
“Do you want to leave Kurdistan?” I asked.
“Yes, maybe to Canada because there is no future here. The political situation is
hopeless here.”
“What is the voting age here [in Kurdistan]? I asked.
“18,” she replied. I asked her if she will vote when she is 18. “Probably not,” she
said, “because it doesn’t matter.”

Field note, April 2016:
Chira, grade 8: If our country stays like this, we probably don’t have a future. Our
country is kind of selfish and dirty.
Ahmed, grade 8: Miss, all these bad situations happen from no teamwork. All of Iraq
doesn’t help its people, its environment, its population, anything. They just work for
themselves.
Chira: Miss, when he said there is no teamwork: People have lost hope so much, if you
tell them we can work together, [they say] no. People have no hope. The problem is we
don’t have a future here.
Ahmed: All the people will go to other places and leave this place. Miss, now the
situation is very bad. There are peshmerga fighting, and people are leaving. I don’t think
there will be a future. After 100 years, maybe there won’t be a country,
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Field note, May 2016
Gulistan, grade 10: Yeah, a lot of them are talking about moving, hoping to move,
wishing to move. Because the things that are happening now, there is no hope that is
gonna get better. Nobody knows what is gonna happen. It’s not safe. The politicians are
all playing with each other. And the politics, no one is willing to help unless it is
benefitting for their own selves. It's politics. It’s dirty. Nothing is clear about politics.
You don’t know your own future, so many are trying to move.

Field note, June 2017
Diana: Yesterday, the government announced they are going to have an independence
referendum in September.
Abbas [male, 30s, security contractor]: This is to make people busy, for some reason only
[the government] knows. This came out of nowhere.
Diana: What about the future of the rest of the country?
Abbas: Oh no, no future. No future. I think in the end, it will be a federal thing. Shia
will take their side. Sunni will take their side. The central government will stay, at least in
front of the world, as one government. I think it will be just federal areas like Kurdistan.

Throughout this dissertation, we have witnessed people grappling with various
models for ethical life. Because ethical behavior in the present is typically premised on
certain conceptualizations of the “future,” interlocutors deliberate over their present
moral obligations regarding that future. Based on their view of the world, they debate the
merits of action or inaction, with reference to a this-worldly, “immanent frame” (Taylor
2007), or to a transcendent one. Competing or overlapping ethical regimes pressured and
pulled people in different directions toward different conclusions. They wrestled with
complexities, contradictions, and confusions. They spoke of doubt and hope. They said
there is a future, or there is no future. More of them concluded the latter. In this chapter,
the interlocutors do most of the talking. Much of their ethical deliberations involved
“myths” about multiple pasts, presents, and futures.
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This chapter listens to interlocutors recount their experiences in three types of
spaces – education, work, and fitness – and reflects on how the “failures” of state,
society, and even “modernity” itself led to deep personal disappointments. The spaces
interlocutors inhabit are said to be, or at least aspire to be, modern, inclusive, or
pluralistic. The people who create and inhabit these “pluralistic” and “modern” spaces
express hopes that their efforts contribute to the betterment of individuals, their
communities, and their country. In Chapter 3, for example, Kurdistan Civilizational
School (KCS) co-founder Yakub Boutros explained how KCS was intended to create a
“shared ethic” that would help rectify “sectarian” practices that begin in childhood, like
when the Iraqi government segregates schoolchildren according to perceived
ethnoreligious identity but, in many cases, still subject all the students to Islamic
majoritarian values.
This was the nature of Deena’s K-12 education. Deena, an Assyrian Christian
woman in her mid-30s, believed that a university education would help people become
“open-minded.” Although Deena describes some positive experiences, her repeated
encounters with “sectarianism” at university and in her workplace lead her to conclude
that interfaith, cross-cultural, or political dialogue in Iraq is futile. Instead, she withdraws
into a small circle of like-minded friends with whom share can share her opinions, and
she finds another sphere in which to work on self-cultivation: the gym.
Ashti, introduced in this chapter, is a Kurdish woman in her 40s, who, despite her
limited formal education, has read widely, learned multiple languages, and lived in
Europe. She described feeling divinely “called” to return to Kurdistan, where she hopes
that she can contribute to Kurdistan’s development. She expected that globalization and
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development in the years that she has been away will have increased access to knowledge
and opportunities to improve oneself, one’s community, and one’s country. In her job as
a teacher in a government-run school, she finds instead youth who express resignation
and lack motivation. She concludes that the deteriorating education system is partly the
fault of the government, which seeks to make its citizens docile rather than empowered.
Ashti wonders why she was “called” to return to a hopeless place, where she waits for a
“future that is already here.” The field note excerpts, vignettes, and lengthy quotes in this
chapter allow interlocutors, in their own words, to describe the sense of failure in society,
state, and modernity itself. While some interlocutors summon the resources to generate
hope for a future, others cannot or do not, resigning themselves to making do in a
“stagnant” present and looking toward an uncertain future, or worse, no future.

The myth of Sisyphus
In one komalayatȋ (social studies) lesson, the teacher, Karza, told the class a story
in which a poor man had three apples. He bit into the first apple; it had a worm, so he
threw it aside. He bit into a second apple, and it also had a worm, so he threw it aside.
Then he turned the light off and bit into his third apple. Why? Karza asked. A few
students suggested answers. A boy in the back of class said, “Because he is poor and
hungry and has to eat, so he doesn't want to see the worm in the third apple.” Karza
smiled and pointed to the boy in the back. “Is happiness inside you or from outside?”
Karza asked. The students were unsure. He then asked the students what they wanted to
be when they grew up. He also asked the students what they wanted to see in their
country after ten years. Some students said they did not know, while others named highstatus jobs like doctor or engineer.
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The teacher’s questions prompted many students to share frustrations about
Kurdistan and Iraq; some insisted things would not improve. In response, Karza wrote
“Albert Camus” on the board and related Camus’ essay on the myth of Sisyphus. Camus
writes,
The gods had condemned Sisyphus to ceaselessly rolling a rock to the top of a
mountain, whence the stone would fall back of its own weight. They had thought
with some reason that there is no more dreadful punishment than futile and
hopeless labor…
Karza asked the class what most people would do if they were Sisyphus; would they keep
pushing the rock back up the mountain only to see it fall again? One girl insisted that no,
most people would not keep trying. Karza disagreed, arguing that most people would
keep trying rather than give up or self-destruct. He encouraged the class not to give up
even though problems in their government or country seem impossible to solve. Karza’s
philosophy is summed up in the conclusion to Camus’ essay:
If this myth is tragic, that is because its hero is conscious. Where would his
torture be, indeed, if at every step the hope of succeeding upheld him? The
workman of today works everyday in his life at the same tasks, and his fate is no
less absurd. But it is tragic only at the rare moments when it becomes conscious.
Sisyphus, proletarian of the gods, powerless and rebellious, knows the whole
extent of his wretched condition: it is what he thinks of during his descent. The
lucidity that was to constitute his torture at the same time crowns his victory.
There is no fate that cannot be surmounted by scorn… It makes of fate a human
matter, which must be settled among men…All Sisyphus' silent joy is contained
therein. His fate belongs to him… This universe henceforth without a master
seems to him neither sterile nor futile. Each atom of that stone, each mineral flake
of that night filled mountain, in itself forms a world. The struggle itself toward the
heights is enough to fill a man's heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy (1991:
23-24).
Life ultimately may be absurd or futile, Karza told the class, but the person who
realizes this futility is freed to be the master of his personal fate. Karza’s lessons
implicitly critiqued attitudes of resignation about Iraq’s problems, and instead offered
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encouragement to confront those problems. He admonished students to reject ignorance,
to turn on the light and look at the worm in the apple.
For the students, Karza modeled how an intellectual approach, including reading
widely and thinking critically, offered an alternative way of learning, and thus living an
ethical life, that was not governed by religion, cultural rules and social expectations, or
by ethnonationalism. His lessons were a radical departure from the traditional
authoritarian culture of classrooms in government schools and in some private schools.
At KCS, notably I observed this authoritarian style of teaching mostly among the ethnic
Kurdish teachers who were trained in government teaching colleges. These teachers
seemed very like the ones I observed in government schools. Far from a tyrant in the
classroom, Karza modeled humility. Saryan, a girl in grade 8, said, “[Karza] cares about
history, and he cares about educating himself. He has a library full of books...And he
cares about learning, teaching the students, and he’s trying to improve as a teacher. He
tells us to let him know if he makes a mistake.” Although I do not know why Karza did
not return to teach the following year, I suspect it may have something to do with his
unconventional pedagogy. Choosing to turn on the light and see the worm has
consequences.

Facing a (non)sectarian future
The myth of Sisyphus was not the only myth that appeared in lessons at Kurdistan
Civilizational School. The Grade 10 English Literature students spent most of the
semester studying C.S. Lewis’ Till We Have Faces: A Myth Retold, a retelling of the
Cupid and Psyche myth. The class typically read and discussed one or two chapters per
week. (I found that students’ English comprehension levels varied, though most students

239

were able to understand the plot of the novel; students whose entire education had been
taught in the English language at KCS demonstrated exceptional reading
comprehension.) The novel is set in a primitive, pagan society in which the protagonist,
Orual, and her sister Psyche live. In the first part of the novel, Orual gives an account of
her life documenting the gods’ injustice toward her. The second part, narrated by an older
Orual, is a reconsideration of her accusations against the gods and a realization about
human self-deception and fallibility vis-a-vis the gods. Like most of Lewis’ work, the
book contains Christian themes and is essentially a redemption narrative in which the
main character experiences a conversion from a state of unbelief in the goodness and
rightness of the gods’ actions to a state of belief. I had read the book a few years prior to
my fieldwork, and my sense is that these themes are likely evident to someone from a
Christian background.
Grade 10 Literature class was, however, taught by a Muslim teacher to a majority
Muslim student body, which resulted in some unorthodox interpretations of Lewis’ book.
Generally, elements of the book that seemed thematically Christian were interpreted
broadly as moral lessons without any acknowledgement of or reference to the Christian
content. Jamila’s approach to teaching Till We Have Faces primarily as a nonsectarian
morality tale permitted her to approach any potentially sectarian religious content within
a broader narrative, one which might be shared by “believers,” that is, theists in general.
Perhaps her framing accords with an Islamic concept, “People of the Book,” which
recognizes Islam’s kinship with other monothesistic religions with holy texts.
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In one lesson, Jamila handed students a paper with an image of a sculpture of
Psyche and Cupid. On the other side of the handout was a summary of the myth of Cupid
and Psyche. Jamila directed her students to examine the statues’ faces.
Jamila: It’s not always about how we look. If someone is gifted with beauty, but they are
ugly inside, you will see the ugly. Our faces reflect who we are. You know how when
you see someone, maybe another student and you tell your friend or your Mom, ‘oh she is
so beautiful,’ but your mom says ‘no she is just ok.’ Why do you think she is beautiful?
Because of how you feel about her. What about Orual? What does she want, in chapter 1?
Zayn: To meet with the gods.
Jamila: Yes, exactly. She wished the gods would answer her questions. She wanted a
court, a judge higher than the gods themselves, because she thought she would win if she
could present her case to them. Why? Because she felt her life was unfair. [A student said
this was because her mother died when she was young and her father was hard, and
because she was considered ugly.] Last time, we agreed that we cannot blame the God for
the things that happen. So now tell me this: Why can’t we see our God? [The students
hesitated. She raised the pitch of her voice.] We are analyzing the story. Try to
understand it and enjoy it. That doesn’t mean we are feeling the same way as Orual or we
are C.S. Lewis.
Serbest: What makes us so special that we should see God?
Jamila: Ok, that is one way to look at it.
Serbest: He is everywhere, but He can’t show himself to everyone. He shows himself to
special people only, like saints and prophets.
Jamila: Why can’t I see the gods and have an argument with them? Why can’t I discuss
my case with them? That is what this story is about. Do we blame or appreciate...?
Hawar: You know what I believe? Each of us has a part of the soul from God, right? My
theory is that when you talk to some good person, you see God in that person.
Gulistan: Or if you have a friend who lives far from you, you can talk to them through
praying, through thinking of them.
Layla: It is impossible to see God when someone is running away from Him.
Jamila, approvingly: Exactly. If I feel his presence, his being, I won’t care if I can see
him or not. I already know him and see he is there. For Orual, she didn’t have faith. She
has a lack of principles and such confusion in her life. That’s why she wants to see the
gods. For me, I know he’s there listening to me.
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Hawar: Miss, it’s always about faith and trust!
Jamila: You won’t need to face him...
Hawar: You can see him in any good thing, in your father, in your mother...
Jamila: She [Orual] was confused, questioning the being of God. Now we know what the
story is based on: faith versus reason. How is this related to the title?
Rida: Face and faith are the same thing. If you have a faith, you have a face to meet God.
Jamila: If we have a face, we are toward the light. But if we don’t have a face, we will
run to the shadow. We can’t see God until we have faith in him. We’re not able to believe
in him until we have faith, a face…Augustine said that ‘Running away from God is like
running away from the sun. As you run from the light, you run into your own shadow.’
What does this mean?
Layla: It’s like when Adam and Eve sinned and they hid, they were living in their own
shadow.
Jamila, hesitating: But that was because they had shame because they sinned, not because
they didn’t have faith.
Georges: You regret the sins at the end of your life, when you die.
Hawar: You don’t see God in your mistakes until they become a disaster. Because after
your whole lifetime you see the disaster.
Jamila: What is the simile here? ‘God is like the sun.’ Why does it take a whole lifetime?
Serbest: You create the shadow and go to the dark side by not following God in the light.
Then you must pray.
Jamila nodded.
Thomas: At the beginning of your life, you are an innocent child, like a blank slate. But
gradually you go away from the light and you realize your mistakes.
Belend: When your life ends you go back to the light.
Jamila: All these answers are wonderful. You all get a bonus point. God is the light.
When you go off his path and run away to your own shadow, away from his rules, it takes
a long time to know your mistakes. That’s why the old people are the wisest. Have you
ever noticed how the old people say, 'Please listen to me. Do not do this or that and these
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consequences will happen. Avoid these bad things.' How do they know? Because they
have lived their whole lives and know.
Hawar: There are some people as well who never pray all their life until they are old.
Jamila: Yes. Sometimes we are in the light, and sometimes we are in the shadow, as
Thomas said.

Throughout the semester, Jamila presented the novel as a morality tale whose
protagonist modeled both desirable and undesirable behaviors. Once she ascertained that
her students had understood the plot, Jamila tended to focus episodically on characters’
moral behavior, rather than to consider the larger character arcs, particularly of the
protagonist. The novel’s protagonist radically alters her interpretation of events; parts one
and two of the book present nearly opposite interpretations of the protagonist’s life and
her relationship to the gods. Rather than analyzing how the relationship between humans
and the divine changes throughout the novel, Jamila portrayed this relationship as static.
For example, when discussing the concept of fate, one of the key themes of the novel,
Jamila led students in a discussion about the ethics of trying to know and alter one’s fate
or destiny:

Jamila: Do you want to know what is going to happen?
Students: Yes!
Jamila: How will you know? Do you use horoscope, Zodiac?
Hawar: Yes, I read a lot of them.
Yakub: Someone I know went to see a prophet...
Jamila: Not a prophet, a seer...
Yakub: ....a seer, and he told him what he ate, if the electricity would go out…
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Jamila: You do not need a seer to know the electricity will go out in Iraq! [class laughs]
Layla: No, no, it’s like this guy who went and learned who he is going to be friends with,
what will happen in his life, like this!
Jamila: No, I mean lucky numbers, reading horoscopes, like this...
Zayn: There was one that said in 10 years I will be a millionaire...or go to prison [class
laughs]
Jamila: You will graduate university and go straight to prison! [more laughter]
Serbest: Some people look at the coffee...
Hawar: My uncle is obsessed with that!
Jamila: [Pause] Why do you think God didn’t make us know our fate?
Serbest: Miss, it’s a surprise! [laughter]
Jamila: What will happen if you know? There has to be a reason....
Zayn: You will try to change it.
Jamila: Yes, if I know I am going to be in a car accident, I will never go in a car again. Or
a plane accident, I will never travel anywhere.
Yakub: You will give up living.
Jamila: So that’s why we cannot know.

About one year after this lesson, a KCS student died tragically in a car accident. When I
heard the news, this conversation immediately came to my mind.

--During the semester I spent in KCS, I joined Grade 10 for at least one of their
lessons almost every day. I usually sat in an extra desk in the back of the classroom, often
close to students Ashur and Rasim. Ashur and Rasim made an odd pair. They preferred to
sit in the back of the room where they could whisper comments to each other throughout
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their lessons. Ashur was a gangly kid who listened to his teachers with rapt attention,
leaning forward in his desk and seemingly hanging on every word, though he did not
speak aloud as often as his peers. His friend, Rasim, was even quieter; he did not like his
classmates referring to him as “the next Einstein” or “nerdy.” Rasim tended to recline in
his desk chair and sometimes put his head on his desktop; whenever a teacher called him
out, he would demonstrate that, much to the teacher’s surprise or consternation, he had
been following the lesson all along.
Both boys were children of university-educated parents from Assyrian Christian
families. Their families had lived in the Christian township of Ainkawa for multiple
generations, and the boys shared intellectual and religious interests. During class and in
conversation with their peers, Ashur and Rasim appeared reluctant to express their
opinions. I was puzzled by their reluctance and silence, particularly when their courses
included overtly Christian content. During the weeks Grade 10 studied the novel Till We
Have Faces, I watched the boys closely. I expected that, as self-identifying Christian
students, Ashur and Rasim would at least contribute to the discussion, especially when
opportunities arose to “correct” their peers’ and teacher’s understanding of the book.
Both boys usually remained silent.
This was because Jamila, their teacher who identified as Muslim, did not solicit
the boys’ opinions as “Christians” studying a “Christian” novel. Rather, Jamila framed
the novel broadly as a morality tale. On one hand, Jamila’s broad ethical framing of the
novel facilitated class discussions about morality: Fictional characters served as proxies
through which students and their teacher could discuss morality, rather than directly
discussing students’ actions, which were the subject of much gossip. For example, one
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fictional character forcing another character to do something led to a broader discussion
about obeying parents and individual choices. Although Jamila conceded that there were
some appropriate contexts for students to make individual choices, she ultimately led the
class to conclude that obeying one’s parents and having respect for social norms is the
general rule. After all, teaching general morality and ethics, not just “the Christian ethic,”
was one of the stated goals of the school, as one of the school’s co-founders said to me in
an interview in 2012.
On the other hand, discussing moral lessons from the novel also may have
facilitated school authorities exercise of power over the students. Throughout the
semester, I observed Jamila seeking information about students’ personal lives, such as
romantic relationships. Students said it was obvious that Jamila had favorites, and they
speculated about which students shared gossip with their teacher. Sometimes, I was told,
Jamila intervened in students’ “private” affairs, such as by sharing the information she
gleaned with other authorities in the school or with students’ parents. Later in this
chapter, I discuss Jamila’s “game” called “confession chair,” in which she prompted
students to answer questions about (im)moral behavior (e.g., “Have you ever kissed
anyone?”) in a “truth or dare” format.
Toward the end of the semester, I interviewed Rasim and Ashur individually.
When I mentioned Till We Have Faces, Rasim said, “It’s phenomenal. This book is
maybe the one that most has impacted me, maybe because I’m a Christian. Most of the
students don’t understand it. They don’t understand that Orual was a sinner and she
repented and was put right with God.” I asked Rasim why he did not share his
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interpretation of the book with his classmates; did students typically not discuss
“controversial things” like religion among themselves?
He replied, “If someone talks about religion in our school, there is gonna be a
fight, ninety percent.” (Recalling my group interview with grade 9 students that resulted
in a scuffle between students, which is described in Chapter 3, I had to agree with
Rasim’s assessment.) Rasim continued, “Some of my friends do, but if people, like in
grade 11, talked about it, for sure there would be hatred and eventually lead to a brawl
between them.” When I asked Rasim if anyone in authority ever told him or other
students not to discuss certain subjects, he replied no, that students had learned to avoid
these topics from experience.
When I asked Rasim’s friend Ashur about controversial topics in the school,
Ashur replied in a similar manner, saying, “I don’t talk much about religion with other
students. I don’t want to get in trouble. If you are a Christian, especially.” Considering
that the private school acknowledges its foundation in “Christian classical education,”
and that Ashur self-identifies as “Christian,” I found his answer surprising. When I
pressed him to say more, Ashur explained that he “discussed religion with Rasim mostly,
but if I talk with anyone else, I am afraid I’m hurting them. Because I would make them
feel bad about things. So, I avoid it.” I had assumed, incorrectly, that students identifying
as Christian might feel comfortable discussing Christianity in the school. I asked Ashur
why he thought the school administrators included Christian content, such as Till We
Have Faces, in the school’s curriculum:
Ashur: I don’t think we should have read this book here. It is mostly about Christian
faith, although Ms. Jamila was giving us other moral tips. I didn’t want to share what I
was thinking when I was in class. The discussion...well, she skipped some big important
stuff. She wasn’t talking about the hidden themes that C.S. Lewis wrote about.
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Diana: What would have you said?
Ashur: What I was thinking...the things in chapter 7. It was so emotional for me to talk
about it. It presented something, like, bits of hope that nobody thought of. Like, you
heard about Halabja and the chemicals [genocide]?
Diana: Of course.
Ashur: Many people sacrificed themselves to save their children.
Diana: The theme of sacrifice is what you are talking about?
Ashur: Yeah.
Diana: What do you mean about the hidden themes that Lewis was writing about?
Ashur: They showed more about how Orual’s thinking was, like, wrong. Although she is
talking a lot, Orual is most likely wrong. She is trying to prove she is right. But what if
you are doing the wrong thing in every step you are [taking]? She didn’t walk with what
the gods gave her. She just thought she is right. Many of us do that and think we are
doing the right thing and we’re not.
Both Rasim and Ashur emphasized that the novel’s protagonist, Orual, is a
“sinner” and is “wrong.” Ashur explained that readers should see themselves in Orual and
realize they also are sinful. In class discussions, however, I did not hear this language
applied to the protagonist. Instead, their teacher, Ms. Jamila, seemed to interpret Orual as
an admirable character, praising her as an example of a strong female leader, rather than
as a foolish, misguided sinner as Ashur and Rasim understood the protagonist. Jamila
instead presented the characters’ actions as generalized moral lessons. For example, she
critiqued one character for his talking about “praying to the gods” despite the character’s
avowed atheism. “Many disbelievers are still using these words,” Jamila told the class.
“They don’t believe, even today, but they still say ‘inshallah’ and ‘Allah kareem.’ They
don’t mean it but still say it.” Jamila often asked students to imagine themselves in
ethical dilemmas like those of the novel’s characters, prompting the class to interpret
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characters’ choices as “right” or “wrong.” While unbelief and hypocrisy were
condemned, the teacher praised the protagonist for her individualism and perseverance.
I have discussed grade 10 students’ lessons about Till We Have Faces at length
because these lessons exemplify how contests of values play out in a space that is said to
be “pluralistic,” but which continues to be shaped by “sectarian” cultures. Religious
beliefs and political opinions are negotiated in spaces portrayed as inclusive and secular,
spaces such as a classroom containing a plurality of ethnoreligious identities. Although
discussions may be intended to include and welcome all viewpoints, the way a teacher
frames and guides the discussion can reinforce majoritarian views. In the examples
above, the value of individual autonomous choice is superseded by the higher values of
filial piety and respect for social and religious norms. Striving to ascertain or to alter
one’s “fate” or “destiny” is interpreted as a sacrilegious challenge to God’s
sovereignty. In these and other lessons I observed in KCS, individual agency is
celebrated so long as it does not threaten dominant social and religious norms.
Conversely, students in classes taught by displaced Christian teachers were encouraged to
exercise their individual agency to change the course of their lives and the future. My
intention here is not to generalize about theological differences between Christians and
Muslims, but rather to point out how students might be pulled in different directions as a
result of competing values in the school. In this way, a fictional, Christian-themed story
about an individual’s radical conversion is reframed as a non-sectarian morality tale in
which characters’ identities are static and Islamic majoritarian views are reinforced.
Andrew Bush, another anthropologist of Iraqi Kurdistan, has examined similar
negotiations of religious differences within a Kurdish household comprised of a non-
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observant Muslim and his pious Muslim wife and daughters. Bush observes that the
family members accommodate one another’s religious differences by creating a general
“Islamic atmosphere” that does not make demands on the unbeliever. Bush describes a
popular form of morality tale which praises the “virtue of not asking” about another
person’s religion. Because the protagonists and audience of these morality tales are
Muslim, Bush infers that the “virtue of not asking” is regarded as an “Islamic virtue.” He
notes that not asking about another person’s religious identity is a “tendency widely
available to Muslims and non-Muslims to affirm religious plurality in Ottoman societies.”
Thus, practicing this (Islamic) “virtue of not asking” contributes to maintaining the
“natural superiority” of Islam (2017:523). At societal and state levels in Egypt, Saba
Mahmood (2015) also has explored negotiations of religious differences. She argues that
secular practices of legal separation of public and private and of politics and religion can
intensify and threaten religious identity rather than protect it. Mahmood suggests that
secular state practices, not only in Egypt but in general, inadvertently “consecrate
majoritarian religious values and norms within the laws of modern politics” to the
detriment of religious minorities (197).
Grade 10 students Ashur and Rasim recognized their classroom was not as liberal
and inclusive a space as it might appear to others. They recognized majoritarian views
being reinforced in lessons and felt they could not offer alternative views which might be
interpreted as a challenge to authority and a threat to the public order of the school and
society. The “virtue of not asking” may have dissuaded Ashur or other students from
saying anything that might suggest their peers or teachers were wrong, which could make
people “feel bad,” as Ashur said. Although the school self-identified as “Christian,”
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religious and political dialogues in the school often reflected (and suited) the
ethnoreligious majority comprised of Muslim Kurdish administrators, teachers, and
students. Not only Christian students, but also Arab, Bahai, Mandean, and Turkoman
students told me that they generally kept their religious and political views to themselves
while at school.

Unmasking the self
Although KCS’ founders may have intended the school to be more overtly
“Christian,” by the time of my fieldwork, the school seemed to offer a vaguely theistic
approach to cultivating ethical life, one that emphasized autonomy, good character, and
moral agency. KCS students have cultivated a generally liberal, romantic notion of the
self as independent and enlightened. This “self” appeared in many lessons I observed,
and often the self was the desired object/subject and site of intervention of classroom
lessons. For example, sixth grade KCS students wrote and performed a theatrical sketch
for their end of the school term ceremony before an audience of family members and
school administrators. In the sketch, a boy walked around the stage announcing, “every
kind of mask for sale.” He waved paper masks inscribed with words like “success,”
“smart,” “confident,” and “classy.” Four students approached him and purchased masks.
The fifth student to approach him criticized the buyers. “You don’t need these masks,”
she told her fellow students. Another girl protested, “But you can’t just go around with
your face uncovered.” Another student said, “Yeah, I got my mask from my parents.”
The girl playing the role of conscientious objector continued, “Don't get me wrong,” she
said. “I've worn a lot of masks in my life, but I got tired of my closet full of identities. A
while back I threw them all out.” The students were silent and looked at one another. One
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by one, they dropped their masks and walked off stage. A student stepped forward to
narrate, saying, “As it is shown, the only character who was brave enough was the
unmasked one. She had the right reasons…We don’t have to fake who we are.”
The autonomous, “true” self, which appears throughout Jamila’s presentation of
Till We Have Faces, and in the above “masks” sketch, is one site where ethical positions
clash. The romanticized liberal “fiction” (Rose 1996) of the radically autonomous self is
at odds with inherited identity categories. The sketch nods to inherited identity categories
when one student commented that he had “got [his] mask from [his] parents.” In
Kurdistan, like much of the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region, the dominant
form of kinship is patrilineal, a type of unilineal descent by which a person’s ancestry is
traced through the father’s line; a person at birth inherits the religious and ethnic identity
of his or her father. Patrilineal reckoning also is preserved in personal status codes (PSC)
which govern family life, stipulating who can marry, divorce, inherit, and pass on
citizenship to children (Efrati 2005; King 2010, 2015; Mahmood 2012; Makdishi 2014).
The Iraqi state, and the Kurdistan Regional Government within it, uses this system of
patrilineal reckoning to assign religious and ethnic identity categories to citizen-subjects.
Citizens are expected, by the state and the community alike, to adhere to inherited
identity categories for life. The Iraqi state recognizes a limited number of identity
categories, all of which are ethnosectarian, such as Muslim Kurd, Chaldean Catholic, and
several others. There is no official recognition of atheism or of religious categories other
than those authorized.
The trope of unmasking the true self also appeared in the truth or dare games
students frequently played in the classroom and outside the school. I spent most of my
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time with the tenth-grade class, who often played truth or dare, as well as a game called
“confession chair.” Their literature teacher, Jamila, introduced grade 10 to this game, in
which a student was selected to sit in the chair and answer four questions truthfully. Most
questions concerned crushes or hypothetical romantic relationships. Sometimes students
were asked to name favorites, to confess lies they had told, or to share personal regrets.
Jamila presided over the confession chair, although she also played the role of coconspirator, gossiping about students and teachers. When I asked students in private how
they felt about the confession chair and truth or dare, some dismissed the games as pure
fun, a distraction from a stressful schedule of studying and examinations. Other students
told me that they suspect their teacher used the game to inform the administration, going
so far as to separate students alleged to be romantically involved.
Nevertheless, students also played truth or dare games at private social events. On
one occasion I went on a picnic with the ninth-grade class, an event unsanctioned by the
school. I was the only adult present, though students often regarded me as something
between an authority figure (an adult but not a teacher) and a student (technically I was a
student, was young, and, according to my Kurdistani friends, appeared even younger).
When the students decided to play truth or dare, they invited me to join. The questions
they asked one another were about romantic relationships, real and hypothetical. The
mood was rowdy, and the questions were more provocative than usual.
When my turn came, I asked an Assyrian Christian girl named “Arbella,” truth or
dare? She chose truth. “Imagine you really loved someone,” I said to Arbella, “but that
person was outside your religion. Would you still marry?” The students fell silent. A
couple boys complained that it was not a good question. Arbella smiled gravely and

253

thought for a moment. Then she replied, “No, no I wouldn’t.” Some of the students
gasped. A girl asked, “Really? Even if you really love him, you wouldn’t get married?”
Arbella shook her head no. Later I apologized to Arbella, because I thought my question
in front of her peers had made her uncomfortable. She smiled broadly and said, “No, I
really liked your question. No one has ever asked me this before.” I suspect this is
because many women would not have much agency in a scenario like the hypothetical
one I described.
The students’ truth or dare questions about hypothetical, private relationships
were only “fun” as long as they are ignored the ethnosectarian categories and other
criteria that would make such relationships impossible for many people. “Dating,”
generally understood to be private a relationship, is still largely a fantasy for young
people in Kurdistan. When I posed a truth question about marriage and religion – and by
extension ethnicity because religious and ethnic categories are linked – my question drew
attention to the students’ limited agency regarding their own futures, as marriage is a
public, collective process in which a young person may have little agency. My question
seemed to frustrate the students, resulting in uncomfortable silence, some voiced
complaints, and some students’ avoidance of me thereafter. I broke the rules of the game
and shattered the illusion of their supposedly liberated selves.
Marrying outside one’s religion or conversion are conceivable events, but
unlikely. In one case, they were even the punch line of a prank. A Christian student
named “James,” with the help of his friends convinced his teacher, Sara, that he had
become an atheist, only to disclose that it was a prank after the teacher started crying and
asked to contact his parents. When I asked James to tell me about the prank, he expressed
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surprise that his teacher actually believed it. For the students, such a scenario was almost
too ridiculous to believe; for their teacher, the alleged deconversion was too potentially
disastrous to dismiss. Nevertheless, several students also told me in private that they had
become agnostics or atheists, but that they could not openly identify as such.
On the one hand “unmasking,” confessional games allowed students to
experiment with social prohibitions. They also demonstrated the expressive creativity, the
critical thinking, and the “open-mindedness” that KCS celebrated. In this way, the games
represent the sense of expectancy for change in politics in the Kurdistan Region – they
are participatory, democratic, transparent, and courageous. On the other hand, the games
are also a means by which school administrators and teachers surveil students. In this
way the games echo fears about governmental deception, corruption and social chaos.
The school administration, under scrutiny from the Ministry of Education, parents, and
the community, exerts pressure on the students to remain in their inherited identity
categories, disciplining them through restrictions about romantic relationships and
forbidding talk about beliefs using a discourse of “morality and religious neutrality.” At
the same time, the liberal education after which the school is modeled contributes to an
understanding of an autonomous self, able to make a break from inherited identity
categories – maybe not bureaucratically by changing one’s government-issued identity
card or by marrying outside one’s ethnosectarian group – but nonetheless a self which is
able to carve out an interior life motivated by a personal creed of “to thine ownself be
true.”
I have discussed the conceptualization of the “self” present in many lessons at
Kurdistan Civilizational School because the “self” is imagined in those lessons impacts
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how people possible “futures.” The liberal education model of KCS produced students
poised to challenge the current political system that restricts personal liberties. Youth
coming of age in KCS speak and act as emerging independent, enlightened selves, largely
due to the school’s liberal education that encourages students to form their own ideas
through analytical discovery and what might be described as a “theistic,” verging on
“secular” ethos. Shifting notions about self, society, and state in the Kurdistan Region
converged on Kurdistan Civilizational School. KCS, through a combination of its
“classical Christian” educational philosophy, its diverse teaching staff and student body,
and government curricular requirements, became a venue for contesting values in a
pluralistic society. But the kind of citizen-subjects KCS produced and the kind desired by
the Kurdistani and/or Iraqi state were at cross-purposes. The Kurdistani government
required that KCS, despite being a private Christian school, teach Kurdish nationalist and
Islamic content to produce a particular citizen subject. KCS uses some Kurdistani
Regional Government (KRG) curriculum, such as in their Mavi Mirov (Human Rights)
and Komalayatȋ (Social Studies) courses, which included Kurdish ethnonationalist and
pro-Islam content.
Throughout my time in KCS, students criticized majoritarian views, such as
Kurdish ethnonationalist or pro-Islam content in their courses. Rather than attributing
flaws solely to failures of government, students attributed failures more often to society.
“Society” was seen as more responsible for reproducing “backward” restrictions
regarding gender, politics, and religion. Teachers also pushed back against
ethnonationalism, political Islam, and the state of cynicism and resignation that resulted
in emigration. In the following chapter, Sara, a displaced Christian teacher at KCS,
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appeals to shared humanity and brotherly love. Students received these appeals
unevenly, especially those resistant to the idea of a rehabilitated Iraqi state. Some
students were quick to point out flaws in the Kurdistan Regional Government, as well, or
more broadly in society, while other students denied these flaws. In Chapter 3, “They
Don’t Love Iraq”, we observed a student arguing with his Civics teacher, Mariam, and
refusing to accept Mariam’s political and social criticism because “no one has hurt
[him]”. Further contributing to students’ doubts are the experiences of minority students
like Muna, who also appears in Chapter 3. (She is the girl displaced from Baghdad and
chosen by school administrators to perform the Kurdish national anthem in front of the
school, who knew that Muna did not understand Kurdish.)
The Kurdistani government faces a similar predicament to the cross-pressures
upon Kurdistan Civilizational School: As the Kurdistan Region reaches toward statehood,
it desires to demonstrate on the global stage that it can tolerate difference in a liberal,
pluralistic society. The future Kurdistani state is discursively envisioned to be a
multicultural, tolerant enclave in the Middle East, contrasted with the nearby Islamic state
that is forcing people to convert. I believe this is why KCS students’ games and pranks –
and the perhaps school itself - are permitted to be pluralistic, but nonetheless surveilled:
The radically autonomous “self,” that might result in romantic couplings across sectarian
lines, or the pranks about religious conversion are performative and provisional. These
modes of role play and confession are low-stakes games, a way for students to
experiment with subjects or practices ordinarily forbidden, such as student sexuality,
beliefs, and politics. The games allow students to experience an alternative or fantasy
self, a person untethered from kinship units, confessional groups, and the state. They
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point toward a possible future where such performances could become everyday realities.
If then, and until then, KCS students are stuck in a country with a long history of conflict
and uncertainties, and they are subject to kinship units, confessional groups, and a state
which work to keep people within their inherited ethnosectarian identity categories.
Considering the uncertainties and pressures youth face, it is not surprising that
many concluded “there is no future” for them or for their country. In a group interview
with Grade 10 students, I asked about their future plans, which led to a discussion of their
country’s problems:

Diana: Do you plan to stay here, in this country?
Ishtar: I would say me, as a [Assyrian] Christian, I will be kicked out as soon as possible
from this country.
Diana: Really?
Ishtar: I don't believe that there will be any Christians by 2020 in this country.
Serbest: It's impossible for the Christians left here.
Layla: I don't want to start anything here. I just want to finish high school and leave.
Serbest: [Christians] will stay.
Ishtar: I'm not talking about [Christians] will leave on their own. They will get kicked
out.
Ashur: I believe the opposite of what they are saying. It's like [you all] are predicting the
bad stuff, not predicting the positive side. Why would anyone leave this to go somewhere
they are not even successful and don’t even know? For many people, they don't know it is
better for them to live in a society where they trust people than to go and try and adapt [to
life abroad]. Not many people know English as we talk now. They will have a lot of
trouble communicating. Two of my friends in France, they have trouble communicating.
Ishtar was predicting that we are going to have more miseries than now. But if the world
is with us, against the bad people…?
Ishtar: For me, I am wanting to leave this country before I [turn] 18.
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Meena: I am going to stay.
Ishtar: Why? If anything happens [Meena] has a Dutch passport, and she is gonna leave.
She will die [if she stays] here.
Meena: It's where I'm from. Why would I leave it? My heart is here.
Ishtar: I love my house. I love this place, but there is no safety. And I don’t believe that
there will be anyone like me, just like my grandparents were forced to leave their cities
and towns by ISIS, just like they thought they would stay forever there, and they left, so I
am leaving too. They are forced to come here [to Erbil] without a house, going between
my aunt and our other aunt's house. And I don't know where we are going to go. Where is
the furthest place, the safest place from here?

Many KCS students, especially ethnoreligious minority students such as Ishtar,
had lost hope that the cycles of war and sectarian violence in Iraq would end. Their
reflections on experiences in school mirrored their doubts about the country. The school’s
founders and administrators envisioned the school to be an inclusive, pluralistic space
that would be a first step in rectifying some of Iraq “sectarian” practices like segregating
students according to their ethnoreligious identities. KCS would teach and model shared
ethical values, which all people could and should strive to realize. Students’ experiences
in the school, however, led them to doubt. There was persistent gossip that teachers were
treating students unequally. Sometimes students told me their teachers were doing one
thing in their private lives but telling students to do another; it was hard to accept
morality lessons from someone behaving hypocritically.
It also was difficult for students to believe that teachers’ or administrators’
avowed desire to include all perspectives was genuine or even possible, considering the
majoritarian Islamic and Kurdish ethnonationalist aspects of KCS. If students could not
express alternative views or share experiences that challenged others’ beliefs, then what
was the point of discussion? If open discussion was not possible in the value pluralistic
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space of KCS, then outside of KCS, they were unlikely to find or to create spaces and
dialogues where shared values could be realized through debate. In their criticisms,
students linked the failures of pluralism in the school to the failures of society and state.
If value pluralism was not tenable in an ethnically and religiously diverse school based on
liberal education, then perhaps not all values are tenable in society or state. Was it
because the school had internalized the problems of society and state, or was it because
the classroom experiments with liberal pluralism failed?

Deena’s disappointment
When I recall all the disappointed, weary young adults questioning whether they
“had a future” in Iraq, I often think of Deena: A Chaldean Christian, in her mid-thirties
yet unmarried, university-educated, and thoughtful, but bored at her desk job. In the
evenings, she exercised at the gym where I taught indoor cycling, which is how we met.
Little by little, Deena told me about disappointments she had suffered and about
unfulfilled family expectations. Her dark brown, almost black eyes suited her melancholy
nature; when she smiled, however, her expression could be warm and reassuring. Other
women at the gym looked up to Deena. She was a success story, having lost a
considerable amount of weight after changing her diet and working with a personal
trainer. When women approached her for advice, she gave instructions and
encouragement in her quiet, serious manner. On social media she shared photographs
posing beside or hugging her young nieces and nephews, commenting that they “made
her life better.”
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Deena was one of three siblings born in Ainkawa, the Christian township of Erbil.
All three siblings have remained there well into their adult years. Deena described her
family as valuing education, but never pressuring Deena or her brother and sister to
succeed in school or toward any particular field of study. Her sister dropped out in her
last year of secondary school. “Why?” I asked. Deena explained,
She decided not to complete it, and she was very, very smart. You know, at that
time we had, I don’t remember which war, it was the 1996 one [the civil conflict
between Kurdish political parties KDP and PUK]. You know, they delayed the
exams two or three times. And one time they did the exam, and later you should
do it again. So, she was very sad, and she said I will not study anymore. She said
in this country everything is bad. She never thinks positive about it. And our
parents never pressured her or forced her to study, which is bad. You know, she
was thinking everything is bad in this country, and we will do nothing in this
country.
Deena and her sister both worked clerical jobs; their brother worked as an
engineer. I asked Deena to tell me more about her experiences in grade school:
You know, in my school, you know I was not that happy in the school. I had
friends, and I was happy with them. But the way of teaching, the teachers were
very tough, using bad punishments, and they were always comparing between the
students, and like stupid, in a stupid way. Instead of making us love each other,
they were teaching us how to hate each other, how to get jealous of each other.
Until university, I didn’t see any teacher respecting his students, or taking a good
way with us. Except one teacher...She was very good. She was very nice. She was
treating us like her kids.
Deena’s description of her education does not romanticize her childhood or the quality of
her education, unlike some members of her generation (e.g., Sara or Naila who appear in
Chapter 3). She frames her relationships with her generational peers, particularly in
educational settings, as a series of failures stemming from narrow religious views,
political ideology, and social expectations. For example, Deena expressed annoyance at
the pro-Baath party content of her primary and secondary school textbooks:
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Ok, at that time, Saddam was there, so we didn’t have much freedom. And also,
the books were all praising Saddam and history...When the teacher was coming
[into the classroom], we would stand up and say something about Saddam. Then
she would say good morning. Always the first ten minutes, they were saying how
Saddam was good, and what he did for the country, and his party. But history - we
had a different kind of history. We had [lessons] about Islam, about the different
ages, the khalifa, about the Baath party, about everything.
Deena’s pro-Baath and Islam lessons excluded Chaldean Christian history or culture,
subsuming her heritage within a national Iraqi identity. Whereas I heard some Chaldean
or Assyrian Iraqi Christians speaking nostalgically about a unified, Iraqi national identity,
this identity was not commensurate with Deena’s thoroughly Christian heritage and
experiences living in the Christian majority township of Ainkawa. She did not speak
wistfully about a lost, unified Iraqi past. Her primary and secondary school population
consisted of about 90% Christians and 10% Muslims, including a few Muslim teachers,
as one might reasonably expect in Ainkawa:
Diana: I guess because your school was in Ainkawa they had a class on
Christianity?
Deena: Yes, and also for the Muslims. But I learned about their [Islamic] history,
nothing else. And they were talking about the good sides, and the battles, and how
brave they were. This kind of thing. You will not learn anything if you just follow
their books. If you need to know, you should search [for] yourself.
Diana: Is that what you did?
Deena: Yes.
Diana: Where did you find information? What did you find?
Deena: You know I found - I am friends with people who are not believing on
Facebook and social media - so I am learning a lot of things from them.
Diana: Not believing which religion?
Deena: You know, I’m not sure if I believe or not. I haven’t decided yet. You
know, I was born like a Christian, and they did the baptism and everything when I
was three months or less than three months. So, we were used to - we were
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Christians - Jesus, Mary, God, this kind of thing. What do you call it? Al-Ruh alQuds?
Diana: Holy Spirit.
Deena: Yes, and we were believing in that a long, long time. It’s not easy to leave.
But when I see all the bad things, I am losing my belief. Even here [gestures,
indicating the office building where she is employed] they are asking me, “What
[religion] are you?” I am saying, “I am a human being like you.” They know I am
a Christian from [her Christian surname]. And they say, “Oh, you are a
Christian.” And they start. I don’t like these kinds of things. I don’t like to be
treated like this. Religion is something personal between you and God. Why
should you interfere in my life? Why should you come and tell me to convert?
But if someone is telling [Muslims] to convert, they will get crazy, like, you are
doing something very bad to them, and they will maybe kill you.
Diana: What kind of things do they say?
Deena: You know, my first day in university, a girl came to me and said, “Why
don’t you convert to Islam? Otherwise, you will not be able to go to heaven.” And
I said, “Why?” And she said, “Because Islam is the last religion. Because God
gives you the mind to think and to know you should convert. Because Muhammed
was the last prophet.” And I said, “Come with me, and let’s go to the jail and see
how many Christians are there and how many Muslims are there.” And she said,
“That is right, because Muslims are the majority. If you go to Europe you will see
Christians doing crimes.” I said, “But you are talking about our country, religion
in our country. Who is killing and taking our rights? I think they are Muslims,
baby, not Christians. Then why should I come to join your religion?” Another guy
came to me and said, “You know you are saying ‘Jesus is God,’ and this is a big
sin.” So I told him, “If I say Jesus is God or the pen is god [holding up a pen on
her office desk], I am affecting you? I’m forcing you to follow me? I’m saying
bad things to you? But you are now, like, disturbing me when you are inviting me
to your religion.” Then one of my friends came to me and said, “Let’s leave this
subject, and come, let’s go and have fun.” After that, many [Muslim] people are
like, “Ok Deena, you are going to church, so please pray for me.” They ask God
to guide you. To guide you to their religion. They mean that, but they don’t say it.
Now I say thank you. That’s it. I don’t go into deep conversation with them,
because I know they will not understand. Diana, not only Muslims are like that.
Also Christians, they think Muslims will hurt them. I have many good Muslim
friends. But my Christian friends sometimes ask me, “How can you be friends
with Muslims? How can you go out with Muslims?”
Diana: What do you say?
Deena: I say they are human beings like me.
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Later in the interview we returned to the subject of Christian-Muslim relations.
Deena: You know, when I went to university, I was even kind of worried to talk
with Muslims or to mix with them. Because they were always saying Muslims are
like something bad, don’t mix with them. But when I mixed with them they were
not bad, they were human beings like us. You know, because Ankawa was a
closed society, Diana, we didn’t mix that much with Muslims. We had one or two
Muslim neighbors, but they were talking Chaldean [language] like us, and they
were very mixed with us, and we didn’t feel anything bad about them. We had
some girls in Ankawa, they left their families and married with Muslim guys. So
this thing was like, these are bad women, and the woman who is selling her[self]
is better than these women. So that is why they were always saying, “Don’t be
close to Muslims, because they will cheat on you, steal from you, kill you, do
something bad to you.”
Diana: What does your family say exactly?
Deena: The family just, you know, say, “Don’t talk to them (Muslims),” and
that’s it.
Diana: Nothing bad happens if you are friends with Muslims?
Deena: Nothing bad. But you know, if a Muslim girl converts to Christianity, bad
things will happen to her. Maybe she will be killed. But not a Christian who goes
to (converts to) Islam.
Diana: Really? She will be killed?
Deena: They have to, Diana, because we don’t have civil marriage here. If she
married a Muslim guy, on her ID she will be Muslim. But she has the right to stay
with her religion, with herself and with her God. But I think even in Christianity
we don’t have civil marriage, so she is not able to stay in her religion and marry a
Muslim guy, because she is not marrying him in church. Even if she stays, the
society will look [at her] as a bad girl.
Diana: I haven’t heard that women who marry a man from a different religion
have to change their religion on their ID...
Deena: Also a man. But now you know, now in Kurdistan I think many people are
converting and nothing bad is happening to them, but they are still very worried. I
have many friends, they converted to Christianity, but they don’t tell [others]
about this. They are very worried. I have one friend who is a Kurd, and some
Arabs who want to, and many Farsi, Persian people.
Diana: Can you tell me about how your friends converted?
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Deena: One of my friends was studying about Islam, and he didn’t like the way he said it is all about revenge and killing, so I need to have some love in my life,
not like this. And the other one said she was fasting. It was Ramadan, and one day
she was reading Quran. After that, she wanted to know what does [the classical
Arabic text] mean, because she was Persian [and did not know Arabic]. And when
she knew what it means, she said ok I am stupid. How am I a slave to this kind of
God? They don’t respect me as a woman. So she said ok, the devil is coming to
me (tempting her); I should keep him very far [waves hand]. So she said after
that, again, I tried to pray, I couldn’t. Then again, I was thinking this is the devil; I
should keep him away. She said I was watching the Jesus movie, and I thought,
after, you know in the end it is written, “If you believe me, follow me.” She said
when I closed my eyes, I just wanted to follow him. I started to follow him. But
some people are using this kind of converting for getting residency abroad, in
other countries, and some of them are using it for their personal issues. So I don’t
know if they are honest or not.
Diana: Do you know many people who say they are atheist or agnostic?
Deena: Yes.
Diana: Would you say that is common here?
Deena: No. Also they don’t say [they are atheist or agnostic]. They are worried. If
they don’t believe - even you see, they are going to mosque, they are going to
church, because they are worried if people know about [their beliefs] they [will]
not [be] respected any more. I have a friend who is a doctor, a respected guy,
good guy, helping everybody, but he doesn’t believe now. But you will see him
every Friday in the mosque praying with people. Because he is worried, he cannot
say.
Diana: So you think people can change their religion here?
Deena: Of course, but it depends on the religion. It depends. You know people
don’t feel that secure, or they don’t feel they will be safe if they change it.
Otherwise, many people will do. But it is happening. Many people are changing
their religion.
Diana: How do you know that?
Deena: I know because I have friends in the [religious group that meets privately
and through social media]. Ok from there I know many people are converting
their religion.
As Deena described examples of people “changing their religion,” her tone
remained skeptical, such as when she pointed out that some conversions may be an effort
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to secure refugee status abroad. Conversions were doubtful and difficult; they did not
necessarily signal any positive changes in a person, much less in society. In Deena’s
narrative, conversions and deconversions flowed from a critique of the insularity of
Christian-majority Ainkawa and her primary and secondary education there. Likewise,
she observed how Muslims, among other ethnoreligious groups, also were isolated,
poorly educated about minorities, and thus ignorant about many of their fellow citizens.
Misinformation was rampant. Failures in religious pluralism continued at the university
level, when interfaith dialogues between students broke down over efforts to convert
rather than to “understand,” as Deena concludes.
And Deena was committed to understanding others. Over the years, but
particularly at university, Kurdish people frequently asked Deena why she did not learn
Kurdish, and why she seemed to “prefer” Arabic and Arabs. “Why do you Christians
never learn Kurdish?” a fellow student asked her. When a Kurdish teacher at university
offered to help Deena, she began assimilating more with Kurdish society:
We had a Kurdish teacher, he was telling me that I was very bad in Kurdish. He
promised me that if I start talking Kurdish, he will help me a lot. I started making
friends with Kurds. So, I was very happy. They were good, good people. Not like
they were saying before about them, that they are bad, that they are hurting me.
[Kurdish people] helped me a lot, really. So, I started [speaking Kurdish]. For two
years I didn’t dare to talk with people. I was just talking among friends. After that
I could. It was like English. I will make mistakes, and they will make fun of me.
Diana: But that’s the only way to learn, to make mistakes, a lot.
Deena: Of course.
Diana: What do you think about Kurdish society here?
Deena: I think I will let the [individual] person to live and decide. I think there are
many good and bad things. They are sociable, they are friendly, especially to
foreigners. They are simple. In the same way, at the same time, I think they have
two personalities. The other one is they are hating, especially Arabs. They also
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hate, sometimes, foreigners. [Lowering her voice] This is something stupid about
Kurdish society: Most of the people hate Arabs.
Diana: I’ve heard that a lot.
Deena: And they are crazy about Islam.
Diana: What do you mean?
Deena: I mean they are Muslims, very Muslim [clenches fist]. How? This religion
came from Arabs! If you hate Arabs, and you are talking badly about Arabs, why
are you following this religion? If you ask them, they will say, “No, it didn’t come
only for Arabs, but for all the world, to save them from sin, to show them heaven
is good.”
To demonstrate her point about foreigners, Deena told me how a former Kurdish
employer mistreated an Ethiopian woman employed to clean the office and serve tea or
coffee to guests. Deena said the woman was harassed and deprived of a place to sleep and
adequate food. Like other foreign domestic workers Deena saw when visiting friends’
houses, the Ethiopian woman was made to clean multiple locations, rather than the one
location stipulated in her contract (if there was a contract). When Deena protested such
mistreatments, people responded by asking, “Why? She is a low-level person.” Such
comments disheartened Deena greatly; she said she cried often during that period of
employment. She eventually left this job, disgusted and disappointed.
Throughout our conversations, Deena leveled criticisms both at Muslims and
Christians. Repeatedly, she pointed to a deep current of hate and misunderstanding:
You know from deep inside, both societies hate each other. Christian society hates
Muslim, and Muslim hates Christian. But the people who are afraid in Christian
society and the people are trying to be nice in Muslim....They don't respect the
religion of the other. The Christians are not showing that they are afraid, and the
Muslims are not showing that they are nice, gentle.
The narrative that emerged from my conversations with Deena linked educational
shortcomings, failed interfaith dialogues, and deep-seated fear and mistrust with a failing
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state. With many anecdotes about disappointing experiences, she explained her loss of
faith in her religion, her society, and her country. Additionally, doctors had diagnosed
Deena with an autoimmune disorder.
You know, I was always eating, eating, eating, oily food with sugar, with a lot of
chocolates with a lot of sweets. I was saying, “Ok who cares? I will die.” I lost
hope. “Ok I will die. Who cares? Let me enjoy life.” This is very wrong. Very
wrong.
During this low period in Deena’s life, a coworker introduced her to a nutritionist
located in “Doctors Street,” the Erbil commercial district specializing in medical services
and products. The nutritionist offered Deena a free health assessment, noting her age,
pulse rate, blood pressure, diet, measurements, and body composition. “They had good
advertising,” Deena noted, smiling wryly. After the health assessment, Deena began
eliminating oily and sugary foods from her diet. She also joined one of the newly opened
gyms in Erbil, the one where I coached indoor cycling. This gym appealed to her because
it employed “knowledgeable” personal trainers, and the facilities were clean and modern,
with a mixed-gender exercise hall; Deena, nevertheless, preferred to exercise in the
women-only section of the gym.
Now I’m eating healthy and exercising. I made a very big change. I lost about 21
kilos. So everybody can do it. You just need to make a decision and start. You
know, I was always saying I will start tomorrow, after a month, after I don't know
how much, but I didn't.

Deena became a health enthusiast, encouraging several of her friends to join the gym and
begin a fitness and diet program. As she moved out of one ethical position in which she
felt ambivalent about family and religious obligations, she entered another, in the
company of her diverse friends at university and at work. As Deena spent more time
away from the domestic sphere, where she had little choice about her diet and daily
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routine and could not talk about her personal beliefs, she found another sphere in which
she could order her ethical life. Her daily routine at the gym and the relationships she
formed there formed an important part of her social, and ethical, life. Her new ethical
positioning made a difference to some extent, though it has more likely “reshuffled” her
ethical life, rather than “transformed” it (Gibson 2019:578).

Ashti’s great expectations
Ashti was one of my Kurdish language tutors and key interlocutors. She was in
her early 40s when I met her in 2016. Ashti grew up in a small town near Kirkuk. Her
father and mother worked together to run a small, successful business. When Ashti’s
father died, his brother pressured Ashti’s mother to marry him so he could inherit the
business. Ashti’s mother refused the marriage proposal to her late husband’s brother.
(She later married a different man.) When Ashti’s mother refused her brother-in-law’s
marriage proposal, Ashti’s paternal uncle took her to live with his family. Ashti said that
he was a harsh man, and he forbade her to continue with her formal education. She
completed only four years of school, from age 7 to 11.
But Ashti was smart and motivated, and she had a kind relative who brought her
books from Baghdad every time he visited. She taught herself Arabic, Kurdish, and
English through a combination of dictionaries, books in various genres, and exposure to
language through television. She especially enjoyed reading philosophy. By the time she
was a teenager, she realized she did not believe Islam. Around age 20 she married and
gave birth to a daughter. For a time, the family lived in Europe. There Ashti became a
Christian and felt what she described to me as a sense that the Holy Spirit was calling her
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to return to Kurdistan. She separated from her husband and returned with her teenage
daughter to the Kurdistan Region. Although Ashti was a convert to Christianity, she
maintained her identity as a Muslim around her family and coworkers, such as by
celebrating Islamic holidays and wearing hijab. She told me that she did this both for her
safety as well as out of respect for the “Kurdish cultural” practice (as opposed to a
“religious” practice) of loosely covering the hair with a scarf.
Back in Kurdistan, Ashti worked for many years as a teacher in a government
school, and she developed a successful side business tutoring students and teaching
Kurdish and Arabic to foreign NGO employees. Her reputation as a skilled teacher
spread, and she was hired to tutor some members of a rich and powerful family. This
family gave Ashti the opportunity to start a private school with their financial backing.
Ashti politely declined because she did not want to become implicated in what she
perceived to be a corrupt system of patronage. She remarked to me that she thought she
did the right thing, but she wondered what her life would have been like if she had
accepted the offer. Sometimes she thought about returning to Europe, she said, because
things had become so bad in Kurdistan. She was depressed to see the continuing decline
of the education system. She felt the youth had no hope.
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Figure 15: A history lesson for a girls’ class in a Kurdish language (government)
secondary school, February 2017. Photo by the author.
During the economic crisis, when people were not receiving their salaries, some
government teachers refused to teach their lessons. Ashti, however, continued teaching at
a government high school for girls in a poor community, where she had worked for
several years. She could have obtained a lucrative position at a private school, but Ashti
said she felt loyal to the government school and her students. I often accompanied her as
she drove to and from her school in “Betala.” It was in a rural area, located along a dusty
highway crowded with oil tankers lumbering to and from Turkey. The town began some
30 years before as a camp for Kurds displaced during the regime of Saddam Hussein.
Eventually the camp residents built permanent structures. By the time of my field work,
the town had expanded to include Arabic speaking IDPs and a school for their children. A
sprawling, gated camp for Syrian Kurdish refugees bordered the town, but reportedly
there was little mixing between the town residents and the camp residents. The area was a
far cry from the nearby, densely populated Erbil, with its modern shopping malls,
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restaurants, and businesses. Betala was, as a Kurdish university professor described it to
me, one of many “empty places” created by a history of displacement and poverty.
In the rainy season, dust turned to mud, and dark clouds hung low over the flat
earth. Sometimes we sat in gloomy silence as Ashti drove us to and from school. Other
times, we conversed. As my language tutor, Ashti often maintained a formal manner with
me, but sometimes, after a dispiriting morning at the school, she would drop her formal
demeanor and ask me, “Diana, what should I do?” It surprised me to see these shifts in
Ashti’s demeanor. In the classroom she was a vigorous, demanding, inspiring teacher. I
watched as she taught the 11 grade girls’ class English literature. Their textbook, which
th

appeared to have been adapted from a British school text, offered summaries of “Great
Books” written in simple English. They had been reading a summary of Great
Expectations. Ashti encouraged the girls to learn from Pip’s example, that they did not
need a rich benefactor or high status to improve themselves. The parallels between the
fictional story and Ashti’s life were remarkable, but she rarely, if ever, disclosed any
personal information to her students. Instead, she exhorted them to do their best in
school, because if they could read, especially if they could read Arabic or English, so
much more of the world would be open to them.
While teaching about Great Expectations, Ashti often looked in the direction of
Sahȋn, one of her best students. Sahȋn excelled at English, unlike most of the girls in the
class. She was the only girl who ventured to ask me simple sentences in English; the
others said they knew only greetings, despite their five years of English classes. None of
their teachers, except Ashti, were conversant in English. Ashti asked Sahȋn to explain to
her classmates how she had improved her English skills; Sahȋn meekly said that she
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studied a lot and watched English language movies, paying careful attention to the
pronunciation. In private, Ashti told me that she was especially concerned to bolster
Sahȋn’s confidence. Sahȋn’s mother was a cleaner for the school, which was a very lowstatus job and a source of embarrassment for Sahȋn. Sometimes Sahȋn stayed behind after
the school shift ended to help her mother clean. Together, they swept the dusty
classrooms and wiped down the old UN-donated desks with their chipped, bright blue
paint, covered in students’ pencil-carved graffiti. Like most girls in her community, Sahȋn
finished her morning shift at school and returned home for a second shift helping her
mother with household chores.
One afternoon, after the morning school shift ended, I walked past Daiki Sahȋn
(mother of Sahȋn) tending a vegetable garden beside the school. Daiki Sahȋn stood up to
greet me, wiping her dirty hands on her loose dress. It was early May, but the noon sun
was already intolerable. She invited me to walk with her to her home, which was very
near the school. Like other homes in this community, the sturdy house was built of cinder
blocks on a dirt lot. We passed through the front gate into the small courtyard where we
greeted her mother, Sahȋn’s grandmother, reclining on a cot in the shade of a tree. Daiki
Sahȋn led me into the jurȋ mȋwan (guestroom) and instructed me to sit on the dǒshak
(cushion) nearest the freestanding AC unit blasting cold air.
Through the open door leading to the kitchen, I saw Sahȋn and her elder sister
mopping the tile floor. They put their mops down to come greet me in the guest room.
Her elder, married sister rested one hand on her pregnant belly as she sat on the dǒshak,
and Sahȋn managed a quiet smile. Sahȋn’s sister eagerly asked a series of questions,
which Sahȋn answered for me. I smiled, realizing that Sahȋn had been listening carefully
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to everything I had said in the prior weeks. I invited them to sit with me, but Sahȋn said
they should return to their chores.
Their brother Ardelan, about ten years old, came into the guest room and flopped
onto one of the cushions to watch the flat screen tv. With sprawled limbs and listless
expression, he watched an American movie, The Edge of Tomorrow, a violent dystopian
film with the tagline “Live. Die. Repeat.” From the cushion, Ardelan used a remote to
decrease the volume and instead read the Arabic subtitles. Daiki Sahȋn entered the room
with a plate of salted cucumbers and scolded the boy for turning the volume too low. He
complained that he did not understand the English. Daiki Sahȋn replied, “But our guest
understands English, right?” As I sat in the guest room, Sahȋn mopped the same section
of floor more than once as she glanced through the open door toward the television,
listening to the film. Sahȋn’s sister beckoned for her help as she crouched over the
chicken kebab roasting on a low grill. Sahȋn’s days were filled with housework, but she
found time to study for her exams - and to watch English movies when she could.
Ashti was acquainted with the kind of life Sahȋn led outside of school; Ashti’s
own childhood was even more restricted. I could see that Ashti became discouraged with
her apathetic female students who had more resources than Ashti ever had, such as their
formal secondary education and access to the internet. When, during a break in between
classes, I asked a cluster of girls about their dreams, some expressed a serious interest in
journalism or teaching. Others joked about becoming movie stars and the like. Sahȋn
listened to her classmates. She exhibited interest in English and in religion class (Islam),
but she was otherwise quiet, obedient with her chores, and diligent with her exam
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preparation. Most of the girls told me they expected to marry soon after graduating high
school, and that there was nothing else for them in their future. Why study?
On our return trip, I shared this information with Ashti. She seemed deflated. Yes,
she agreed that most of the girls would marry soon after graduation. Many would fail
their exams. She complained that the weak government curriculum and religion had made
people stupid and docile. Ashti could not understand why she had been “called” to return
to Kurdistan, where she saw so little opportunity for transformation. She was waiting for
her daughter, Kani, to graduate from university before they emigrated, but perhaps they
should leave now? she asked me. Would they be accepted in the United States or
Canada? What if Donald Trump was elected president? Many times, we discussed how
she and her daughter might emigrate. Inevitably these conversations would end with
Ashti saying she could not shake the feeling that she was supposed to stay. So she
stayed.
Ashti diligently taught her government school lessons without a salary for
months. Although she stayed busy teaching private lessons in the evenings and on
weekends, she never declined to help me with language tutoring, translation, or to meet at
my home or a cafe to talk. With her savings, she had bought a two-story, recently
constructed house halfway between Erbil and the school in Betala. It was a pleasant,
peaceful neighborhood. They tried to live a healthy life, Ashti said. They exercised and
ate fresh food, hoping to alleviate Ashti’s recurring stomach ulcers. In the evenings, they
watched Arabic or Turkish language series or movies. Kani was a polyglot like her
mother. She was a third-year dental student in the best dental program in Erbil. Two
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years remained in her dental training, so she and Ashti resigned themselves to at least two
more years in Erbil. When I left the field in July 2017, Ashti and Kani were still waiting.

Brave New Kurdistan
Each year the Erbil International Book Fair is held in the event hall at Sami
Abdulrahman Park. One afternoon, not having any interviews to do or places to go, I
dropped by the fair. Dozens of booksellers set up booths, and hundreds of people were
milling about. The view inside the hall was strikingly different from the view outside: In
any given street or shop in Erbil, it was uncommon to see very conservative Islamic
fashions such as those associated with Salafi Islamists. Every now and then, I passed by a
woman in all-black niqab (veiled except for her eyes) rather than in colorful Kurdish
clothes, hair peeking out from a loosely-wrapped headscarf. Typically, women wearing
niqab were accompanied by a man with a long beard and wearing ankle-length robes,
rather than the traditional loose shirt and baggy sharwal pants Kurdish men usually wear.
More Westernized styles like blue jeans and t shirts also are popular, especially with
youth. Inside the book fair, the street scene was reversed; while the majority of
pedestrians wore traditional Kurdish clothing or Western-style clothes, the majority of the
book fair attendees wore conservative Islamic dress. Booth after booth was stacked with
publications about Islam: Beautiful editions of the Qur’an, books on Islamic
jurisprudence (fȋqh), writings by popular teachers, guides to living a proper Islamic
lifestyle, and children’s morality tales. Almost all were in Arabic.
To my surprise, it was difficult for me to locate booksellers offering anything
about Kurdish history or culture. Specifically, I was looking for books by Kurdish
novelist and intellectual Bakhtiyar Ali, whose quotes appear at the beginning of each
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chapter of this dissertation. A few sellers offered books in English, mostly for learning
English. Amused, I stopped to photograph a display featuring a book in Kurdish about
revolutionary leader Mullah Mustafa Barzanȋ placed beside a book about newly elected
American President Donald Trump. A journalist and some curious male attendees asked
to photograph me or take a selfie with me beside said books. I politely declined.
I paused at a booth with books advocating the views of controversial Turkish
Islamic scholar Fethullah Gülen. As I crouched to see the titles at the base of the shelf,
from behind me a timid, polite voice asked in English, “Miss, do you want to know more
about Islam?” Two boys around 8 or 9 years old stood behind me, grinning. They had
attended the local Gülen school for boys and were pleased to see a foreigner interested in
their school subjects. After a friendly chat and exchange of emails, I gathered my
purchases (I finally had found the lone bookseller with Ali’s works), eager to remove
myself from the stuffy, crowded hall and return to the version of Hewlêr I felt I knew
better.
Over the next few days, I casually described my book fair experience to various
Kurdistani acquaintances to observe their reactions. Many seemed to know what I was
going to say before I said it, sighing or waving their hands dismissively as soon as I
mentioned Arabic or Islamic books. Private school students complained that the fair
offered so few books in English. But the complaint most adults held in common was that
the fair evidenced a worrying, growing interest in more conservative forms of Islam.
Deena, who appears earlier in this chapter, was one of those worried adults. I saw
her almost every evening in the women’s section of the gym where I taught indoor
cycling. As I told her about the book fair, she stopped her hand weight exercises and
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dropped the weights on a nearby bench. “You know it scares me, all those strict, very
hard Islamic books, the thinking, what it is doing to the people,” Denna said, making a
clenched fist and shaking her head. “You should pray for us, Diana, really. You will get
to leave this place, but we have to live here. Sometimes I think we should all just leave.”
I replied, “I hope you can make a life here, because if you all leave, what will
happen to this place? To this country?” She looked at me with a resigned expression and
repeated, “You know, you get to leave this place, but we have to live here.” After a pause
she added, “At least there is somebody [meaning me, the anthropologist] who knows
what our life is…” she trailed off and went back to her hand weights. I left the gym that
evening with a heavy, guilty weight in the pit of my stomach.
A couple days later I met up with Ashti, my Kurdish teacher and key interlocutor,
at a cafe inside a Western-style shopping mall. As I described the book fair to her, I
mentioned that most of the books were written in Arabic or about Islam. She smiled
knowingly. Many times, Ashti had shared with me how she feared the growing influence
of conservative Islam in Kurdistan. I also mentioned that the fair had very few books in
English for sale. She asked which ones, and for some reason, George Orwell’s 1984 was
the first one that came to my mind. Ashti was familiar with 1984, which did not surprise
me considering how widely she read and how she was concerned with governance and
freedoms. She asked could I recommend any other books like 1984.
“Well, there’s Brave New World,” I replied. “It is about a future state in which
people only care about being happy, about their comfort. They don’t read books or talk
about ideas.”
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“Like Kurdistan!” she exclaimed, smiling with recognition at the similarity
between the novel and her life. Her smile slowly faded. For a moment, she watched the
traffic passing outside the café, then turned to me and said, “But the future is already
here.”
Field notes excerpt
Field note, 3 Feb 2016
Suddenly Naza said to me, “Do you remember when I asked you if this country
has a future, and you told me you wanted to hear what I thought first. You didn’t tell me
what you really think.”
I admit I hesitated. Then I said, “This country doesn’t have a future as long as it is
influenced, or controlled, by more powerful countries.” I used the metaphor of a pawn on
a chessboard and said that throughout history the people of this region have been used by
their more powerful neighbors. Naza seemed to be agreeing with me. Her friend, Rewan,
was frowning and shook her head.
“I don’t think so,” Rewan said. “I think this country has a future.”
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Chapter 6: “Bits of hope”
“My dear Ghazalnus, I am neither a philosopher nor a poet. I am a hunter of
masterpieces. I know what kind of city I can build, but I need your powers on my side
from the outset. The realm I am dreaming of cannot be built without the poets, the ghazal
writers and the great singers of this city. What do you want? Tell me which mansion you
covet in this city - which field, which farm, which woman, which impossible thing, tell me.
Together, you and I shall build a city drawn by your imagination and my power.”
“I can’t,” Ghazalnus said. “Forgive me brother, I feel that you want us to create
something that would conceal the filth and beauty of this city. If you want my imagination
to come to your aid, don’t try to stop us from seeing all that is ugly. The imagination is a
beautiful journey, but it should not make humans forget about disaster.” - Bakhtiyar Ali,
I Stared at the Night of the City

Philosopher kings
In the above excerpt from Bakhtiyar Ali’s magical realist novel, Ghazalnus in the
Gardens of Imagination, a Kurdish politician called the “Baron of the Imagination”
pleads with the protagonist, Ghazalnus. The Baron desires to harness Ghazalnus’
imaginative abilities to build a more powerful and beautiful city. Ghazalnus refuses to
help the politician because such a dream city would mask the “ugly,” cruel reality of life
in contemporary Kurdistan; there is beauty and truth too precious to entrust to politicians
(called “barons” in the novel). The barons have created terrible things, such as a “book of
death” that the Baron of the Imagination has hidden in the luxury district “Nwemiran”
(“new royalty”). Nwemiran fittingly is the home of the political elite who have become
wealthy through graft, and, as I mentioned in the dissertation’s introduction, it is likely
that the fictional neighborhood is modeled after an actual luxury residential development
in Erbil called “Dream City.”
Throughout the novel, Ghazalnus’ followers investigate the barons’ corruption,
documenting in a book what they have learned about evil, as well as about the power of
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the imagination. In the novel’s conclusion, one of the characters reveals that this book is
the one the reader holds. Breaking the “fourth wall,” he addresses the reader directly,
And you, too, who have entered the garden, it does not matter how you came by
this book, but please do us one small favor: don’t let it fall into the hands of the
barons…Please don’t let it fall into their hands. The peace of us all depends on it
(542).
I see in Ghazalnus’ refusal and the novel’s conclusion a condemnation of the Platonic
“philosopher-king.” In Book 5 of The Republic, Socrates suggests that the utopian city
requires a ruler who is both philosopher and king: “Until philosophers rule as kings in
their cities…so that political power and philosophy become thoroughly blended
together…cities will have no rest from evils…nor, I think, will the human race” (Reeve
2004:166). The Baron of the Imagination, who is, by his own admission, “neither a
philosopher or poet,” seeks to unite his brute political power with Ghazalnus’ wisdom
and creative powers, together ruling as philosopher-king. But to do this, Ghazalnus
argues, would create a city that hides ugliness, and more importantly, suppresses dissent.
It is this aspect of the philosopher-king, a tendency toward totalitarianism and
authoritarianism, that political and social philosopher Karl Popper condemned in his
critique of “historicism.” (To be clear: I am not situating my dissertation in political or
philosophical literatures or debates; throughout I make brief references as I have found a
handful of theorists outside anthropology useful to think with about my ethnography.)
Popper argued that, if the main function of the social sciences (or in the novel’s case, the
imagination) is to comprehend the social and political “laws” guiding human
development, then this view of knowledge and politics eventually leads to centralized
government control of individuals and large-scale social engineering with potentially
disastrous results:
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Social revolutions are not brought about by rational plans, but by social forces, for
instance, by conflicts of interests. The old idea of a powerful philosopher-king
who would put into practice some carefully thought-out plans was a fairy-tale
invented in the interest of a land-owning aristocracy. The democratic equivalent
of this fairy-tale is the superstition that enough people of good will may be
persuaded by rational argument to take planned action…The real outcome will
always be very different from the rational construction. It will always be the
resultant of the momentary constellation of contesting forces…All social
engineering, no matter how much it prides itself on its realism and on its scientific
character, is doomed to remain a Utopian dream” (2002:42)
Popper’s observations also recall Jacques Derrida’s critique of the “engineer”
versus the “bricoleur,” as I discussed in Chapter 1. The bricoleur combines and creates
with whatever is at hand, which is why the French bricoleur sometimes is translated
“handyman.” Levi-Strauss contrasts the bricoleur with the engineer, who has the training
and resources to construct a new cultural whole rather than to repurpose materials and
tools. The engineer, however, is a “myth,” as all discourse is bricolage (Derrida 1978).
People “make do” in their everyday lives as they “make innumerable and infinitesimal
transformations of and within the dominant cultural economy in order to adapt it to their
own interests and their own rules” (De Certeau 1984). Throughout this dissertation,
conflicts of values often appear as struggles between would-be “philosopher-kings” or
“engineers,” such as politicians or administrators, and the “bricoleurs” who comprise the
majority of Kurdistani society.
In this last chapter, I tentatively draw together magical realism, some (brief)
political philosophy, and my interlocutors’ narratives for the ways in which they can help
us understand a society grappling with sectarianism and value pluralism. By “sectarian” I
do not refer to the mere fact of diversity, or of the politicization of identities, but rather
how diversity and identity politics have created the conditions in which the people who
appear throughout this ethnography experience contests of values. How the Ottoman
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empire and contemporary Middle Eastern states have regulated and “tolerated” religious
difference continues to shape how people understand identity in contemporary Kurdistan.
Recall that the Ottoman Empire permitted religious communities some self-governance
through the millet system (Baer et al. 2009; Makdisi 2017). As anthropologist Andrew
Shryock (2009) observes in his conversation with historians Marc Baer and Ussama
Makdisi, scholars often have treated “Ottoman tolerance as a virtue” and have
disregarded how the Ottoman state was “a violent, hegemonic imperial formation in its
own right” (936). Makdisi (2017) notes that the significance of the Ottoman millet
system was not about “tolerance” or “intolerance,” but that different communities lived
side by side through imperial and state formations (53).
When the Ottoman Empire collapsed, the states that emerged were built largely
on the same system of regulating difference via the patrilineal conferral of ethnoreligious
identity (King 2018). The Iraqi state employs the logic of patriliny to assign
ethnoreligious identities to its citizens and governs them accordingly. The education
sector, for example, is organized according to ethnoreligious identity, assigning students
to schools based on their perceived identity and first language. Cultivating a “shared
ethic” across segregated communities with segregated schools proves difficult, as we saw
in the case of Kurdistan Civilizational School. In my interview with Yakub Boutros, a cofounder of KCS, Boutros argued that creating a shared ethic, and what I would call a
“pluralistic” space, is necessary to counteract practices of “separation” based on ethnicity
and religion that reproduce “sectarian” political cultures.
I must acknowledge, again, that the concept of “sectarianism” is problematic:
Scholars of Iraq and the Middle East have tended to focus on the politicization of
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collective identity categories, sometimes inadvertently reproducing the illusion of clearly
bounded religious and ethnic identities. As Ussama Makdisi observes, “the idea of
sectarianism, and the sectarian, has come to haunt the modern imaginary of the Arab
world in much the same way that the idea of racism has haunted the modern imaginary of
the USA” (2017:25). Makdisi and other contributors to the edited volume
Sectarianization (Hashemi and Postel 2017) locate the emergence of sectarianism in the
form which we recognize it today in the nineteenth century Ottoman empire. Scholars
like Suad Joseph (2008) and Ussama Makdisi (2008) have demonstrated
how sectarianism is a historically specific form of social differentiation, practiced for
political purposes within state level organizations. When I speak of “sectarian political
cultures,” I am not referring to a thin and reductive concept of “sectarianism” as
something ancient and intractable plaguing contemporary Iraq, although power struggles
between sects are as old as empires. In the past couple centuries, the Ottoman Empire,
British Mandate governance, the Iraqi state, and foreign interventions have
instrumentalized sectarian difference in enduring ways.
In this dissertation, interlocutors have described the ways in which
“sectarianism,” as an enduring form of social differentiation instrumentalized by the
modern state, negatively impacts their lives, such as by limiting whom they can befriend
or marry, or the spaces in which they can participate or feel welcome. Sectarian
categories are inherently unstable. People experience pressures to stabilize these
categories and commit to them as a dominant, or hegemonic, form of identity. My
interlocutors described pressures from family members, from neighbors, or other
authority figures to identify only with their inherited ethnoreligious identity categories
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(i.e., not to convert) and not to associate with people belonging to other groups. Of
course, many people I knew came from families which were critical of such “sectarian”
practices, but their association with some people and participation in some spaces was
constrained, nonetheless.

Generating hope
In the past couple decades, political and developmental discourses that portray the
Kurdistan Region as a progressive haven characterized by “tolerance” and
“multilculturalism” have proliferated. One the one hand, “tolerance” discourse, or
“radical affirmation” of religious difference is nothing new for the region, as it seems to
be an enduring feature of post-Ottoman societies (Bush 2020). Undoubtedly, the war with
the Islamic State and the ongoing political conflict with the federal Iraqi government in
Baghdad intensified tolerance discourse that portrays the Kurdistan Region as a
counterpublic, a positive other to Iraq or to the Islamic State. However, the experiences
of many people I knew, especially members of ethnoreligious minorities, demonstrated
the limits of “tolerance.” In many cases, what people at the margins of Kurdistani society
experienced might be considered a thin form of tolerance – providing refuge but
withholding rights.
In Kurdistan, just as in Iraq, people are citizens because first and foremost they
belong to a group that is a state-recognized ethnoreligious identity category, whose
membership they inherit through patrilineal kinship. For this reason, Kurdistani
“citizenship” (were there an independent Kurdistani state) would not be offered to the
many refugees and internally displaced people residing in the Kurdistan Region,

285

thousands of whom probably will remain there the rest of their lives. The Kurdistan
Regional Government is not likely to recognize these long-term residents as citizens, or
to extend them to benefits afforded citizens, but will continue to consider them as
displaced citizens of the Syrian or Iraqi states. While the Kurdistan Region has absorbed
hundreds of thousands of people and supported them at great expense, this conception of
citizenship has helped the KRG to deflect some of the financial burden by referring
displaced Iraqis to the federal government in Baghdad to which they are still citizensubjects. I witnessed such deflection firsthand when I attended regular “Education
Cluster” meetings. In these meetings, members of the Kurdistani government, the Erbil
Governorate, and numerous local and international organizations frequently debated
jurisdiction and responsibility for various populations of refugee or displaced
schoolchildren. Generally, people who fled areas outside the Kurdistan Region’s borders,
such as Christians, Muslims, Arabs, and Yezidis, and who now lived in the Kurdistan
Region, were considered to fall under the Iraqi federal government’s jurisdiction. When
relief organizations who worked in education approached Kurdistani government for
permissions or funds, often they were referred to the central government in Baghdad, or
vice versa. It seemed some relief organizations were engaged in a constant back and forth
between the two governments. Being “tolerant” of multiculturalism can be very
expensive.
About tolerance, and more generally about the limits of freedoms in Kurdistan,
my interlocutors frequently criticized the Iraqi and Kurdistani governments, their society,
their communities, even their own family and friends. As my interlocutors have
demonstrated throughout this dissertation, there is no consensus on the nature and extent
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of “tolerance,” either as it is experienced or as it “should be” in contemporary Kurdistani
society. Why, then, do conceptualizations of tolerance feature so often in political and
modernization discourse, and in interlocutors’ assessments of the state? Tolerance, and
the quality of life it protects, is central to how effectively a society or state can generate
“hope” for the “future.” Ghassan Hage (2003) suggests that we conceptualize societies as
“mechanisms for the distribution of hope.” “The kind of affective attachment (worrying
or caring) that a society creates among its citizens is intimately connected to its capacity
to distribute hope,” but capitalist and neoliberal regimes “have contributed to the
‘shrinking’ of this capacity” (Hage 2003:3, cited in Miyazaki 2004).
In his book, The Method of Hope, Hirokazu Miyazaki examines how hope is
produced through various kinds of knowledge and is “predicated on the inheritance of a
past hope and its performative replication in the present” (2004:139). For much of the
twentieth century, Iraqi leaders effectively drew upon the territory’s history of many,
great civilizations, from the emergence of the state in ancient Mesopotamia, to the
Assyrian and Babylonian empires, to the modern Iraqi state. Generations of Iraqi children
learned in school that their country inherited the achievements and pride of these
civilizations. They were told that their ethnic and religious identities are part of this
collective heritage, and that the diverse communities residing in the country comprised a
unified, national Iraqi identity.
Minority interlocutors who came of age before the 2003 invasion sometimes
spoke nostalgically about the vision of Iraq they were presented with in school, or the
Iraq that they experienced in childhood. In Chapter 3, Sara and Naila lament the loss of
Iraqi identity, good citizenship, and neighborliness. Others, like Deena in Chapter 5,
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remain critical of the Baathist ideology they encountered in childhood. Iraqi nationalist
ideology also effectively focused citizens not on ethnic or religious difference but on
developing Iraq’s natural resources to the benefit of all. “There is only one future in the
nationalist developmental imagination,” Sara Pursley notes, and that is toward becoming
a “developed country” (2019:217-218).
When Iraq’s unified “nationalist developmental” future was dismantled by the
2003 invasion, the “future” became multiple and uncertain. Throughout the dissertation, I
have used the heuristic “ethical positions” to describe ethical regimes that frame human
experience within their narrative grasp. Ethical positions operate according to different
temporalities – different pasts, presents, and futures. In thinking about how people were
cross-pressured, pulled in different directions toward different frames, I have found it
useful to make a two-by-two matrix to illustrate. My intention is not to reduce
complexities or render people as if they only live according to one “position”, but to offer
points of reference or the boundaries of ethical positions. In Chapter 1, I described how
interlocutors position themselves vis-à-vis various collectivities, ideas, and the state.
Below, I have made a simple diagram to represent a spectrum of possible ethical
positions based on what I heard interlocutors say and what I observed them do. I use this
diagram as a way of thinking about how people negotiate various ethical positions, and
not as a set of rigid categories in which to “type” people. Along this matrix, one measure
is “immanence” versus “transcendence,” and the other is “action” versus “inaction”.
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Table 1. Ethical positioning
Immanent action

Transcendent action

present with agnostic future

future-oriented present

Immanent inaction

Transcendent inaction

present without future

fate-oriented present

“Immanence” refers to a view of the human condition in the natural world,
unaided by anything supernatural. “Transcendence” refers to a view of the human
condition in a world both natural and supernatural. “Action” refers to the degree to which
any ethical position directs a person to “do so something” in the present. Conversely,
“inaction” refers to how an ethical position is said to minimize or to absolve the human
necessity of “doing something” in the present. Along these axes about immanence and
transcendence, and action and inaction, are different conceptualizations of the “future,” or
of “no future.”
“Immanent action” is present in Karza’s pedagogy in Chapters 2 and 3. In his
social studies lessons, he presents students with an ethical life premised somewhat on
existentialism, exemplified by the myth of Sisyphus: The act of applying oneself in the
endless present, action which is itself a source of meaning that is also agnostic about any
future. Karza presents his philosophy as a noble, ethical response to the difficulties of life
in Iraq, and he encourages his students to find meaning in the act of not giving up. It is
also present in the relief work I observed among some Kurdistani young people. In April
2017, I joined the first meeting of a new relief organization created by Kurdistani youth.
“We are a secret group,” Rizgar, the lead organizer, explained at the organization’s first

289

meeting. “No one needs to know who we are. We don’t want to be in the news. We don’t
need the government. We don’t need to be an NGO. A group of people who are
committed can do a lot. That’s our purpose.” Rizgar addressed the small group gathered
around an outdoor café table,
If people can just see what is happening - there are 1.8 million refugees and IDPs
here, and there is a lot of shit - excuse my language - but there is a lot of shit. It is
not pretty. It is difficult to see, the kind of poverty, the suffering. And some of it
really fucked me up. It did. But then when you see you can actually help people,
that you can make a difference, then you don’t feel hopeless.
Rizgar told the group about how he met the family of a girl with a hole in her heart. He
asked the mother if he could take a photo with the girl to post, because he wanted people
to “see her, to see that this isn’t something out there, this problem is here, and we have to
do something. The government, the NGOs, they won't do it,” he said. “We can’t just wait
around for them to…If people could just see this, touch it, feel it, they would believe it.
They would understand that they can do something,” he said. “Am I crazy? Do you
believe?” he asked us, looking from one to another.
With “immanent action,” belief is generated through empirical evidence, “seeing,
feeling, and touching” as Rizgar said, or, as in the metaphor that Karza used, turning on
the light to see the worm in the apple. It is an ethical positioning that can inspire action
while remaining agnostic about any “future,” because meaning and hope are generated in
the present, where they sustain daily life, essentially pushing the rock back up the
mountain in the eternal present. This ethical positioning can be very effective in difficult
conditions, like war or a “failing” state, because, unlike nationalism and modernization
narratives, it is not dependent on any “future” in any teleological sense.
Proponents of immanent action reject what I refer to as “immanent inaction,”
characterized, perhaps unfairly, as “giving up” and “doing nothing.” In Ethnographies of
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Waiting: Doubt, Hope, and Uncertainty, Andreas Bandak and Manpreet K. Janeja write
about how “waiting” is an “unstable object.” They argue that, “Waiting is not to be found
merely in the absence of action but in an uncertain terrain where what is hoped for may
or may not occur. Periods of waiting release diverse affects ranging from hope,
enthusiasm, and urgency to apathy, paralysis and lethargy” (2020:16). Immanent inaction
may manifest as epicurean “eat, drink, and be merry,” but I think it is more likely a sense
of helplessness or hopelessness resulting from harsh conditions and with conscious
reference to an uncertain or absent future that has been displaced by disaster.
If “immanent inaction” is an ethical position, it is subject to the same criticisms of
the anthropologies of “virtue ethics” and “the good,” which I discussed in Chapter 2. If
people are focused on survival and have limited agency, a model of ethical life that is
premised on conscious, moral deliberation and action does not leave people living in
“immanent inaction” any “ethics” to speak of. Rather, as critics of virtue ethics point out,
there are moral opportunities in the mundane, “ordinary ethics” of daily life. Very few of
my interlocutors might be said to inhabit the “immanent inaction” ethical position,
largely because I spent time around people who not merely surviving and had resources
at their disposal to “do something.”
“Transcendent action” in this dissertation is most obvious in the “missional”
behavior of the founders of the Kurdistan Civilizational School. Motivated by religious
faith, the present is inflected with the supernatural as people work toward a “known”
future. Transcendent action also is present among interlocutors like Deena, who found a
way to survive through their participation in some sphere, such as the gym, and who
sometimes encouraged other people to take up the same set of practices for their benefit.
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Additionally, nationalism and modernization discourses also resemble transcendent
action. These discourses conceptualize the present as the site of continuous intervention,
so that a desirable future will one day be realized, whether that is a “developed” or
“modern” country, or an independent state.
Finally, “transcendent inaction” conceptualizes the present as the site of moral
obligations, such as adhering to religious or cultural practices that make a person “good,”
with reference to a telos, such as paradise. For this reason, “transcendent inaction” is
often characterized, perhaps unfairly, as “fatalistic,” as it seems to ignore potential thisworldly action, in the political realm for example, because it is focused on a preordained
future. Transcendent inaction is present in tenth grade literature teacher Jamila’s
presentation of the novel Till We Have Faces, as described in Chapter 5. She interprets
the protagonist’s demand to have an answer from the gods as arrogant and blasphemous.
In this context, she leads her students in a discussion about why humans should not “try
to know their future,” which is to demand an answer from God. Instead, humans are
instructed to live upstanding moral lives in the present, without attempting to interfere
with “fate.”
Of course, “ethical positions” are heuristic devices I use to think about how
people conceptualize the world and their place in it. Ethical positioning is about how
people position their own roles and responsibilities in relation to family, community,
nation, or state. In my analysis, I have tried to be careful to not to place interlocutors
squarely into any of these types of “positions.” First, people rarely, if ever, participate in
only one type of ethical behavior, such as religion, although they may aspire to do so.
Second, I have tried to center interlocutors’ interpretations of their ethical lives as they
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articulated them to me. This stylistic and analytical decision, while I believe it more
accurately renders the people I met in all their complexity, does return us to a long
standing concern in anthropology: To take care not mistake “obligations,” or “oughts,” or
“the good.” I referenced this debate in my discussion of ethics in Chapter 2.
Like “the good,” concepts of “hope” present a similar problem for
anthropologists. Cheryl Mattingly and Uffe Juul Jensen (2015) write that,
Hope has long been regarded with great suspicion in social theory. And perhaps
nowhere has the skepticism been more clearly directed than to people’s
moralities, their beliefs about the good and the right, about individual
responsibility and the cultivation of a self. Actors may have their hopes and
dreams but these are not to be taken at face value (41).
By now, it should be clear that ethical positions may operate according to different
conceptions of time and have different ways of reconciling pasts, presents, and futures. In
Anthropology and Philosophy: Dialogues on Trust and Hope, the editors reflect on the
temporalities of hope,
Trusting and hoping alike are conjectural modes of understanding. They relate to
the practical identity of human beings as persons. Who can I trust? What may I
hope? Although both trust and hope are related to factual understandings of past
experiences, they equally imply a move toward the future that depends on the
imaginary anticipation of the imminent. They concern future states that exceed the
immediate control of the person trusting or hoping. But whereas trust typically
concerns near and probably futures that mostly meet our expectations, hope may
very well paint a scenario of a possible and radically different future (Liisberg,
Pedersen, and Dalsgård 2015:1).
Ethical positioning is impacted, of course, by emplacement in space and time. In Iraq,
cyclical violence, corruption, and foreign interventions have, no doubt limited the kinds
of ethical positions people can take. At the same time, however, the potential advantages
of relative political and economic stability, and interest in creating a more “tolerant” and
equitable society and state, have amplified and intensified ethical mobility. Some people,
positioned by wealth and status, were more mobile, and perhaps more anxious, than
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others. For some interlocutors, the ability to move between different kinds of spaces with
different sets of values increased the feeling of being pulled and pushed in different
directions. I concede that these conditions may not constitute “value pluralism” in the
strictest sense of the concept, as offering “an account of the actual structure of the moral
universe” (Galston 2002:30). Rather, the contests of values I observed were more like the
moral pluralism of Isaiah Berlin. Galston writes of Berlin, “He depicts a world in which
fundamental values are plural, conflicting, incommensurable in theory, and
uncombineable in practice – a world in which there is no single, univocal summum
bonum that can be defined philosophically, much less politically” (ibid.).
Of course, conflicting values in the form of religious difference have long
coexisted in Kurdistan, regulated by empire or by state and not without violence.
However, ethnic and religious identity categories have effectively bounded sets of values,
committing people to adherence, or at least the appearance of adherence, to those values
and attendant practices ascribed to their community, and only their community. In the
modern state, bounded identity categories have limited many forms of action or
belonging, including religious (de)conversion, intermarriage, inheritance, and citizenship.
What made contests of values in Kurdistan relevant to many of my interlocutors was not
just that values are multiple, conflicting, and incommensurable, but that they also were
available and possible for some people to adopt, but not others. Moving between ethical
positions presented and multiplied choices and obligations, which seemed to me to be a
source of anxiety for many of my interlocutors. How effectively people moved between
or took different ethical positions, and how effectively they realized the values attending
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those positions, has enormous consequences for generating hope. About conceptualizing
“hope,” Mattingly and Jensen write,
We will speak of hope not as simple optimism or faith in some ‘happy ending,’
but as something darker and morally demanding. Paradoxically, hope is on
intimate terms with despair. It asks for more than life promises. It is poised for
disappointment.” “For these families, hope emerges as a strenuous moral
project...Thus, cultivating a hopeful stance intimately involves an ongoing
conversation with embittered despair. To hope is to be reminded of what is not,
and what might never be. (2015:38-39).
Hope is made possible, or impossible, by governance, tolerance, and access to resources.
Value pluralism, and contexts that approximate it, offer the possibility of an
“otherwise” in contemporary Kurdistan. The ability to rank-order values in new ways has
been made more possible by a unique set of conditions in Kurdistan: On the one hand,
there are stabilizing conditions of “modernity,” “modernization” discourse, and
nationalism, such as the conceptualization of historical-linear time and the
recontextualization of women in “revolutionary time” and “reproductive time,” and
children as the “eternal future” (Pursley 2019). On the other hand, there are the
destabilizing conditions of foreign interventions, the spread of global capitalism and
neoliberalism, cycles of violence, and the perceived “failures” of the Iraqi and Kurdistani
states. The convergence of these conditions has had tremendous effects on ethical life, on
how people conceptualize time and space in the nation and in the state, their relation to
“modernity,” and their resulting moral obligations. The chief of these obligations for
many people, it seems, is the moral obligation to hope, which Mattingly and Jensen argue
is bound up with “views of what it means to live a good life, to be a good person”
(2015:39).
Based on one’s ethical positioning, moral obligations and the ability to cultivate
hope vary. Immanent action encourages moral striving in the present that is agnostic
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about the “future” and not predicated on any telos. Immanent inaction’s “displaced” or
“lost” national or state futures makes the cultivation of hope difficult. Both transcendent
action and transcendent inaction direct people toward a telos, although one’s moral
obligations regarding the future vary according to conceptions of “providence” or “fate.”
One sense of “fate” was the “judgment day” some of my interlocutors occasionally
evoked. Perhaps because my field work occurred during the conflict with the Islamic
State, apocalypse and judgment seemed experientially nearer. Mariam, the civics teacher,
used the concept as a way of critiquing bad governance and of creating a sense of
urgency to persuade her students and their generation to take action, either to prevent or
to forestall the coming “judgment.” Mariam said,
Since 1991, when I was 7 or 8 years old, I kept hearing about the “judgment day.”
People were saying what was happening was the judgment day. This is always the
case when something bad is happening. For example, the Armenians after World
War I said that it was the judgment. One day it will be judgment day for you. You
don’t know and I don’t know when. So, I just live my life and try to know what is
going on.
She admonished her students to keep up with news reporting, especially about the rest of
Iraq, despite many students’ claims that Iraq was “not their country.” In the day of
judgment, however, they would be held accountable for their moral choices, for what
they did, or did not do, for their families, communities, and country. No one knew when
that day would arrive, so everyone should “try to know what is going on” and to do their
best. In her lessons on the Iraqi Constitution and the contemporary political situation,
Mariam often spoke of the uncertainties and urgencies of time:
This is the difference between people who learned from the past and those who
did not. If we go back to ancient times, we were more developed then than now.
Imagine it: We are blessed in this country because we are part of this land, but we
are cursed, too. For example, I am 33 years old. My mom keeps worrying about
me, about my grandchildren. If we stay here there will be no future, she says.
Shall we go or shall we stay? Shall we act or shall we be like a people just
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watching, waiting? But we have this faith in each one of us. It will make us have
hope.
Yakub [sneering]: Inshallah (God-willing)…
Mariam [seriously]: Yes. [with emphasis] Inshallah.
---

In this dissertation, I have endeavored to describe a view of ethical life in
Kurdistan in a way that does not reduce it to “grand schemes” (Schielke 2010b) like
religion, or nationalism, modernization, or secularization. These “grand schemes” appear
throughout my dissertation and haunt my analysis whenever my interlocutors evoked
them, often presented as binaries, in their critiques of society and state. Although people
challenged conceptualizations of the “sectarian,” the “modern,” the “nation,” and the
“state,” their interpretations nevertheless tended to reproduce elements of the same
problematic discourses. By relying heavily on ethnography, such as extended vignettes,
transcripts of conversations, and lengthy quotes, I hope I have preserved many of the
complexities, the contradictions, the uncertainties, the failures, and the triumphs of
people who respond to a “moral obligation to hope” in the face of extraordinary
circumstances. My use of the heuristics “ethical positions” or “ethical positioning” has
not been to type people or to reduce expressions of moral life to neat categories, but
rather to provide the reader with some points of reference that are present in
interlocutors’ ethical lives as they narrated their lives to me and as I observed them.
I especially have attended to ethical life with a focus on Kurdistani young people,
whom I have grouped into two cohorts: teenagers and young adults. Children and youth
(0-24 years) comprise nearly half the population of the Middle East North Africa Region
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(“MENA Generation 2030” 2019). In Iraq, almost half the population is under 19 years
old, and about one third is between 15 and 29 years old (World Bank 2020). The
anthropology of children and youth studies in the MENA region is a relatively new and
growing subfield and one that offers many unexplored areas for research. For example, in
spending time with a variety of young people, including “emerging” adults, my research
sites expanded beyond the familiar domains of nationalism like schools, and considered
spaces in which youth have formed communities of ethical practice such as bodybuilding,
various forms of fitness and sports, and humanitarian work.
Moral and nationalist discourses, in portraying youth as the “future of the nation”
also unduly burden young people, who by virtue of their youth, lack social and political
agency and have limited resources for exercising the little agency they do have. The
enormous youth presence at recent protests across Iraq is not just a sign of their lack of
jobs or political frustrations; it is an exercise of their agency to fullest by putting all they
have on the line – their lives. I hope that, by attending to how young people narrate their
experiences, they can be appreciated as moral agents now and not as becoming or future
agents. They are moral agents acting in the present and represented in the ethnographic
present in this dissertation. They offer so much more than merely signifying a yet
unrealized and uncertain future. I hope they know that their thoughts, opinions, questions,
actions, disappointments, and hopes all matter to me, and to many people appearing in
this dissertation, not just because they are “the future.” We care for them and want the
best for them, and in caring, we may generate some hope for the future. Listening to the
narratives of people in search of not just “liveable lives,” but in search of “the good,” is
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crucial for cultivating hope. Generating hope is crucial, not only for our interlocutors, but
also for our discipline of anthropology, with its own troubled past and uncertain futures.
We may find, as Ashur said, “bits of hope that nobody thought of.”
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